Presidential Primaries: A Perspective on an American Electoral Left

The final installment in this three part series makes the case that the presidential primaries are/should be/could be a national political discussion – happening only every four years, at best – that a permanent American electoral left should participate in eagerly. The  first article in this series, “An Obama Primary Challenge?” argued the importance of challenging the President from his left.  The second, “Know Thy Rules: The Effectiveness of a Third Party Challenge” addressed the ways in which the structure of the American political system hampers the “third party” route taken in numerous other nations.

Part III

Why is it so hard to understand the need for a primary challenge to Barack Obama?  When Jesse Jackson ran in the 1988 presidential primaries, pretty much everybody understood the point.  No, he wasn’t going to get elected president – or even win the nomination, but the reasons for a primary campaign don’t end there.  What Jackson would do was say what needed to be said.  He would get ideas shared by a lot of people onto the front page for the first time in a long time, maybe ever.  He would point out the nation’s shortcomings on the domestic front as well as our excesses on our many foreign fronts.  People would talk to each other about them; some would organize.  Other candidates might even have to address some of this for once.  As he used to put it, he would “keep hope alive.”

The Obama “Hope” posters notwithstanding, it seems obvious that Jackson’s “hope” is very much in need of life support these days.  Even those convinced that the President has fought the good fight, that in his heart he remains a man of peace, and that our problems are all due to Republicans and Blue Dog Democrats, must certainly recognize the still growing gap between rich and poor, as well as the fact that we currently bomb more countries than in the Bush years.  Whatever else may be the case, by now it seems clear that just being the change we wish to see doesn’t cut it as political strategy.  We need government committed to making the change we wish to see.  And for that to happen, at the least, we need someone spelling out the nature of that  change – on the national level, much as Jesse Jackson once did.

The surface arguments against challenging Obama are the fears that it would somehow weaken him and might alienate Black America, the group that formed the base of Jackson’s campaign.  The reluctance to promote an alternative vision seems to run even deeper, though, for the fact is that the Jackson candidacy was an anomaly.  A look back at the last two presidential campaigns – when there was no Democratic incumbent – may provide a more typical example of the American Left’s unwillingness to support candidates aspiring to promote its ideas.

When the Republicans lost control of Congress in 2006, the most widely cited cause was the Bush Administration’s war in Iraq.  So when the Democratic takeover produced virtually no impact on that war, it seemed inevitable that Iraq become the defining issue of the 2008 presidential race.  And yet primary voters did not back the serious antiwar candidates who were available, with the result that by Super Tuesday, the only remaining Democratic presidential aspirant pledged to complete troop withdrawal was Mike Gravel, the former Alaska Senator and prominent Vietnam War opponent, whose exceedingly modest campaign never netted so much as a half of one percent of the vote in any primary or caucus.Before the race was over, Gravel would actually bolt the Democratic Party entirely and join the Libertarians.

Meanwhile, the small “l” libertarian Republican Texas Congressman Ron Paul mounted the most unlikely, and most successful antiwar candidacy of the entire presidential season, although by Super Tuesday it too had become quite marginal.  The later stages of the race were then dominated by Democrats Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama – who were not committed to removing all American troops from Iraq during the four-year term that they sought – and Republican John McCain – who did not appear committed to removing them during the twenty-first century.  If anti-Iraq War sentiment had once been a defining electoral force, it was not any longer.  And along with the antiwar movement went any notion that a significant electoral left existed in America in 2008.  We might say it committed suicide.

Some thought any sense of urgency about the Iraq War left the Democratic race with the departure of John Edwards.  As a U.S. Senator, Edwards had voted to authorize the war, just as Clinton had; and also voted to fund it, as both Clinton and Obama had.  As a presidential candidate, however, he had tried to carve out some kind of acceptable antiwar campaign position, that is to say, to the left of the other well funded candidates, but not too far to their left.  Media critic Norman Solomon’s generous interpretation was that Edwards’ position on the war was “evolving,” once calling him “the most improved presidential candidate of 2007.”  And, in fact, by the time Edwards withdrew, he was calling for the removal of all combat troops within a year.  In many respects he was the 2008 version of Howard Dean, the former Vermont Governor deemed the “electable” antiwar candidate four years earlier.  Neither proved either as antiwar or as electable as most supporters wished, however.

The antiwar candidate from whom many Dean and Edwards backers averted their vision was Ohio Congressman Dennis Kucinich. In 2004, his supporters used to say that Kucinich actually was the candidate many people thought Dean to be.  Both had opposed the Iraq War at the start, but where Kucinich continued to call for complete U.S. troop withdrawal in ninety days, Dean grew vague on the question.  Similarly, up until the day he withdrew from the 2008 race, Edwards still envisioned 5,000 troops guarding the U.S. Embassy in Iraq at the end of his projected first White House term, a possibility that only made sense in the context of an ongoing military occupation.

Edwards’ candidacy met pretty much the same fate as Dean’s: premised upon their supposed electability, both quickly melted away once that premise proved chimerical – unlike the issues-based Kucinich campaign which chugged on through the entire 2004 primary season.  In 2008, however, Kucinich found himself shut out of network television debates before the first votes were even cast in the Iowa caucuses.  (The networks were likely only too happy to do this, of course, but were able to justify his exclusion with polls showing antiwar voters not supporting antiwar candidates.)  2008 proved less a reprise of his prior campaign than of the 1992 effort of Larry Agran, the once and future mayor of Irvine, California, who ran on a platform similar to the then-recent Jesse Jackson candidacies, but was deemed too obscure to participate in the presidential debates.

Kucinich’s withdrawal from the race ended what slim chance remained for any presidential primary discussion, not only of immediate withdrawal from Iraq, but of a Canadian-style single payer health care plan, a serious critique of free trade policies, and a range of other issues.  Gravel remained, true, but while his positions (quite close to Kucinich’s, with the exception of a flat tax plan) were quite serious, his fundraising was not.  Where the less than $4 million Kucinich had raised by the end of 2007 was quite insubstantial compared to Clinton’s $115 million and Obama’s $102 million, it was nonetheless an order of magnitude larger than Gravel’s $379,795.  Raising less than Jim Gilmore (you’ll have to look that one up) had in pursuit of the Republican nomination, Gravel’s campaign was quite simply unknown to the overwhelming majority of the electorate.

Much of Kucinich’s 2008 difficulty undoubtedly stemmed from the fact that while his wire-to-wire 2004 campaign had arguably been the most significant left wing Democratic presidential candidacy since Jesse Jackson’s 1988 run, that wasn’t saying all that much.  Kucinich had netted but 67 delegates compared to the nearly 400 Jackson won in his first try in 1984.  So where Jackson’s supporters felt they had something to build on and went on to win over 1,200 delegates the second time out, many of Kucinich’s no doubt began looking elsewhere after the first race.
The disparagement Kucinich’s candidacy encountered from the right and center was only to be expected – and no doubt would have been far more vociferous had they thought there was any need to take him more seriously.

The criticism from the left probably deserves greater scrutiny, though.  A widely cited article on the Edwards campaign by Bill Fletcher, Executive Editor of The Black Commentator, argued that both Edwards and Kucinich “fell prey to the historic ‘white populist error.’ What is this error, you ask?” he wrote, “Simply put, it is the idea that unity will magically appear by building a campaign that attacks poverty and corporate abuse, supports unions and focuses on the challenges facing the working class, BUT IGNORES RACE AND GENDER.” (Capitals in original).  Given that Kucinich actually supported reparations for slavery, this seems less a seriously considered critique than a rote add-on to an article about Edwards, particularly in light of Fletcher’s later role as a leader of “Progressives for Obama,” despite obvious Obama’s failure to live up to the standards Fletcher previously enunciated. (Fletcher currently opposes a primary challenge to Obama on the grounds that it would alienate black voters – and the argument for a black challenger to Obama is certainly worth considering.)

This was not the typical left wing critique of Kucinich, though, and one wonders whether its wide circulation might have had something to do with its offering white leftists an out from having to do anything for better candidates with lesser prospects.  Many actually seemed to feel that Kucinich was too good on the issues.  Supporters of more “mainstream” candidates routinely acknowledged that he was better on Iraq or health care than the candidate they actually backed, but felt the country somehow wasn’t ready for that.  Certainly the Pentagon and the insurance industry weren’t, anyhow.  So why even try?

It’s true that when Jackson ran not everyone immediately got the point – mainstream political commentators continually asked, “What does Jesse want?” The real question, though, was what Jackson’s voters wanted.  Why did they break with the conventional wisdom that you “threw away” your vote when you backed someone you didn’t think had much chance of becoming the eventual nominee?  For some, of course, the main reason was that he was a black candidate who brought that community’s concerns to the attention of a wider audience.  For others, though, it was his platform that included creating a Works Progress Administration-style program to rebuild America’s infrastructure; a fifteen percent Department of Defense budget cut; reparations to descendants of slaves; a single-payer system of universal health care; increased federal funding for public education; free community college for all; and reversing tax cuts for the richest Americans and earmarking the revenue for social welfare programs.  In other words, it was a platform of the left, a platform very much like that of Dennis Kucinich.

Some of Jackson’s ideas – like the Canadian-style health care system – had never received front page treatment before.  Among other things, keeping hope alive meant keeping those ideas in the political debate.  But this was not to be.  When Jackson opted against a third try in 1992, those ideas were no longer to be found in the presidential discussion, Larry Agron’s efforts notwithstanding.  Four years later, despite widespread discontent over his tack to the right, no significant Democrat challenged Bill Clinton’s re-election.  And by 2000, the presidential primaries showed no trace at all of the ideas that had motivated Jackson’s base twelve years earlier – even with no incumbent in the race.
There have now been five Democratic presidential nominating conventions since Jesse Jackson’s last run.  In those gatherings, the sum total of delegates elected to represent a candidate with a platform similar to Jackson’s is the 67 Kucinich delegates elected in 2004.  Did those ideas disappear?  Obviously not.  Some, like a single payer health care system have steadily gained support, to the point where one state, Vermont, has started on the path of implementation.  What has disappeared, however, is the American Left’s will to take itself seriously – and with it any need for the rest of the nation to do so either.

Right now, pollsters for Rasmussen Reports tell us that 70% of Democrats support immediate withdrawal from Afghanistan, a position that, as of the moment, will be represented only in the Republican Primaries (by not one, but two candidates – Ron Paul and former New Mexico Governor Gary Johnson.)  Rasmussen (whose polls are generally considered skewed to the right) also reports 39% of all voters (compared to 32% in 2009 Rasmussen poll) supporting a single-payer health care system along the lines of the bill recently re-filed by Senator Bernie Sanders.   Right now, that position would have no supporters in either set of primaries.

The Obama candidacy was supposed to be all about energizing and activating America’s youth.  Well, many of those once energized and activated are now alienated.  And what are they told today?  Be quiet.  Don’t go jeopardizing what we’ve got.  Not the wisest course, even for the Obama supporters, me thinks.

It may well be true that those who heard what Obama actually said during the 2008 campaign – as opposed to what they wanted to hear him say – don’t have all that much reason to be disillusioned with his performance.  But for a very large number of his voters it was not like that.  They thought that a community organizer would try to bring about real change.  They didn’t expect him to give the insurance industry half the loaf before the health care fight even began.  They thought he only said that he would expand the Afghanistan War and bring it to Pakistan because he had to say things like that to defuse the right.  They shouldn’t have thought these things, but they did.  Hey, if the Nobel Peace Prize Committee could fool itself, why shouldn’t the average American voter?  If anything, Obama’s backers might welcome a primary challenge as a way for him to try to restate his case and revitalize his base.  If he’s got something to say for his actions – and inactions – by all means, let him say it.  If nothing else, the man does give a good speech.

To some, a primary challenge is a diversion from what we really need to be doing – some type of “organizing” to provide a base for the change that we wish Obama really wanted to effect.  We need to become better, more active citizens – the argument goes – committed to “making” him do the right thing – as in that story about FDR once telling someone or other to “make me do it.”  Certainly we could actually benefit from more activism on all levels, but to argue that community or labor organizing can substitute for electoral activity is, well, a-political – in the real-world sense of politics.

The sad fact is that, since the Jackson campaigns, the American Left has largely opted out of the biggest political game in the land – the race for the White House, the national discussion that comes only every fourth year.  Right now, Obama faces a reelection campaign in which he will have to answer to no one to his left.  Oh, there will no doubt be some third party challenge or other, but few of even Obama’s harshest critics will want to run the risk of inadvertently facilitating a Republican take over of the White House.  One might even consider Obama guilty of an impeachable offense – the continued bombing Libya in violation of the War Powers Act – or an indictable offense (were the International Criminal Court to hold the U.S. to the same standards as militarily weaker nations) – the drone bombing campaigns in Pakistan and Yemen – and still recognize that worse is possible.   After all, we had it for the previous eight years.

But the need for careful action is not an excuse for inaction.  Do we really mean to tell every new young voter disillusioned with our never-ending state of war that the only place to go is to Ron Paul and the libertarians?  Do we mean to tell all the budding activists outraged at seeing the poor stay poor and the rich get richer, that there’s no room for that discussion in the presidential election process?

To commit to a primary race against Obama requires a vision.  A vision, first, of a 2012 nominating convention with a bloc of delegates committed to ending the corporate warfare state, and saying so.  And a vision of future conventions with blocs of delegates of the left large enough to make a difference in the policies of the eventual nominee.  All of this may seem like quite a stretch, given how lifeless the presidential nomination process has become.  It requires hope – not the passive kind where we keep our mouths shut, cross our fingers and hope that Obama will bend our way, but active hope.

Jesse Jackson was on to something.  Let’s find a candidate.  Let’s talk to people.  Let’s send some delegates to Charlotte, North Carolina next year.  Let’s make the president answer to us.  We may not be able to “make him do” the things we want, but I think we’d at least be heading in the right direction.

San Francisco Gets an Antiwar Congresswoman

The recent 226-202 House of Representatives approval of the supplemental budget was a particular disappointment to antiwar activists.  At one point they’d thought it might be possible to block the bill and its $79.9 billion Department of Defense appropriation earmarked largely for the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, – at least temporarily.   Nonetheless, San Francisco antiwar voters might take some consolation in one thing anyhow – it appears that the city now has an antiwar Congresswoman.  And no, it’s not House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, but Jackie Speier, elected just last year to represent the less liberal western part of the city and several towns on the Peninsula to the south.

Not only was Speier one of but sixty votes (fifty-one of them Democrat) against the budget in its first trip through the House, but she also made a second, tougher vote against it.  When House Republicans took umbrage at the addition of a $5 billion International Monetary Fund loan guarantee, they announced they would switch sides and vote against the bill upon its return from the Senate, raising the possibility of its defeat should the antiwar Democrat votes hold firm.

Predictably, they did not.  This time even Pelosi herself – who did not vote the first time as is common practice for a Speaker – was recorded in favor, presumably to demonstrate how much the House leadership really wanted the votes.  And yet, despite a San Francisco Chronicle report that “the White House has threatened to pull support from Democratic freshmen who vote no,” Speier did just that, one of only six freshmen – among thirty-two total Democrats – to do so.  Arguably, Speier was doing nothing but what San Francisco voters had directed her to do last November when 59 percent of them supported Proposition U which stated that the city’s Congressional representatives “should vote against any further funding for the deployment of United States Armed Forces in Iraq.”

But realistically speaking, although the ballot question’s only exception concerned “funds specifically earmarked to provide for their [American troops in Iraq] safe and orderly withdrawal” and did not exempt funding requests from Democratic Presidents, the fact that George Bush had negotiated a troop withdrawal agreement before leaving office seems to have made most House Democrats feel they have a pass to fund that war right through 2011. And certainly Pelosi has never given any indication of paying the proposition any heed despite the fact that 61 percent of her district backed it.

On the contrary, she’s made it clear that she views it as a Democratic Speaker’s duty to ensure the funding of what a Democratic President has now taken on as his wars.  Her spokesman, Brendan Daly, told the Chronicle that Pelosi was telling members “we need to do this, this is President Obama’s plan for both Iraq and Afghanistan. He’s got a plan to end the war in Iraq.  He’s got a plan to refocus our efforts in Afghanistan, and we need to support the president in that, and this is the right way to go.”

And yet when Representative Jim McGovern (D-MA) proposed adding language calling for the Secretary of Defense to “submit to Congress a report outlining the United States exit strategy for United States military forces in Afghanistan” by December 31, 2009, it was no dice.  Pelosi’s view is apparently that the President shall give us his plan in his own good time. (McGovern has since filed his amendment as a free-standing bill with 84 co-sponsors.)

Her San Francisco colleague Speier, on the other hand, said she had “serious problems with the current wars” and didn’t believe that “escalating the conflicts make America or the world safer.”  Speier’s viewpoint is particularly welcome in that it differs so markedly from that of her predecessor, the late Tom Lantos, who voted for the first House resolution for the Iraq War (which Pelosi did not.)

Moreover, in her ascent to her new position, Speier had betrayed no particular maverick tendencies.  She gained it not through any kind of insurgent antiwar campaign but more of a vetting process of the area’s political establishment.  A former state legislator forced to leave office due to term limits, she had failed in a prior bid for the Democratic nomination for Lieutenant Governor. But when she announced her interest in the Lantos seat, it soon became clear that she would have the endorsements deemed to matter – and presumably the attendant campaign financing.  At this point, other potential candidates backed off and the insider consensus choice was presented to the voters for their ratification.  Speier then won 90 percent of the Democratic vote in a special primary after a campaign that seemed to involve less of telling people what she stood for than reminding them that they already knew her – and that her ultimate victory was inevitable.

So, at a point when the country’s antiwar movements are largely stalled, Bay Area antiwar voters can at least cheer the pleasant surprise of having a new Congresswoman willing to buck both the White House and the House leadership.

Afghanistan: An Inaugural Gift

So now that we have a new President, what to get him for an inauguration present? How about an antiwar movement? Specifically an anti-Afghanistan War movement. Some may consider it in poor taste to immediately set about opposing Barack Obama’s Afghan policy before it’s had a chance to “work.” But some ideas don’t deserve a chance to work, and adding an additional 30,000 American troops to the 32,000 currently in Afghanistan is one of them.

You might think it should be easy enough to develop a movement against a war that has been going on for over seven years, but for almost all this time the nation has considered the Afghanistan War with little more than averted vision. After the September 11, 2001 attacks, retaliatory US military action was widely viewed as inevitable. The only question was what the target would be. If a country is bombed by military aircraft, you look for their country of origin; if it is attacked by highjacked airliners, things are not so simple. But when Afghanistan was chosen, the prospect of the demise of its Taliban government alleviated at least some of the misgivings of those who considered invading an entire country an inappropriate response to the actions of nineteen hijackers. Already notorious in the west for blowing up its giant ancient Buddha statues, its treatment of women was so primitive that George Bush could be viewed as a feminist crusader for launching an attack against it.

However, before there was much time to actually consider what was going on in Afghanistan, came the buildup to Iraq invasion the following year. Ever since then, Afghanistan has largely been lost in the glare. This has been an extraordinary lapse of attention, even for a country that seems to have come to accept military conflict as the norm. However, even Afghanistan War’s early opponents resigned themselves to devoting their complete energies to opposing the larger and more outrageous Iraq War with the hope for a day when they could return to actively organizing against what had now become America’s second war.

That day has probably arrived, not with the hoped for clarity of an actual end of the Iraq War, but with the vaguer prospect of an end coming in the next couple of years. But of course, the people who plan these wars don’t exactly keep the convenience of potential antiwar movements in mind, and a murky set of circumstances is what we’ve now got.

Whether antiwar interests like it or not, between the perception of Obama as an antiwar candidate (whether deserved or not) and the Iraqi troop withdrawal agreement negotiated by the outgoing administration, the public is likely to give President Obama a pass on Iraq for at least the next year. Therefore, even though Afghanistan may still not feel like the correct priority for American antiwar interests, circumstances seem to dictate that it may become just that. For one thing, the leeway the new President will enjoy regarding Iraq will not extend to the Afghanistan War, which he has embraced as a “good war,” unlike that “dumb” one in Iraq. In fact, with the talk of the surge, there even seems to be a reasonable chance that Afghanistan will one day be remembered more as Obama’s war than as Bush’s.

There are some Obama supporters whom I have talked with recently who do not think that he really meant much, if anything, of what he said about Afghanistan during the campaign.  Rather, it was the sort of thing that he felt that he had to say in order to get elected. This theory assumes that you can’t seriously aspire to the White House without supporting at least one military action. However it seems least equally plausible that his stance reflects a genuine belief that the Democrats will be able to get the Afghanistan War “right” by being smarter about it, much as “the best and the brightest” of the Kennedy Administration once figured that they could fix Eisenhower’s Vietnam problem for us.

Building broad support for getting out of Afghanistan will likely not be easy in the short run. The upcoming escalation will probably produce some military successes that will foster illusions about finally “turning a corner” there. There will likely be lots of tough talk about eliminating the Afghan opium trade, closing the border with Pakistan, and perhaps even extending the war to that country (something that candidate Obama indirectly advocated during the primary season). The new Administration will inevitably benefit from the perception of bringing new vision to the conflict, even if it has done no such thing. However, if and when this war moves from the periphery and the nation begins to focus more attentively, opposition will inevitably deepen.

In order for such opposition to mount, the first uncomfortable fact that America needs to confront is that the Karzai government that the US and NATO forces are committed to defending would not exist without the foreign invasion. Its legitimacy is based on the force of arms–foreign arms. Unpleasant as the prospect of another Taliban government may be, can we assume that it is a less legitimate option from an Afghani point of view? In addition, the other portion of Washington’s rationale, that we have engaged in seven years of war in the unsuccessful pursuit of one man, Osama bin Laden, becomes somewhat pale in the light of the fact that the US rejected out of hand the Taliban’s offer to turn him over to another Muslim country for trial if he were found.

Even more urgently, Americans will need to wake up to the fact that a “war on terror” is a slogan – like a “war on crime,” not a military operation like the invasion of Normandy. The American public is capable enough of sympathizing with the suffering peoples of the world, the population of Darfur for instance. However, unfortunately that empathetic capability often vanishes when the cause of the suffering is the US itself. Can we Americans really imagine ourselves accepting a situation like that of Afghanistan today where a foreign power (namely us) will bomb the occasional wedding, say, “Oops, our bad,” and continue right along because mistakes happen in even in the best intentioned of wars? The day our country actually comes to grips with what it means to be on the receiving end of our misconceived “war on terror” will be the day its support crumbles.

Hopefully the friends of Obama who think his heart really isn’t in the escalation of the fight in Afghanistan will realize that they can do him no greater favor than helping to deliver a groundswell of opposition to being there. After all, friends don’t let friends fight dumb wars. And if they’re right, if he’s really serious about wanting to “forge a hard-earned peace in Afghanistan” as he said in his inaugural address, even he will ultimately thank us.

It may take a while to catch on, we should start practicing the words now: “Afghanistan–out now!”

Robert Gates: Beyond Politics

Hacking off the people that got you elected is a dubious way of beginning a presidency. Why on earth then would President-elect Obama draw the ire of some Democrats by keeping Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, a Bush appointee, in his cabinet?

“Change” has been the mantra of the Obama machine’s public face from day one. It catapulted him from an obscure, yet “articulate and bright and clean” (thanks, Joe) junior U.S. Senator from Illinois to the next President of the United States. As such, the Obama campaign promised a transparent administration that would redress the excesses of power wielded by the unitary executive under Bush’s wicked little coven. We would see an end to the war in Iraq and a realignment of our foreign policy that would lead to open communications with those nations deemed unworthy by the Bush cadre. Good God, don’t let any of THOSE guys stick around for his new “change” administration.

The thing is, Secretary Gates isn’t really one of those guys.

In fact, Robert Gates has served seven presidents, both Republican and Democrat, during his years with the intelligence community. He is notable for being the only director of the CIA to rise in ranks from an entry-level position to director (DCI). He wasn’t born with the proverbial silver spoon in his mouth and earned his directorship in 1991 the hard way. In fact, he was up for the job in 1987, but shadows of doubt about his role in the Iran-Contra affair took their toll on his nomination. There were intimations that he may have been complicit in suppressing irregularities that should have been reported to Congress during the affair. However, Gates, unlike many, was completely cleared of any wrongdoing. In fact, during those confirmation hearings, he gained a measure of introspection that the current administration lacks, as noted in his memoirs:

I would go over those points in my mind a thousand times in the months and years to come, but the criticisms still hit home. A thousand times I would go over the ‘might-have-beens’ if I had raised more hell than I did with Casey [former director of the CIA William]  about non-notification of Congress, if I had demanded that the NSC get out of covert action, if I had insisted that CIA not play by NSC rules, if I had been more aggressive with the DO in my first months as DDCI, if I had gone to the Attorney General.

Gates’ political alignment is a little vague, but he most certainly leans conservative. Some sources cite him as an Independent, while others quote him as saying “I consider myself a Republican.” However, his foreign policy ideals were shaped by those conservatives who did not necessarily hold with the current administration’s neoconservative “either you are with us or you are with the terrorists” absolutist philosophy. Rather, Gates could be better identified with the more rational “realists” of the first Bush administration. In fact, during his service as deputy national security adviser during the Bush 41 administration, Gates worked closely with then director Brent Scowcroft, some even referring to Gates as his protégé . Scowcroft has been vilified by the neocons for his vocal opposition to the war in Iraq, and his influence on Gates should not be underestimated.

Gates’ work with the Iraq Study Group before his nomination to Secretary of Defense should also be considered closely. This group consisted of a bipartisan team of heavy hitters, including former Secretary of State James Baker, former representative Lee Hamilton, and retired Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor. The group’s recommendations, published in 2006, significantly differed from the course of action taken by the Bush administration. They favored a substantial shift in responsibility for Iraq’s security from U.S. to Iraqi forces and opined that “by the first quarter of 2008…all combat brigades not necessary for force protection could be out of Iraq.” Instead, we got the surge. The surge, arguably, was effective, but Gates’ presumable role in advising the group in matters of intelligence steered them towards their conclusions that a troop reduction was the wiser course. It is a testament to Gates’ integrity that he listened to his better judgment rather than the rantings of the hawks. Gates maintained a rational voice and was the farthest thing from a sycophant to the neoconservative prevailing interests of the administration.

Gates’ reliance upon his own well-founded deductive ability over hard line party rhetoric became even more evident during his confirmation hearings for Secretary of Defense. When asked to describe his motivations for accepting the nomination to the position, Gates stated that he believed “very deeply that one of the fundamental factors in our success in the Cold War was our ability to have a broad, bipartisan agreement on the fundamental strategy on how to deal with the Soviet Union” and that “it is imperative, in this long war on terrorism that we face that could go on for a generation, that there be a bipartisan agreement.” That philosophy of bipartisanship stands in stark contrast to the Bush administration’s politically unilateral attitude.

Even more revealing is his thoughtful, realistic understanding of relations with Iran and Syria. When asked by Sen. Byrd, D-West Virginia, if “an attack on either Iran or Syria would worsen the violence in Iraq and lead to greater American casualties,” Gates paused gravely, and replied, “Yes, sir, I think that’s very likely.”

What one gathers from studying Secretary Gates is that his actions are guided by his assimilation of experience and an exceptional understanding of the geopolitical world around him. He is no slave to demagoguery, and has a history with the more levelheaded elders of his party. His agenda seems one of a true civil servant as opposed to a political ladder-climber. He has used his ascendancy to power to effect cautious, intelligent policies that are much more self-guided than adherence to any particular political dogma. President-elect Obama seems to value these characteristics as virtue enough to override divisive political considerations and has entrusted the defense of the nation to such a man of intelligence, independence, and integrity.