The Georgian-Russian Conflict: NATO Goes Global

This is the second of a two-part series dealing with the core issues underlying the Georgian-Russian War of 2008, most notably that ethnic Russian populations abandoned beyond the borders of the old of the Soviet Union.

Part 1, entitled “More than Barbed Wire,” dealt with the history leading up to the collapse, the impact of lost borders, and the isolation of Russian enclaves outside Moscow’s control. This part, entitled “NATO Goes Global ,” deals with Russification under Stalin, the current status quo of the “frozen conflict zones,” and the role of NATO (under the Bush administration) in contributing to the Georgian-Russian conflict.

The Russians are Coming…no Staying

So where did these Russians come from? A great part of Stalin’s consolidation of the USSR was based on guaranteeing the internal security of a nation with far flung borders and a great many hostile guests, most notably in Eastern Europe. It was not simply a matter to be resolved by the military and intelligence agencies alone. Subversion could easily permeate all sectors of the infrastructure – communication, industry, transport, commodities – no part having immunity from an orchestrated assault from within. The solution was to remove the upper echelon of management in these areas and replace them with Russians. This included the intelligentsia, the sort of social network that commingled within that stratum of business, society, and educational elites. They were labeled ‘enemies of the people’ (“people” being the working class) and as such deemed guilty of “informal opposition to the government,” defined as participating in little more than critical conversation about the limitations of the communist system. Most were sentenced to internal exile in the far reaches of Siberia or to the oil fields of Kazakhstan as laborers. Others entered the Gulag never to be seen again. These purges or population transfers were conducted throughout the USSR and Eastern Europe, resulting in a nearly 60% death toll among the deportees. In other cases, like the Tatar population of the Crimean peninsula (this was probably their fourth or fifth eviction over history), the transfers were purely a matter of ethnic cleansing aimed at removing a recalcitrant population from a sensitive area—that being the headquarters of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet. Combined, these actions amounted to the further russification of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics – emphasis on “Union.”

So home is indeed where your hat is hanging, at least in the case of the Russian technocrats now in charge of the Soviet realm. What happened next is what always happens in forty years of living. Children are born, parents grow old, people are buried, and social networks ossify on the new land. In one sense, it mirrors the colonizing experience of other European ex-patriots, but with a different twist: The Soviet Union was not driven out of these territories, but also collapsed abruptly from the perimeter. In the chaos that followed, it quickly became apparent that these Russians not only didn’t want to go home (i.e., they were home), but under the circumstances weren’t really welcome in Russia anyway. The economic realities of the new Russia could ill afford the infusion of upwards of 20 million refugees.

Twenty years after the demise of the USSR, Eurasia is left with the four entities: South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karadakh and Transnistria – termed “frozen conflict zones” in the vernacular of diplomatic exchange. Following the founding of the CIS in 1991, the group went on to establish the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) mirroring both the precepts of NATO combined with economic notions ingrained in the principles of the European Union (EU). Little coalescence has been achieved by this collective since its inception, and two of the chief antagonists in the current dilemma, Georgia and Ukraine, have either failed to ratify the CSTO Treaty or actively withdrawn from it. Russia has flip-flopped, calling it of little use in 2007 while seeking CSTO recognition for South Ossetia and Abkhazia in ’08, no doubt in an attempt to force a lopsided vote on the issue. And to the north, the Republic of Moldova refuses to recognize Transnistria, also known as the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic. Not much can be asserted by the current Moldovan government since the zone is still home to a Russian army, there on the pretext of guarding two warehouses of obsolete ammunition. Russia’s sharp rebuke to the Saakashvili government in Georgia is more than ample evidence to Moldova that Moscow will not tolerate aggressive actions against Russian nationals in any of these conflict zones.

NATO Goes Global

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was a key element in the Cold War strategy of isolating and then encircling the Soviet Union. Its success has long been a subject of debate in the US and Europe. In some regards, it was a dangerous though necessary alliance because all assumptions pointed to a third confrontation on European soil, one with the potential to become global. By all accounts, the treaty was a mutual defense pact because an attack on West Germany constituted an attack on the United States. This was seen as a sensible response to the Soviet Union’s vast superiority in conventional forces stationed in Eastern Europe. No one cared to test the strength of this treaty in real time, for as the relationship between the US and USSR matured, and the evidence suggested that no winner would emerge from the contest.

NATO today is a relic of those forty years of distrust. It holds little value in defensive strategy outside of Western Europe, other than as a deflective tool in support of basically unilateral actions by the United States – as in Afghanistan or Iraq. Membership should seem somewhat ludicrous to the leadership of countries such as Georgia and Ukraine – except for one minor detail: The mere twenty years since the demise of the USSR. Former satellites of the Soviet Union have little trust in the “new” Russia, the once and still dominant power on the two continents. Russia however, has issues of its own and these issues demand both recognition and a degree of respect. Russia in its current geographic form has not existed in almost one hundred years. Considering its history and insular attitude, it should be noted as rather remarkable the degree of flexibility the nation has exhibited in that same twenty years. Too often the collapse of the Union is linked as a personal defeat of the Russian nation and its people. Hardly the case. The system changed, but not the sense of pride the people feel about their homeland. These former nations and SSRs simply cannot seek their own security at the expense of Russia’s. They need to broker a position based on what is real, not on the couched assurances heard at an embassy cocktail party.

NATO needs to back away and invest some of its energy on an introspective analysis on its purpose and objectives for the 21st century. It may discover that it has none. Selling its wares to Russia’s neighbors, whose own issues have little to do with European security, is both disrespectful and dishonest to all parties. The Georgian-Russian War of 2008 is a prime example of Russia’s restraint and perhaps more importantly its maturity. It mirrors the approach that it has taken on other issues concerning these “frozen conflict zones.” The Russian response was measured, to the point and designed to discourage any further provocation. Georgia is a little bent, but not broken. Perhaps it is also wiser for the experience. Membership in any strategic alliance demands common sense and discretion above all else. While the Bush administration saw fit to dangle the NATO carrot under Georgia’s receptive nose, it should have stopped for a moment and considered Russia’s reaction. Exporting democracy as an alternative to repressive regimes is one thing, but giving them the keys for a military option is quite another. Washington can assist in resolving the matter of these “unrecognized states,” but it will be Moscow’s signature on any substantive agreement. It may surprise some, but Vladimir Putin has read the Monroe Doctrine and the Roosevelt Corollary. Maybe we should read it again, with a renewed sense that regional issues need to be resolved by regional players.