Our Foreign Policy Minsky Moment

If there can be any kind of silver lining to our ongoing “Great Recession” it might be that it has elevated the level of economic discussion, at least slightly. For instance, when’s the last time you heard anyone talking about the “magic of the marketplace?”  On the contrary, a fair number of writers and economists seem to have experienced recovered memories of things the country once used to know – like that a capitalist economy is cyclical and inherently prone to crises such as the current one.  In this, the ninth year of our Afghanistan War, the discussion of our foreign policy cries out for similar flashes of enlightenment.

The most interesting economic concept to emerge from recent obscurity is the “Minsky Moment,” Hyman Minsky having been an economist who described a type of social amnesia that occurs as people will themselves into believing that business cycles are things of the past as they engage in riskier and riskier financial activity.  Admirers of Minsky, who died in 1997, named the point when the dream comes crashing down into the nightmare of the next financial crisis after him.  Minsky saw several stages to the process, as gradual societal memory loss of past depressions and recessions leads to something of a state of euphoria when we may hear arguments, such as heard only a few years ago, that transformative innovations like computerization and the Internet have created a “new economy” of permanent prosperity.

Looking at the course of American foreign policy from the Vietnam War to the current day, it is hard to miss a similar dream cycle playing out there.  After Vietnam, a new sense of modesty came over American foreign policy.  Yes, our military could unleash destruction upon southeast Asia that was in some respects unmatched in world history.  And, yes, we might be able to keep it up indefinitely – we would not be “defeated” in the conventional sense.  But the ultimate message of that war was No: No matter what our military might, we could not impose our will on a country that did not wish to have its system dictated by foreign armies from halfway around the world.

Not every one approved of this national dose of humility, of course.  The “Vietnam Syndrome” was roundly denounced in interventionist circles, as the new reticence toward foreign military intervention steered policymakers toward subversion rather than invasion.  Nicaragua can probably thank the Vietnam Syndrome for the fact that Ronald Reagan merely funded its government’s  political and military opposition rather than engaging in full scale invasion.

But slowly the memories faded and were replaced with new ones.  The first George Bush’s Gulf War did not turn into a quagmire. And Bill Clinton’s bombings of Somalia, Bosnia, Sudan, Afghanistan, and Yugoslavia sort of returned the country to its old habits. The euphoria stage surely arrived with the second George Bush when a senior adviser to the President could inform a reporter that he was merely ”in what we call the reality-based community” who ”believe that solutions emerge from your judicious study of discernible reality,” while the White House recognized that ”We’re an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality.”

We have left that stage, clearly. A statement like the above now seems as unimaginable as it did in the first decades after the Vietnam War.  Yet the turnaround is obviously far from completed; the country has not really shed the omnipotence illusion.  For, while the rationale for the Iraq War may now be widely understood as farcical, the Afghanistan War remains on the upswing.

Every war is different, to be sure, and at one point the Afghanistan and Vietnam Wars appeared to have little more in common than the fact that they were on the same continent.  After all, who could be further apart than the communist Viet Cong and the fundamentalist Taliban?  But as time has passed an overwhelming resemblance has come to the fore: Both wars are attempts to “create our own reality” in countries that have many times demonstrated that they will not allow this to happen.

Our foreign policy Minsky Moment, if there is to be one, will certainly not originate in the White House or the Pentagon, though. The White House would be too afraid of the political consequences of facing the facts and the Pentagon would be too embarrassed to do so. We will have to figure out how some other way to wake the country from its dreams.

The Dilemmas of Democracy: Responding to Tainted Elections

After following Asian elections for the past year, I have noticed an emerging pattern that we are likely to see more of in the coming years around the world. Elections in Iran,  Afghanistan, and Sri Lanka have presented the international community with a thorny dilemma.

On the one hand, these elections were held under less-than-ideal circumstances. They were marred by inexcusable corruption, violence, vote rigging, and the silencing of opposition voices in the media and on the streets.

On the other hand, they also represent a process and an outcome that the international community and those living in these countries appear to have largely accepted and agreed with. While elections were not as free and fair as most would have liked or expected, they were elections that – for all their flaws – appear to have granted victory to the candidate who the most people voted for.

Yes, Ahmendinijhad in Iran, Karzai in Afghanistan, and Rajapaksa in Sri Lanka are all pretty unsympathetic figures and definitely played dirty to win the presidency in their respective countries. Yet there seems little doubt that they all won far more votes than their challengers – even given the doubts about the legitimacy of many of those votes. Even in Iran, Ahmendinijhad’s support has been widespread and not limited to rural areas.

So, what do we make of such elections? Foreign critics and the domestic opposition have good reason, as well as the right, to complain about the flaws and undemocratic tactics used by the winners to secure power. Their concerns after elections should certainly be heeded and investigated. Winning an election should not give the victor absolute power or the right to repress and persecute critics and minorities.

Yet, in the absence of evidence that an election was clearly stolen, the elected government – however odious – should also be respected and acknowledged as the legitimate voice of the people of that country. America’s strategic interests will surely color how the US government and public see such leaders (Ahmedinijhad = bad, a threat, Karzai = corrupt but tolerable, a needed partner, Rajapaksa = who cares?), but there should always be an awareness that elections often are contested, dirty things even the most robust democracies (in the US too – Florida 2000 anyone?).

The precarious balancing of these two realities will, I suspect, become essential as more countries embrace elections without being interested or even understanding the civil and human rights that many developed countries have traditionally expected to naturally go along with democracy. While the outcome of elections in places like the US, Canada, Europe, Japan, India (along with others) are not generally called into question, elections in many parts of the developing world are not as clear cut.

As citizens and as part of the international community how will we respond to such elections? How do such elections potentially change our relations with certain countries? Will the US government recognize such elections? How should we engage with corrupt leaders with no respect for the rule of law or human rights who have also won have seemingly won elections? How do we balance the importance of the process of having a free and fair election with the actual freedoms on the ground if one does not necessarily imply the other?

To deny the legitimacy of an seemingly fair election seems condescending and ignores the voices of millions of people who may legitimately disagree with us. To accept their legitimacy seems to deny the very real flaws of such a system and the hardships faced by its challengers. Such complex and obfuscated elections in many parts of the developing world who are beginning to experiment with democracy will undoubtedly complicate US (and other countries’) foreign policy in years to come.

Upcoming elections in places like Burma, Tajikistan, the Philippines, Sudan, Iraq, Egypt, Ukraine, and another in Sri Lanka, will test how the international community responds to potentially complicated and fraudulent elections. Democracy is far from robust in many of these countries, but it is still largely democratic compared to many neighboring countries. To challenge the legitimacy of these elections may risk indirectly leading to a collapse of any hope for future votes.

Of course, each election must be evaluated and responded to on its own terms, and it is important to consider democracy an ideal to strive towards, not a simple definition that invites a conclusive yes or no answer. Democracy is not black and white – there are many shades of gray. Elections serve a purpose, but are always flawed and complicated. Get used to it.

American Foreign Policy Scripted by Dead German Writers?

A recent headline, “Snuff out militant Islam’s lethal spark – kill bin Laden,” brought to mind a friend’s story about a graduate student he’d once had. This student had felt himself seriously wronged somewhere in the academic process and appeared obsessed with vindication. My friend’s prescription was that he should read “Michael Kohlhaas,” a novella by German writer Heinrich von Kleist.  Since the student’s field was modern American history, the main concern was not the study of literature but the story’s theme – the potential self destructiveness of the drive for revenge, even if a person is actually in the right. Joel Brinkley, the author of the article with the inflamed headline, looked like he might benefit from the same medicine.  And, unfortunately, he’s far from the only one.

When the legal system fails to provide Kleist’s protagonist (based on a real life figure of 250 years earlier) with proper redress after he is wronged by a minor noble, Kohlhaas decides to take matters into his own hands. Eventually he will burn the noble’s house down and raise a private army to repeatedly attack the city of Wittenberg in his attempt to capture the man. His wife will die of injuries sustained in the pursuit of his goal and Martin Luther and the Kaiser in Vienna will become personally involved in the matter. At the very end, he does find that some measure of justice has been done. Unfortunately, that realization comes as he is being led to his beheading.

There was a point when Brinkley, a former New York Times writer now teaching journalism at Stanford, would have raised few eyebrows in writing, “Right now, the most effective thing the United States could do to turn the tide in the so-called war on terror is to capture or kill Osama bin Laden, the terrorists’ shining symbol.” But that point was eight years, two wars, ten of thousands of casualties, and a trillion dollars ago. Today, such writing conveys the obsession of a real-life Michael Kohlhaas who wants to go on and on and on in pursuit of his concept of justice. Of bin Laden he writes, “We know where he is, more or less [sic],” but “Pakistan refuses to go after him.” His solution?  “I’m not talking about an invasion. Infiltrate the region with special-operations forces.”

How many countries can there be, I wondered, where a journalist writing that sending armed personnel into another country does not constitute an invasion will not be asked to seek professional help? But at least Brinkley does recognize that the Pakistanis might see things a little differently: “Let them scream,” he writes, “Over almost a decade, we have given Pakistan every chance to do the job. Now it’s time to do it ourselves.”

What seems to bother Brinkley most is that “Today, bin Laden must wake up every morning with a smile on his face for all he has inspired.” This he may well do, but probably not quite for the reasons Brinkley thinks.  Bin Laden’s stated goal, let us remember, it to maneuver the United States into a global war against Islam that will spiral out of control. So he’d have every reason to smile if he read an article like Brinkley’s. Ultimately, it’s not columnists like Brinkley who matter, though, but the Kohlhaasian spirit that seems to drive our foreign policy.  After all, while much of the country once dismissed George W. Bush as a hopeless, misguided warmonger and embraced Barack Obama as a peace candidate, this second post-9/11 President appears at least as committed to globalizing this war as his predecessor, if perhaps in somewhat different directions.  From the point of view of tying the U.S. down in endless war, what’s not to like?

But if the strategy of that war seem like something Kleist might have imagined, the tactics bring to mind a far better remembered German writer – Franz Kafka, the rare author influential enough to have his name turned into an adjective. While there are probably as many different definitions of “Kafkaesque” as there are readers of Kafka – and maybe more – “incomprehensibly complex, bizarre, or illogical” will probably do as well as any.  But whatever your personal definition of Kafkaesque may be, American military operations in and over Pakistan will probably fit it.

The current centerpiece of that campaign appears to be a program of missile strikes aimed at “terrorist leaders” from unmanned “Predator” drone planes flying above the country. Officially, though, there is no such program and as a spokesperson for the Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff says, “We do not discuss current operations one way or the other, regardless of their nature.”

The New York Times reports the strikes are “carried out from a secret base in Pakistan and controlled by satellite link from C.I.A. headquarters in Virginia.”  The government of Pakistan regularly denounces them as a violation of its sovereignty. Unnamed U.S. officials claim there is an understanding under which the Pakistani government allows the U.S. to carry out the strikes while the U.S. allows the Pakistanis to publicly denounce the attacks. The government of Pakistan denies this.

Unnamed U.S. intelligence officials frequently name figures they claim have been killed in the strikes. A recent target was Pakistani Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud, whom, the Washington Post says, “a senior U.S. official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity” called “one of the worst people on the planet.”  As you might expect, this non-existent program is rather unpopular among the people of the country where its targets live: a Gallup Pakistan poll found it with 9 percent support among the Pakistani population.

The uncertain level of civilian casualties is a growing concern. A United Nations rights investigator complains that “the Central Intelligence Agency is running a program that is killing significant numbers of people and there is absolutely no accountability in terms of the relevant international laws.” Unnamed sources within the U.S. government privately assure reporters that civilian deaths are lower than reported. One unnamed government official told the New York Times that the drone strikes are “the purest form of self-defense.”  The C.I.A. had no comment on a report that the private security contractor formerly known as Blackwater – now Xe Services LLC – was involved in the work of actually placing the bombs on the drones.  An unnamed defense official denied it to The Nation magazine – “on background.”

In response to repeated questions about the unacknowledged drone strike campaign at a press conference in Pakistan, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton would only say that “there is a war going on.” She did not specify to which war she referred. The United States Government acknowledges being at war in Iraq and Afghanistan, but not in Pakistan. Appearing at a memorial service for seven CIA operatives killed in Afghanistan, some of whom were thought to be involved in the planning of the Pakistan drone strikes, President Barack Obama exhorted hundreds of their colleagues “to win this war.”  He also did not specify of which war he was speaking.

In regard to the acknowledged war in Afghanistan, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates recently said, “The Taliban, we recognize, are part of the political fabric of Afghanistan at this point.” He did not say at exactly which point this recognition occurred; the U.S. overthrew the Taliban government eight years ago and has been at war with the organization ever since. Gates went on to say that “The question is whether they are prepared to play a legitimate role in the political fabric of Afghanistan going forward, meaning participating in elections, meaning not assassinating local officials and killing families.” He did not say whether a simple denial of involvement in assassinations and other killings – on or off the record – would suffice in place of an actual cessation of such activities. Nor did he speak to the question as to when various Taliban officials might be removed from the United Nations “terrorist blacklist” that currently prohibits the Afghanistan government from negotiating with them.

I have to think Kleist and Kafka would have loved this material.

Secret New Weapon: Serena Sends Taliban Running for Hills

Inserting myself into one of the remotest regions of Afghanistan—and embedding myself with no one in particular except a sheep farmer named Tirkluckless—I interview him. I do this mainly because he can talk, unlike his sheep. The intelligence he provides me, however, is stunning. As a bandit in A Fistful of Dollars once stated, “In these parts, a man’s life can depend upon a mere scrap of information.”

“You seem pretty calm, Tirk,” I say. “The Taliban are howling at the door, and not a NATO soldier within 50 miles, yet you calmly tiptoe around the sheep dip without a care in the world. What’s that all about?”

“Did ye not know, oh infidel? The American drones circle above like eagles—I can certainly hear them, as they interfere with the bah-bah-ing of my sheep and therefore I cannot sleep when I’m trying to count my sheep. Anyway, there are not only drones but the CIA has also secretly inserted Serena Williams into the foothills of the Forbidden Mountains.”

“What? Serena Williams? Come on.”

“Indeed, it is true, oh unbelieving one. She has been sighted on several occasions, cursing the wolves and frightening them to death. She even outruns them and eats them for breakfast.”

“If this is true, Kirk, it’s still incredible. She makes the Special Forces look like girl scouts.”

“It’s Tirk, not Kirk. My full name is Tirkluckless. How many times must I remind you of that, oh clueless Trekkie nerd? Be careful or I shall smite you. I come from a rough neighborhood. Last week, down near the capital, I was watching a full-scale battle between NATO forces and Taliban insurgents, and a ladies’ tennis match broke out.”

“Good heavens, that is a rough neighborhood. I take it Serena was there?”

“Yes, she was. She is a one-woman Special Forces, to be sure. Already she has crushed many a Taliban with her powerful thighs and decapitated others by hurling tennis rackets with superhuman agility and accuracy. Still others she curses to death with unimaginable slurs calculated to defeat their manhood. Yes, oh beardless one, the mountain villagers sing folk songs about her. They call her the Wild Woman With Huge Haunches and Thighs That May Crush a Man into Ragged Pieces. Oh—I’m getting excited; I had better to stop now.”

“Uhm—no, please, go on. I’m sure you can control yourself.”

“She is also veddy beautiful, you know, and she’s having breasts like mangos!”

“I seem to recall that line from A Passage to India.”

“What, those Shiva-worshipping heathen?”

“Now, now, I think the Serena-lust is getting the better of you.”

“Well, there are always my sheep with which to—“

“Ahem. You were saying?”

“You must understand this is a lonely place, sahib. Indeed, before you there was ne’er a white man to be seen in these hills since the days of W.C. Fields in the 1930s. He had lost his corkscrew, you may recall, and was forced to survive on food and water.”

“Such a contingency would be unfortunate, yes.”

“The word in the hills is that Osama bin Laden watches ladies’ tennis on satellite TV and he shivers with fright as we speak. I have seen a sneak preview of a new video he will release, denouncing women in sport—and women in general, of course. He promises to hack off the arms of any female who dares to bare her arms, let alone use them to hurl tennis rackets at him.”

“How do you feel about this?”

“Well, he’s not all hell and brimstone, actually. He has a heart. He says the point is negotiable and that if the USA will call off Serena, he will settle for a ladies’ tennis referee position at the US Open.”

“He really is scared.”

“He said the officiating call was in error; there was no foot fault and therefore as punishment the referee’s tongue must be removed and Serena’s fine must be canceled.”

“A man of mercy, I see.”

“Praised be to the heavens, Serena shall return home and I shall return to my sheep in peace. If we run out of wolves and Taliban, she might develop a taste for lamb.”

Future of Afghanistan Complicated by Election Outcome

The Afghan presidential elections have ended. And I’m sure I’m not the only one to who finds the outcome thoroughly unsatisfying. After vehemently denying that his campaign had engaged in massive voting fraud, President Hamid Karzai essentially admitted to fraud, accepting the election commission’s revised vote tally. This revision dropped Karzai’s support from 54% to under 50%, triggering a runoff under the Afghan constitution. Karzai’s opponent in the runoff, Abdullah Abdullah, not in a position to actually win and fearing more fraud and violence with a second round of voting, dropped out of the contest, leaving Karzai the winner.

American officials act reasonably satisfied with these elections, though it’s hard to see why. They are now left with an Afghan partner in the escalating war against the Taliban that has run a shockingly corrupt and ineffective government, has garnered less than half the majority of votes cast in the election, and has committed large-scale fraud in a failed effort to win these elections. To sum up, Karzai has proven to be bad at governing Afghanistan, does not have the support of most of the Afghan people, and was caught trying to steal the election. While Karzai seems to have legitimately won a commanding plurality of the vote, his behavior indicates a blatant disregard for the electoral process and the rule of law that would be condemned by the US government had it occurred in a place such as Iran or Venezuela.

Though President Obama gave Karzai a scolding about improving his governance when he called to congratulate him on his victory, close US-Afghan cooperation is bound to continue. Indeed, if Obama has his way, it will increase (though he appears to be feeling less hawkish about Afghanistan than he was as candidate – perhaps because of this tainted election). And it should. The return of the Taliban poses a threat to Afghans, the region, and perhaps the world. After a decade of supporting violent religious fanatics (both Afghan and foreign) against the Soviets, and then walking away to let these extremists, drug kingpins, and warlords plunge the country into civil war, the US owes the Afghan people a serious commitment to rebuilding Afghanistan by providing security, promoting development, and nurturing a democratic government.

This means US military involvement is needed, but more importantly, it means overcoming the challenges of bringing things like water, electricity, roads, health care, education, and jobs to Afghans. Yet, hopes have been dashed that these elections would give Afghanistan a clear and legitimate democratic leader who was ready to work with the US and battle the Taliban with the support of the Afghan public. The muddied results will certainly make the work of the Afghan government, the US, NATO, and other foreign players more difficult. And the Taliban are already claiming victory, believing that their attacks stopped the second round of voting.

In the end, these elections give little hope for the immediate future of Afghanistan and the US mission there. By his own actions, Karzai has weakened his position vis-à-vis the Taliban, and the US will be hard-pressed to win Afghan hearts and minds while backing a largely discredited Afghan government and failing to follow through on efforts to improve the lives of Afghan people. US involvement is also becoming increasingly unpopular at home, and the longer US soldiers and aid workers are in Afghanistan, the more chances there are for casualties that may not be palatable to Americans who increasingly believe that there are unclear reasons to stay in Afghanistan.

The Obama administration is hopeful that Karzai will clean up his act and the UK is making threats that it can’t support a government that is so unapologetically corrupt. However, it is hard to imagine that the US or the UK – as heavily invested in Afghanistan as they are – will simply quit Afghanistan if Karzai continues running his government as is. The US certainly has some leverage over Karzai, but for now it has little choice but to put most of its eggs in one basket, hoping that he is the man best suited to improve life in Afghanistan and to fight the Taliban. Unrest seems sure to continue to plague Afghanistan, and US ability to win a counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan has been seriously compromised by this election’s outcome. How adeptly Obama’s strategy can adapt to today’s complex political situation in Afghanistan and how well US forces can work with other regional players (Pakistan, India, Russia, Iran, China) will be key to preventing Afghanistan and the entire region from becoming more dangerous and unstable than they are today.

This is the second article covering the Afghan election and the fourth in a series on major elections in Asia this year.

GOP Demands to see Nobel Committee’s Birth Certificate

When the news broke earlier that sitting American (or is it Kenyan or Indonesian?) President Barack Obama was bequeathed with the Nobel Peace Prize, I naturally assumed that the Rush Limbaugh’s head would explode and the Republican Party would be stuck with a gargantuan body instead of a party head. Moreover, I instinctively knew that the blogosphere would be buzzing with more Republican and Conservative invective than Democrat or Liberal encomium.

Am I really that prescient or do Republicans really hate Barack Obama that much that many would put breathing oxygen in abeyance in order to vituperatively criticize President Obama?

“This fully exposes the illusion that is Barack Obama,” said conservative talk show host Rush Limbaugh. Rush continued: “And with this ‘award’ the elites of the world are urging Obama, THE MAN OF PEACE, to not do the surge in Afghanistan, not (sic) take action against Iran and its nuclear program and to basically continue his intentions to emasculate the United States…. They love a weakened, neutered U.S and this is their way of promoting that concept. I think God has a great sense of humor, too.”

Oh Rush, did you run out of Oxycontin refills again? While we rational Americans have grown accustomed to the bile invective spewed daily from Mr. Limbaugh more effortlessly than potato chip crumbs, some Republicans decided that Rush Limbaugh is just too understanding and flirted with invective of their own.

Eric Erickson of the ever-so enlightening Red State.com had these encouraging words to say:

I did not realize the Nobel Peace Prize had an affirmative action quota.

Knee-jerk vitriol and racist commentary notwithstanding, the award is baffling some on the left as well.

Michael Moore, for example, offered his congratulations but boldly declared action as well.

Congratulations President Obama on the Nobel Peace Prize–Now earn it! Freedom can not be delivered from the front seat of someone else’s Humvee. You have to end our involvement in Afghanistan now. If you don’t, you’ll have no choice but to return the prize to Oslo.

Indeed, Obama may have made such lofty pronouncements such as closing Guantanamo, bringing the troops home from Iraq, wanting a nuclear weapon-free world, admitting to the Iranians that we overthrew their democratically-elected president in 1953, etc. But he has yet to follow through any of his pronouncements with concrete action and, worse yet, is risking escalating a lost cause in Afghanistan by extending our outstretched and vitiated troops in a purposeless battle.

Don’t believe me, just click here to read about the growing numbers of troops suffering from PTSD.

I realize that President Obama is looking to make up for the fact that Afghanistan and the “just war” was abandoned by the ruthless Bush Administration to pursue a petty vendetta in Iraq and make billions of dollars in no-bid contracts for their cronies. However, 6 years have passed since troops were shifted away from the Afghanistan conflict, and the situation has grown increasingly dire for our supposed mission. After all, the primary objective for going into Afghanistan was to kill and capture Osama bin Laden and his key associates, disrupt the vast Afghan terror network, and prevent Afghanistan from becoming another hotbed for terrorism.

Has blowback and the situation in Iraq taught us anything? The U.S. is  not in Afghanistan to police a nation beset by tribalism and internal conflicts. We cannot naively expect to train a miserably incompetent army at the aegis of a corrupt government,  an army that may ultimately joins the Taliban anyway.

Barack Obama winning the Noble peace prize–something that not even he expected–is certainly momentous and naturally is being lauded by the sane world. But it is imperative that we do not allow ourselves to get stuck in the warm and fuzzy clouds of this achievement as many did immediately following the election of Barack Obama. Intelligent critics must ensure that President Obama does in fact earn this prestigious prize.

Why Another Karzai Government May be Bad for Afghanistan

If you read the news (in the US anyway) it is common knowledge that what is most important in the current Afghan elections is not necessarily who wins, but that the elections be seen as legitimate and transparent by the Afghan public as well as the international community. Now, almost three weeks after election day, it is highly questionable whether the election process this time around will be, in the end, seen as legitimate by Afghans or the international community. There have been widespread allegations of voter fraud, including among supporters of sitting President Hamid Karzai. The sheer volume of complaints has pushed back the announcement of the election’s official results by at least two weeks.

With 90% of the vote counted, Karzai appears to have won 54% of the vote, with runner-up Dr. Abdullah Abdullah with 28%, and the remainder of the vote being split among 36 other presidential candidates. However, these results are not official, hundreds of thousands of votes have been thrown out, and there have been persistent allegations of massive voter fraud. It appears that there is substance to many of the allegations, raising the possibility that enough votes could be disqualified to drop Karzai’s tally to under the 50% that he needs to avoid a runoff with Abdullah. Investigations into voter fraud could last months, delaying any eventual runoff and threatening to plunge Afghanistan into more violence and perhaps a constitutional crisis as competing groups and candidates jockey for a position in whatever government eventually comes to power (or alternatively, strive to discredit and destabilize the government elect).

The reason for the strong opposition against Karzai has been his government’s extreme corruption and his political amorality in being willing to team up with unsavory former warlords like Abdul Rashid Dostum, accused of human right atrocities against Taliban captives under his control. The Afghan people also have seen Karzai largely as the candidate of the US and the international community which has generated distrust concerning the outcome of the vote, believing that his victory has been preordained without concern for Afghan opinion. If Karzai wins a majority in a flawed election process, his adminstration is sure to be dogged by accusations that it came to power illegitimately. Should he fail to win over 50%, his position would be confirmed as relatively weak while he would be subject to repeated opposition attacks (during and between election campaign) highlighting his corruption and poor administration. If Karzai were to win the runoff election, he would be returning to office with a poor record, a weak administration, and no mandate from Afghans. If on the other hand, Abdullah were to win the run off, there may be a public sense of hope for a new direction in Afghan politics, and a belief in the legitimacy of the electoral system. Nor would Abdullah have the amount of negative baggage that is holding Karzai back. While Abdullah’s backers are also likely to have engaged in vote fraud, the most serious allegations appear to be against the Karzai campaign. An Abdullah win would more likely be perceived as representative of a fair and legitimate electoral process.

The biggest difference between Karzai and Abdullah is that Karzai supports a government with power concentrated in the office of president, while Abdullah sees a parliamentary system as a more appropriate system for representing the diversity of Afghan beliefs and communities. An Abdullah win would mean a fundamental restructuring of the Afghan government with unpredictable results. In governing, Abdullah would probably need to rely on supporters as shady as Karzai’s, and his government would face the same difficult challenges to improving life in Afghanistan that Karzai’s would.

But it may just be time for a change. Karzai may have been the man for the job when the Taliban fell. He had an admirable history of brave opposition to the Taliban and al Qaeda. He challenged Presidents Bush and Musharraf on many aspects of his country’s rebuilding and advocated strongly for the Afghan people. He may have been the best chance to hold Afghanistan together after 2001, but now, his rule has become a liability for the Afghan state. A new leader is needed to bring legitimacy to the election process and to restore faith in the Afghan government itself. Bringing progress in Afghanistan will be a difficult task for anyone, but should Karzai win, it will be harder than need be.

This article is the third in a series about major elections taking place in Asia this year.  Part one and two covered the recent elections in India.

San Francisco Gets an Antiwar Congresswoman

The recent 226-202 House of Representatives approval of the supplemental budget was a particular disappointment to antiwar activists.  At one point they’d thought it might be possible to block the bill and its $79.9 billion Department of Defense appropriation earmarked largely for the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, – at least temporarily.   Nonetheless, San Francisco antiwar voters might take some consolation in one thing anyhow – it appears that the city now has an antiwar Congresswoman.  And no, it’s not House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, but Jackie Speier, elected just last year to represent the less liberal western part of the city and several towns on the Peninsula to the south.

Not only was Speier one of but sixty votes (fifty-one of them Democrat) against the budget in its first trip through the House, but she also made a second, tougher vote against it.  When House Republicans took umbrage at the addition of a $5 billion International Monetary Fund loan guarantee, they announced they would switch sides and vote against the bill upon its return from the Senate, raising the possibility of its defeat should the antiwar Democrat votes hold firm.

Predictably, they did not.  This time even Pelosi herself – who did not vote the first time as is common practice for a Speaker – was recorded in favor, presumably to demonstrate how much the House leadership really wanted the votes.  And yet, despite a San Francisco Chronicle report that “the White House has threatened to pull support from Democratic freshmen who vote no,” Speier did just that, one of only six freshmen – among thirty-two total Democrats – to do so.  Arguably, Speier was doing nothing but what San Francisco voters had directed her to do last November when 59 percent of them supported Proposition U which stated that the city’s Congressional representatives “should vote against any further funding for the deployment of United States Armed Forces in Iraq.”

But realistically speaking, although the ballot question’s only exception concerned “funds specifically earmarked to provide for their [American troops in Iraq] safe and orderly withdrawal” and did not exempt funding requests from Democratic Presidents, the fact that George Bush had negotiated a troop withdrawal agreement before leaving office seems to have made most House Democrats feel they have a pass to fund that war right through 2011. And certainly Pelosi has never given any indication of paying the proposition any heed despite the fact that 61 percent of her district backed it.

On the contrary, she’s made it clear that she views it as a Democratic Speaker’s duty to ensure the funding of what a Democratic President has now taken on as his wars.  Her spokesman, Brendan Daly, told the Chronicle that Pelosi was telling members “we need to do this, this is President Obama’s plan for both Iraq and Afghanistan. He’s got a plan to end the war in Iraq.  He’s got a plan to refocus our efforts in Afghanistan, and we need to support the president in that, and this is the right way to go.”

And yet when Representative Jim McGovern (D-MA) proposed adding language calling for the Secretary of Defense to “submit to Congress a report outlining the United States exit strategy for United States military forces in Afghanistan” by December 31, 2009, it was no dice.  Pelosi’s view is apparently that the President shall give us his plan in his own good time. (McGovern has since filed his amendment as a free-standing bill with 84 co-sponsors.)

Her San Francisco colleague Speier, on the other hand, said she had “serious problems with the current wars” and didn’t believe that “escalating the conflicts make America or the world safer.”  Speier’s viewpoint is particularly welcome in that it differs so markedly from that of her predecessor, the late Tom Lantos, who voted for the first House resolution for the Iraq War (which Pelosi did not.)

Moreover, in her ascent to her new position, Speier had betrayed no particular maverick tendencies.  She gained it not through any kind of insurgent antiwar campaign but more of a vetting process of the area’s political establishment.  A former state legislator forced to leave office due to term limits, she had failed in a prior bid for the Democratic nomination for Lieutenant Governor. But when she announced her interest in the Lantos seat, it soon became clear that she would have the endorsements deemed to matter – and presumably the attendant campaign financing.  At this point, other potential candidates backed off and the insider consensus choice was presented to the voters for their ratification.  Speier then won 90 percent of the Democratic vote in a special primary after a campaign that seemed to involve less of telling people what she stood for than reminding them that they already knew her – and that her ultimate victory was inevitable.

So, at a point when the country’s antiwar movements are largely stalled, Bay Area antiwar voters can at least cheer the pleasant surprise of having a new Congresswoman willing to buck both the White House and the House leadership.

Pakistan: Caught in the Crossfire, Part 2

This is the second of my two part series dealing with Pakistan through the eyes of  Naveed, a lecturer at an Islamabad University. Please see Part 1 for more context.

After being enlightened about Pakistan’s history and foreign interference, I was desperate to find out his views about the insurgency in his native tribal areas. We were out in the open air, and Naveed was in a calm mood.

“So you asked me about the insurgency in the North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan?,” he uttered after taking a deep breath. As I nodded, he said: “To understand the present insurgency, you have to go back to the British Empire era when Pashtun tribal areas had their own tribal administrators called ‘Walis’.”

ISOLATION AND INDIFFERENCE

“The British did little to interfere in our lives and gave us the freedom to have our own code which we call the ‘jirga’ (assembly of tribal elders) that defines laws, regulations, and policies. Soon after the independence, we joined Pakistan on certain preconditions. One of them was to have our own jirga system,” Naveed said, adding that Pakistani courts and law enforcement have no jurisdiction over the tribal areas known as Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).

FATA is an interesting region of Pakistan. It covers an area of 27,220 sq. km and has an estimated population of 3.5 million. Pashtuns comprise the overwhelming majority of the population with a few ethnic Hazaras, Sikhs, and Punjabis living alongside. The literacy rate is hardly 10%, well below the national average of 40%. It is an underdeveloped area with few metalled roads and limited gas and electricity supply. The locals do not pay tax to the state. With only seven percent of the land area cultivatable, people make a livelihood by smuggling custom-free goods from Afghanistan, operating car theft rackets, drug trafficking, and selling locally produced illegal small and heavy arms.

The Pakistani government seldom intervenes in the tribal affairs. A government appointed political agent called “Malik” represents the federation with few executive powers. FATA is however represented in the National Assembly in Islamabad. Unelected tribal elders represented the region until the system was changed in 1997 to introduce mandatory elections. However, little has changed as the elections are contested on tribal rather than on political lines. Therefore, although there are now elections, most individuals vote solely along tribal lines. This is in contrast to the rest of the country where political parties cut across tribal identities.

“This whole region is in a limbo. It is part of Pakistan, but at the same time it is not. Confused aren’t you?” a sarcastic Naveed remarked at my puzzled face. “Thanks to our tribal elders’ wishes, the government never incorporated us into mainstream Pakistan. There always remained a divide between the settled and tribal areas that local leaders as well as Islamabad exploited for their own gains. We are the Pakistani version of America’s Wild West,” he joked in his patent ironic tone.

The dynamics of this tribal society are now unraveling. Due to the fact that this region never became part of the mainstream Pakistani society, the allegiance of the people is toward their tribes or clans rather than to their country. The idea of a shared cultural identity has remained confined to the boundaries of the tribal regions spread across Pakistan and Afghanistan. Therefore, although they are counted as part of the Pakistani population and their areas are shown on the map as part of federal Pakistan, the state has failed to win the Pashtun hearts and minds in order to fully include them in the wider Pakistani cultural society.

“The people in the province, especially in the tribal areas, felt the isolation. Politicians, time and again, made promises to bring them into the mainstream and grant a comprehensive political and judicial system. From Bhutto to his daughter Benazir and from General Zia-ul-Haq to his stalwart Nawaz Sharif, everyone made promises. Empty promises. Things hardly changed on the ground,” Naveed remarked. “Does a promise remain a promise if unfulfilled?,” he argued while referring to an Urdu proverb with a similar connotation.

RETURNS OF THE HOLY ALLIANCE

The outbreak of a guerrilla war in Afghanistan is a turning point in the history of Pakistan. In 1980, Pakistani military dictator General Zia-ul-Haq setup an alliance with the United States to send fighters across the border to aid the Afghan resistance against the Soviet-backed government in Kabul. The joint Pakistani-US investment of arms and fighters radically altered the course of war in Afghanistan, drawing Soviet troops into a long, bloody conflict that ultimately left them defeated and contributed to the disintegration of the USSR.

But the Pakistan-US alliance also brought a host of problems to the region, especially Pakistan. The tribal areas, acting as a launching pad for anti-Soviet fighters known as the “mujahideen,” became a den of illegal arms, drugs, and smuggling. Millions of people from Afghanistan sought refuge in Pakistan, straining the already limited resources of their hosts. The impoverished refugees from Afghanistan, at times, clashed with more modern and well-off Pakistanis due to cultural, religious, and lifestyle differences. People still resent the military government of General Zia over his handling of the Afghan crisis.

The area that was touched most by the conflict was the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan. Naveed described the post-war situation. “The mujahideen returned to their homes. The government had no rehabilitation plan for them. Frustration rose tremendously and their warfare experience gave them the confidence to lift their arms and fight for their rights.” He added that veterans of the Afghan war returned to Pakistan along with their comrades from the Middle East, Central Asia, and North Africa.

“Most of the non-Afghan fighters were exiles from their home countries who could no longer return to their states. Many of their home governments feared a rebellion from their ranks and labeled them as unwanted elements. The only people who welcomed them were the Pashtuns as we have an ancient code of hospitality and generosity for someone who asks for protection and refuge,” Naveed explained, pride for his culture and traditions evident in his tone.

While the USSR left Afghanistan humiliated and defeated, the US reveled with joy. Afghanistan was abandoned, as the US interest was limited to the defeat of its nuclear rival rather than rebuilding of the nation. Former mujahideen turned their guns on each other and a full-scale civil war ensued. Thousands of people died during the conflict from 1992-1996. The only forces that stopped the civil war were the Taliban, who drove the warring former mujahideen factions from power and seized control of 90% of the country.

HOSTILITIES AT HOME

“The former mujahideen who returned from Afghanistan demanded a judicial system based on Islamic law and Pashtun culture and traditions. This was their own version of Shariah. It was a simple demand that was raised to deal with the complex law and order situation in their region,” the young academic described, adding that the local people were very enthusiastic about such demands. “Everybody including the former mujahideen wanted it. The government, instead of principally agreeing to their demand and holding a referendum to decide the issue, sent troops and tanks to the region. People did not get what they really wanted,” he remarked with bitterness replacing his usually soft tone.

In 1994, a bloody conflict erupted in the Malakand division of NWFP province. Veterans of the Afghan war formed a militia called “Tehrik Nifaz Shariat Muhammadi” (Movement for the Imposition of Muhammad’s Shariah law) and started an armed uprising in the region. Government buildings in the region were attacked and occupied in November 1994. The Islamabad government led by the late Benazir Bhutto, initially signing a peace agreement with the militants, backed off under international pressure and waged a military operation. The TNSM militants were flushed out to the hills, and calm was restored. However, the situation on the ground remained the same, and no general judicial system reforms were introduced to speed up the delivery of justice. The demand for a time saving and cost-effective judicial system in the national courts remained unheard, further infuriating the masses.

Hundreds of people lost their lives in the bloody conflict between the TNSM militants and Pakistani armed forces from November 1994 until early 1996. Thousands of people also left their homes in the region due to the conflict.

“The government’s short-sighted and half-baked measures exacerbated the situation. It waged an armed operation against the group but forged an alliance with the leadership. The head of TNSM, Maulana Sufi Muhammad, was captured by the army, but was released without any charges. I do not understand the logic of a military operation that ends up with the signing of a peace deal and distribution of sweets,” the 26 year-old said while mentioning the local practice of distributing sweets on the eve of a festive ceremony. “They sit side-by-side adorning each other with garlands while people mourn over their losses and bury their dead. Is this justice?”

According to a statement issued on May 3, 2001 by the then-NWFP provincial governor Owais Ghani, criminals and assorted illegal arms, timber, and drugs mafias provided financial support to the TNSM and flourished under their rule. TNSM strictly denies the allegations. The Shariah movement returned to the political scene in the region with a vengeance soon after the 9/11 attacks in the USA. While the then-US President George W. Bush was envisioning plans to invade Afghanistan and topple the Taliban government in Kabul, the former mujahideen in Pakistan were renewing their vows for a jihad and promising a new war against the USA along the same lines of struggle against the USSR.

Soon after the US forces invaded Afghanistan on October 7, 2001, TNSM was the first pro-Taliban group to send its forces to fight alongside the Taliban. Thousands of fighters crossed into Afghanistan along with their leader Maulana Sufi Muhammad. The TNSM fighters returned to their bases after Taliban retreated from urban Afghanistan to their rural strongholds to initiate a guerrilla war against the occupying US and NATO forces. Leaders of TNSM were arrested by Islamabad after their return in 2002 and imprisoned on charges of incitement of violence and violation of state laws. President General Pervez Musharraf outlawed the organization in 2002.

Naveed stopped all of a sudden in the middle of the conversation. Something was clearly bugging him as his face turned red. “The cat and mouse game between TNSM and Pakistani military continued. The Pakistani government enjoyed the support of Washington while TNSM were bolstered by the inclusion of al-Qaeda elements in its ranks. The government signed a peace deal on one day and initiated an armed operation against the opposite side the very next day,” Naveed uttered angrily.

His outburst continued: “Nothing changed on the ground except that the situation got out of control and the militants got bolder with their tactics. Pakistani military attacked militant positions on the ground. They also hit their hideouts from the air with the help of Cobra gunship helicopters given by the US.”

“As if this was not enough to wreak havoc, the US drones unleashed hell from the skies, allegedly killing hundreds of innocent civilians. Thousands of people have been caught in the crossfire with no place to run and nowhere to hide. I’ve seen the carnage myself. Was this all for peace?”

Stocky-built Naveed came to an abrupt halt. His voice was shaky, and he didn’t want to continue anymore. Having lived for more than a year with him I never saw Naveed so silent before. He silenced himself. The aggression was in his hands, but he unclenched his fists and stood still. What else can he do?

As we were having this chat on a rainy spring evening, thousands of internally displaced refugees in Swat valley in northwest Pakistan were lying in the open without any shelter. There is an acute shortage of food in the refugee camps, I’m told. But one thing is very certain. There is no shortage of ammunition on either side.

The radical Islamists impose their style of governance in the name of religion and carry out their harsh sentences against poor and powerless people. In the opinion of many in Pakistan, the Islamabad government with the aid of the US government bombs and maims its own people by using tanks and fighter planes. The poor and powerless people, suppressed by the militants and oppressed by the government, run to save their lives. Where is the democratic promise of liberty, fraternity, and equality? Why don’t I see the Islamic spirit of forgiveness, compassion, and justice? Perhaps, both the sides are interested in furthering their agenda and exploiting their subjects in the name of their ideologies.

Pakistan: Caught in the Crossfire, Part 1

“Yes, Pakistan may be a failed state. So what?” said Naveed.  “I don’t care if my country is a failed state or not, but I do care who is behind its failures. They’re the ones I blame for failing my country.”

It’s been more than a year since I last saw my friend, Naveed, a 26-year-old marketing and finance graduate who is now a lecturer at an Islamabad University. He went back to his country soon after completing his Masters degree in Business Administration. When leaving for home, his mood was an eerie mixture of optimism and caution. “I’m confident that things will finally change in my country,” he said before boarding the flight. I remember his confident words but can’t forget the empty smile on his face.  It seems to require more than confident words and smiles to live in a country where optimism and pessimism on any given day are as predictable as the flip of a coin.

Pakistan is  a country where failure is rewarded. We like to live in a state of denial.  We often believe that we have never been wrong or can be wrong.  In the process we make many excuses to justify our actions.

LAMENTABLE HISTORY

“Moign, to understand my ‘lecture,’ as you put it, you have to understand the history of the country,” Naveed said jokingly. It seemed that he was once again enjoying the argumentative chats that we used to have in our free time while living together in student accommodation. Nothing seems to have changed since then.

Pakistan has a long history of foreign interference before there was any lawlessness, unemployment, corruption, civil mismanagement, or army intervention in the country. Soon after its birth in 1947 as a result of blood-strewn partition carried out by the imperial British, the infant state had to pick a master that would act as a caretaker of the country’s policies and safeguard its interests. The choices at that time were the USSR and the USA. The country’s first Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, embraced the latter. And the results of this “embrace,”  as promised, were magical.

During the 1950s and 1960s, the new Pakistani master taught its new satellite state to be wary of two things — communism and grass-roots democracy. As a result, the rulers of Pakistan always kept these two “viruses” in check. Thousands of workers suspected of communist sympathies were put behind the bars and a general election was ruled out in favor of a “sustained democracy” that was “compatible with the country’s Islamic and social values.” Both of these decisions had a devastating effect on the country’s democratic identity and politico-economic activities.

Washington, the “torch-bearer of democracy” and “leader of the free world,” never raised an eyebrow when a military coup in 1958 overthrew the civilian administration in the then Pakistani capital city of Karachi. Instead, new accords of friendship and military partnership were signed that gave the Americans access to the Soviet’s backyard for the first time. The US military soon stationed U2 bombers in the country to keep an eye on Soviet activities in Central Asia.  (One of these U2’s launched from Pakistan would of course be shot down by USSR surface-to-air missiles over Soviet skies on May 1, 1960.)

“This was the first time we pleased our masters and had bit of a misadventure,” a bitter Naveed remarked.

OBSESSION OF THE SOCIETY

“Islam, it seems to me, is a blanket term that defines our ambitions and justifies each and every deed performed in our political and social life. From politicians to common man, everyone has his or her own idea of Islam and chart their plans accordingly.”

Pakistan was created in the name of Islam with the founding leaders promising no room for ethnic partisanship and discrimination. But that’s not what really happened. The country witnessed its first bout of instability in 1952 when Bengal was stripped of its national language status despite the fact that it was spoken by more than half of the country’s population. The imposition of Urdu as the sole national language was seen as an imperial move that triggered riots across the eastern half of the newborn geographically disjointed state. This was the first time when the seeds of ethnic divide were sown in the newly cultivated fields of Pakistan.

The Pakistani army fought the Indian army in 1965 when its misadventures (which included covert military operations in Indian controlled Kashmir) backfired in occupied Jammu & Kashmir. New Delhi [India] then invaded our country to teach us a lesson. For the first time we raised the flag of Jihad against an occupying power and the then (military) rulers drummed up massive support – all in the name of Islam.

Naveed added that this is the official textbook version of Pakistani history, and not necessarily his.

From this time on, we have never looked back on the idea of our army as the vanguard of Islam, and we, as a nation, as the righteous people.

HEADS & TAILS

The situation got more interesting in 1970 after the first ever free and fair general elections for a parliament were held in both wings of Pakistan–East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) and West Pakistan (now Pakistan).

The Bengali separatist movement in 1971 complained that the majority Bengali ethnic group was being sidelined by the minority Punjabis that dominated the civil service and the military. They also accused West Pakistan of usurping the resources of East Pakistan and exploiting them. Statistically, they weren’t wrong as exporting jute produced in East Pakistan generated most of Pakistan’s revenues, while East Pakistanis suffered under grinding poverty.

“I think that was the first time we said: ‘Heads or tails, both flips of the coin are ours, hence we win the toss,” Naveed said while referring to an Urdu proverb that has a similar connotation.

A military operation was waged against Awami League, the party that was demanding more autonomy for the Bengali-dominated East Pakistan and a fair distribution of resources between both entities of  the Pakistani federation. Though winning a clear majority in 1970 elections, Awami League’s leader, Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman, was denied the transfer of power and was instead arrested and tried for treason.

Disgruntled East Pakistanis took up arms against the powerful Punjabi-dominated Pakistani Army. A bloody civil war broke out in the eastern wing of Pakistan that saw the army, along with its pro-Islamic paramilitary groups, attempting to crush the separatist movement. Bengali separatists, thanks to the active support from India, soon weakened the grip of the Pakistani army in the eastern territory. The nine month long bloody movement witnessed countless massacres of innocent people and wanton destruction of property and infrastructure. The people’s power superseded the military’s might, and the Pakistani army surrendered to Bengali insurgents and their principal backers – the Indian army.

This is how we learnt the lesson. Or shall I say, this is how we are taught at school. We are told: This all happened due to some miscreants that created mistrust between us (Pakistanis) and Bengalis (Bangladeshis). India wanted to extract revenge and dismember us. But thanks to our valiant Islamic army we did not let that happen. We succeeded in keeping our western flank intact while giving our Bengali brothers the right to freedom.

Naveed’s tone while quoting his history textbook didn’t seem convincing to me, but I let him continue rather than dispute the textbook version.

HAPPY MASTER

Pakistan’s chief ally, the United States of America, of course did not practically intervene in the conflict. However, Islamabad enjoyed its tacit approval throughout the conflict. The USS Enterprise was dispatched to the Bay of Bengal in 1971 to boost the morale of its ally in the region. The hue and cry raised by human rights groups over genocides committed by the Pakistani army were ignored, and a steady supply of military hardware and ammunition flowed from the US.

The public was in shock when they found that the Pakistani army has surrendered to the Indian army and the Bengali separatists. No one could believe their eyes. Their army, strengthened by the spirit of Jihad, was defeated by the Indian army and their “mercenaries.” At least this is what was fed to them during the 1971 conflict.

Naveed insisted that people for the first time became wary of the Pakistani army’s alliance with the US army and lost their faith in the military as an institution.

“The surrender of 94,000 Pakistani military and paramilitary personnel was not a joke,” he added while referring to the fall of Dhaka on December 16, 1971. “All the architects of this humiliation got away with their crimes and were never brought to justice. The public felt betrayed by their own guardians,” he said while referring to the fact that though a formal inquiry of the war was conducted, the main players of the debacle were never punished.

HOLY ALLIANCE

After a brief interval of civilian rule from 1972 to 1977, a military regime returned from the barracks to instigate a coup d’état. Under an alleged agreement with the US, Pakistani military chief General Zia-ul-Haq overthrew Pakistan’s first democratically elected civilian leader, Zulfiqar Bhutto. Bhutto was later hanged to death on charges of treason and murder.

While other murder cases drag on for years and years, Mr. Bhutto was executed within five months. Lawlessness, vigilantism, police heavy handedness, extra-judicial murders, and many other problems stem from the dilapidated justice system of Pakistan.

Afghanistan was invaded by the USSR in December 1979, soon after General Zia took the reigns of the government. The Soviet invasion not only rang bells in Islamabad, but it also stirred unease in Washington, DC. With the Vietnam War’s humiliation in mind, the Americans seized on the opportunity to drag the Soviets into a long, bloody war that would deplete their power and leave them economically and militarily drained and exhausted.

Bureaucrats under the command of the then US Secretary of State Zbigniew Brzezinski initiated a plan that started the training of Afghan insurgents by the CIA months before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan itself.

The US struck a holy alliance with the anti-Soviet insurgents who called themselves “mujahideen” – the ones waging Jihad in the name of God – to bleed the USSR army to death in Afghanistan and seek revenge for role in the Vietnam defeat. To me this was the height of hypocrisy demonstrated by both sides. While the capitalist Americans and Islamists in the Middle East and South Asia seldom saw eye to eye on any issue and often regarded one another as adversaries, they struck an alliance against communism. What a historic alliance it was!”

ARMY, INC.

While the world’s attention was set on the war in Afghanistan, General Zia-ul-Haq’s autocratic regime throttled the voices of reform and democracy in the country at the behest of his “Islamic agenda.”  During his 11 years in power, the country never had free and fair democratic elections and the army, in connivance with the so-called Islamist forces, ruled with an iron fist. At this time, all important civil institutions like the judiciary, election commission, press, bureaucracy, and foreign service came under direct military control, and the army’s role in the country’s day-to-day affairs changed from an institution to a corporation.

The army initiated schemes for banking, insurance, heavy industries, housing, aviation, education, security firms, farms, and food production and soon became the country’s biggest enterprise. This in turn weakened private businesses, which  stood no chance of competing with the military backed businesses due to their growing political and economic clout. Civil institutions also suffered a direct blow and languished due to deliberate neglect and apathy, partly due to political strife in the country.

General Zia-ul-Haq died in a mysterious plane crash along with many of his top generals and the US Ambassador on August 17, 1988. The country then returned to civilian rule after 11 years of military in power, but little changed on the ground. The army, instead of returning to the barracks, realigned itself and started interfering in politics by supporting its favorite candidates.

Naveed agrees with the view that Pakistan’s problems are not the result of a few years of mismanagement and chaos. “The crises have been brewing since the military eclipsed the civilian institutions and democracy was wound up in favor of a martial law in 1958,” the young Pakistani graduate said lamenting the fact that army’s role was only strengthened by the Americans. “We have never seen them (Americans) flaying military intervention in our politics. This is a mockery of democracy by any standards.”

“So what are the reasons behind the insurgency in the tribal regions of Pakistan including the latest bloodshed in Swat valley? What went so wrong that led the country to the brink of failure and to be labeled as a failed state?” I asked Naveed impromptu. Naveed, totally baffled by the complex nature of my questions, took me out for a walk. “Is it OK if I answer your questions in the open air? I need to breathe some fresh air,” he asked. I nodded and made a quick exit with him.

Why is the insurgency raging in many parts of Pakistan? Born in the tribal areas, whom will he blame for the deaths of innocent lives and suffering of millions of people? I kept on walking in the chilly evening wondering what he was going to say about the ground realities.

I will explore the answer to this and more in Part 2 of this two part series.

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