Error: Unable to create directory /home/demockra/public_html/wp-content/uploads/2010/09. Is its parent directory writable by the server? North Korea: An Uncertain Future

Last week North Korea conducted a test launch of what it claimed to be a satellite, now successfully orbiting the globe and beaming patriotic, revolutionary music to the masses. South Korea, Japan, the US, and many others assert this was no peaceful satellite launch but a provocative and threatening intercontinental ballistic missile test in violation of UN Resolution 1718, and have found no evidence of a singing revolutionary satellite in orbit. So either this test appears to have been, in actuality, a missile test or it was a failed attempt to put a North Korean satellite into orbit – both scenarios that contradict North Korea’s version of events.

President Obama, South Korea, and Japan quickly came out with withering condemnations of the launch, describing it as “provocative” and “reckless,” and calling for sharp, immediate action from the UN, possibly including further economic sanctions. China and Russia, the other two participants in the Six-Party Talks and closer to North Korea, cautioned against “an emotional knee-jerk reaction” to the test, reminding all parties to remain focused on the main goal of the Six-Party Talks – the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

Regardless of what happens in response to this immediate crisis, one has to wonder: What is going on in North Korea? Often described as reclusive and one of the world’s most closed societies, North Korea is something of an enigma – especially to Americans. Of course there was the Korean War of the early 1950s, but fewer and fewer Americans remember it, know much about it, or care about it. And to be honest, it is hard to see how that conflict – over 50 years ago – has much relevance as a way of explaining what is going on today. However, it does frame the current situation, and for that reason I will provide a brief history of the Korean peninsula and the complex and usually vitriol US-North Korean relationship since 1945.

The Cold War

In August of 1945, World War II ended, and Korea was granted independence from its Japanese colonizers. This independence came with a price however. Korea, like Germany, would be split in two – one part, essentially, to be a US puppet state, and the other to be a Soviet one. Exiles Syngman Rhee (who had been living in the US) and Kim Il-Sung (who had been in the USSR) returned to Korea to rule the South and North, respectively. Within five years, North Korea invaded the South in an effort to unify the peninsula under its own rule. Much of South Korea, including its capital Seoul, was captured by the North, prompting a massive military response from the UN – led by the US and South Korea. By the end of the conflict, at least 3 million Koreans, almost 1 million Chinese, and over 50,000 Americans had died. After the conflict was over, Korea remained divided almost exactly as it had been before 1950. Relations between the North and South have remained uneasy ever since, and tens of thousands of US troops and (until 1991) thousands of nuclear warheads have been based in the South. Over the years, clashes along the 4 km wide Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) dividing the two countries have not been uncommon. US spy ships and airplanes have been captured or shot down by the North, the North has often threateningly tunneled beneath the DMZ, and the North was responsible for the hijacking and downing of Korean Airlines flight 858 in 1987. At the same time, for 50 years after the Korean War, the US vigorously supported harsh economic sanctions against the North.

Post-Cold War

With the fall of the USSR in 1991, North Korea lost a significant supporter and has struggled with food shortages and a collapsing economy ever since. Since that time, there has been constant speculation about the North’s developing of a military nuclear program and its sharing of military knowledge and technology with nations such as Pakistan and Syria. In 1993 the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was disallowed from inspecting North Korean nuclear sites, and the North withdrew from the IAEA the next year. In 1994 Kim Il-Sung died and was replaced as North Korea’s head of state by his son, Kim Jong-Il. While the US and North Korea signed the 1994 Agreed Framework to improve relations, its implementation has been rocky, with both sides failing to fully follow through on their commitments. In 1998 the South’s new president Kim Dae-Jung introduced his sweeping new “Sunshine Policy,” a policy of engagement aimed at spurring improved North-South relations and increased cross-border trade and cooperation. The North continued developing its missile program, but largely within the guidelines agreed upon with the US and the South. At the same time, the US played a role in militarily strengthening Japan and South Korea against the North.

Efforts continued to normalize North-South and North-US relations until 2001. At that time new US President George Bush took a much more hawkish position toward the North than President Clinton had, and famously included North Korea in his “Axis of Evil” along with Iran and Iraq. This stance worsened US-North Korean relations considerably, and over the next few years North Korea defiantly expanded its nuclear program and withdrew from the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2003. New governments in South Korea and Japan treated the North more coolly. Bogged down in Iraq, the Bush administration was compelled to try negotiation through the Six Party Talks – which involved the US, North Korea, South Korea, China, Russia, and Japan. Further bellicose statements by President Bush and disagreements over the terms of the Agreed Framework gave the North excuses to withdraw from the talks, and in October of 2006 North Korea tested a nuclear weapon. Incredibly, talks continued after this test, and were successful enough that some foresaw a breakthrough in US-North Korean relations in 2007; yet by late 2008 talks broke down again. Complicating matters was the reported stroke of North Korea’s “Dear Leader” Kim Jong-Il in August of 2008, creating fears about the North’s immediate future – including the stability of its political system and the fate of its nuclear weapons. However,  the US and the North worked cooperatively during this time to alleviate the effects of famines in the North and to find the remains of American servicemen killed since 1950 in the North, and war was in fact averted through diplomatic channels on many occasions.

Prelude to a Transition?

To the average American observer – myself included – North Korea’s actions are perplexing. Why exactly are they test firing rockets over Japan? Why now? What are their motivations? And more generally, why has North Korea spent so much money and risked so much global animosity on developing its nuclear weapons program? Why has it remained such a closed country? With the fall of the USSR and China’s transformation to free market heavyweight, why has it clung to its rigid form of communism? And this is just the beginning.

Here are a few thoughts, first concerning the immediate situation. Despite Kim Jong-Il’s very public appreciation for the launch, it was the first time since August that he has appeared in public, probably due to his questionable health. If he is in fact in poor health, the North may be facing a rocky transition of power and this launch may be a way of declaring North Korea’s continued military strength and its intention to proceed with a space and military program regardless of whether he continues to rule or not. Indeed, after considerable diplomatic progress in 2008, in recent months the North has been more hostile toward Japan and South Korea, has kicked out US humanitarian aid teams, and has detained two American journalists, indicating an unpredictable government possibly undergoing a significant change.

A Negotiation Tactic?

On the other hand, North Korea has used provocative military tests in the past to extract concessions from the US during the Six-Party Talks, such as having its name dropped from the US’s state sponsors of terrorism list or to procure humanitarian and development aid. So, this week’s action could be a signal that the North’s political regime is weak and in need of assistance, for which it would like to use this test as a bargaining chip.

That the North’s military activities are mainly a tactic to drive a harder bargain with the US is the accepted explanation for North Korean motives. While this is certainly part of the picture, it is hard to believe that this is North Korea’s sole purpose for developing such a large military program. Nearly a quarter of the North’s GNP is devoted to military spending, and it has 1.2 million active duty military personnel, nearly double the South’s standing military. This makes North Korea’s military one of the largest in the world, despite the fact that it is a nation of just 23 million people. So, long before the Six Party Talks, the North has been building a formidable military for its own sake, not just as a bargaining chip. The large and threatening US presence in northeast Asia since 1950 is surely a factor, as is the significant drop in military support from Russia and China in recent decades. It is not surprising that the North feels vulnerable, and its massive military is surely one reason that its government has endured and that it continues to exist at all as a nation.

Game Theory with Obama?

The US is experiencing a transition of power as well, and this launch was perhaps directed at a young, inexperienced President Obama. Before the launch, Obama’s administration indicated a willingness to pursue high-level bilateral talks with North Korea and received no answer from Pyongyang. Perhaps, the launch was an effort by North Korea to get the attention of the new administration, and to engage the US on its own terms. It could also have been, in part, a test just to see what reaction the launch would prompt from the US. Over the past few decades, the North has seemed interested in engaging with the US and the South when given the chance. Some also have argued that the recent launch does not explicitly violate UN Resolution 1718, indicating that the North wants attention, but not to actually break its obligations under 1718. This test may have been a way of gauging the sincerity of the Obama administration’s overtures to the North. If Obama can keep a cool head and avoid Bush’s war-mongering rhetoric even in a sticky situation, the North may take Obama’s offers to engage more seriously. Obama declined to use the US missile defense system to shoot down the North’s rocket, and instead sharply denounced the launch and steered the issue to the UN while working with other members of the Six-Party Talks to come up with a constructive response. Time will tell how much Obama’s strategy will differ from that of former Presidents Bush or Clinton.

Why Isolation?

As for North Korea’s more general isolation from the global community, there seem to be a few compelling explanations. The most obvious and simplistic reason is the desire of a small circle of political and military North Korean elites to retain power at any cost. Life in North Korea is hard, stifling, and unforgiving. The North’s particularly harsh interpretation of communism has propped up a family dynasty and benefited a small group at the expense of most for over 50 years. Yet today’s rulers are not as “beloved” as Kim Il-Sung and the North’s focus on military success seems to be a way of demonstrating its power and bestowing legitimacy on a regime that has few other successes to point to.

Demonizing the North Korean leadership is the easy way to explain its actions, but other factors are in play as well.  As mentioned above, the North received substantial economic and military support from both the Soviet Union and China during the Cold War. With the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 however, much of the North’s support gave way. In contrast to much of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics, North Korea’s leadership has adjusted poorly to a post-Cold War world, prioritizing its own survival over a more holistic concern for North Korea’s people and place in this new world. It has remained largely isolated economically and politically and has suffered devastating famines since the early 1990s. Legitimate and imagined fears have resulted in disproportionate military spending that certainly prevents the North from investing in economic development, improving government services and infrastructure, or providing humanitarian aid to the extent necessary. This inability to adjust effectively to a new world has led to economic and political weakness that military strength has attempted to compensate for.

Additionally, as mentioned above, between 1950 and 2000 the US enforced an economic embargo on the North that isolated it from the capitalist world. That was not much of a problem during the Cold War when the North could count on support from the USSR and China, but afterward the North suffered tremendously. Economic sanctions in various forms have often been the response to the North’s more recent military activities. Intended to punish North Korea’s defiant leaders, limiting trade and aid to the North since the 1950s has contributed to the small country’s international isolation and have been an obstacle to normalized relations with other nations.

What’s Next?

What the future holds for North Korea is anybody’s guess, especially if Kim Jong-Il’s health deteriorates further. Will he remain in power, engaging with the international community in his characteristically bold and theatrical way? Will a smooth transition of power take place? Or does the country face a political upheaval with unpredictable and potentially frightening consequences in the near future? And what of denuclearizing and even reunifying the Korean peninsula? Both the North and the US show signs of wanting to increase engagement and economic cooperation, and this would certainly be preferable to the prickly and potentially disastrous path they are on now. Yet both must work hard to overcome their mutual distrust of one another while saving face and appearing not to give up too much to the other, long-feared side of the 38th parallel.