In parts of Andhra Pradesh, Orissa, Bihar, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, West Bengal, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, and Uttar Pradesh there are multiple threats to Indian democracy – extreme poverty, political disempowerment, unfair and exploitative economic relationships, lack of health care and education, sexual exploitation, lack of recognition of local rights to land and resources, and others.

In addition to these causes for Naxalite sympathy, support, and success in these areas, the actual violence of the conflict between Naxalites and the Indian state affects locals in many negative ways – killings, rapes, kidnappings, torture, hostage-takings, property stolen or destroyed, livelihoods ruined, villages displaced, families split in a state of near civil war. More recently, growing interest in these resource-rich lands by the Indian government and the private sector have led to an escalation in the conflict and to the further disempowerment of poor locals.

Regional disparities in India are vast

The Indian government’s response to these injustices and the resulting violence has been inadequate and unsuccessful. One tactic used, especially vigorously in the state of Chhattisgarh, has been to attack and silence non-violent human rights activists who speak out about the violence perpetrated by state governments and private militias against innocent citizens – overwhelmingly poor adivasis (indigenous people).

The highest profile case has been with Dr. Binayak Sen – a noted human rights activist and a pediatrician working with many of the states’ poorest families. Chhattisgarh’s High Court recently upheld his shocking life sentence for sedition and treason despite a lack of evidence that he conspired with Naxalites to commit violent acts. The state’s draconian and undemocratic laws put in place to fight the Naxalites, the Chhattisgarh Special Public Security Act of 2005 (CSPSA), and similar to laws in Kashmir and the Northeast used to fight separatists make this type of persecution possible.

Less well-known individuals also have been accused of aiding the Naxalites and thrown in jail, including activist Kartam Joga, cinematographer TG Ajay, and Kolkata businessman Piyush Guha. Other human rights defenders and organizations have been forced to flee Chhattisgarh due to threats and harassment by police and district authorities. The Indian Supreme Court has been the one official body that has dared to intervene, releasing Dr. Sen for lack of evidence once already, hearing a petition against the Chhattisgarh government submitted by Kartam Joga and two other activists, and reprimanding the Chhattisgarh government for its failure to rein in anti-Maoist militias who have been accused of extensive human rights abuses.

As these cases wind their way through the courts, attract international concern, and spark protest and outrage in India, one should be concerned for India’s future. Perhaps fueling the fire, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said in 2007:

Left-wing extremism is probably (the) biggest security challenge to the Indian state. It continues to be so and we cannot rest in peace until we have eliminated this virus….We need to cripple the hold of Naxalite forces with all the means at our command.

In reality, the Naxalite threat to the Indian state, though widespread and growing as well as disruptive, remains far from toppling state governments, let alone the central government – its goal by 2050. At the risk of disagreeing with Dr. Singh, the bigger threat, as I see it, is how the Indian government responds to the Naxalites – not so different from the dilemma facing the United States in its war on terrorism.

Naxalites pose localized threats, and the murders, kidnappings, and other violent acts they commit must be condemned. However, they do not threaten Indian democracy as a whole. At least not yet. However, if the government – at the local, state and national level – responds clumsily, disproportionately, or unwisely to the threat, these blunders could do far more to harm the legitimacy of and faith in the government and the democratic system as a whole. Jailing non-violent activists attempting to improve the lives of people stuck in these conflict zones sends the wrong message and runs counter to the government’s own interests in these areas.

For now, the use of laws like the CSPSA is an exception to the rule (which is certainly not to say that India’s justice system is otherwise without problems). In much of India there is a healthy respect for human rights and the rule of law and an independent and respected judiciary. Or at least those ideas are given lip service.

And in other parts of the country,  the political system – for all its faults – is far more responsive to and representative of its citizens than those in the feudal backwaters where the Naxalites thrive. The silencing of human right defenders is fortunately rare, but Chhattisgarh foreshadows a darker and more authoritarian India struggling to overcome serious threats to its national integrity while promoting reliable security and economic development for its people.

After the votes were tallied on March 16, the UPA did emerge victorious. And by much more than anyone had thought. To form a government in India, a party or coalition must win 272 seats to claim a majority in the Lok Sabha, the lower house of Parliament. The Congress won 206 seats on its own, and its five pre-poll allies won an additional 52 seats, putting the UPA within reach of 272, needing to pick up only a few more independent and smaller party representatives. To American ears, this may sound like less than a mandate. However, in most national elections, only about half of Indian voters vote for the two parties with a national presence – the Congress and the BJP. The last time any single Indian party won over 200 seats was in 1991. And the most optimistic Congress members predicted 180 seats at the most. The BJP finished a distant second, claiming 116 seats, and no other party gained more than 23 seats. The last UPA government didn’t even have 272 members and had to rely on support “from the outside” from India’s communist parties – known as the Left. When the Left withdrew its support over the Indo-US nuclear deal, the Congress was forced to enlist the support of an on-again off-again ally, the Samajwadi Party, who also supported the UPA from the outside. So the fact that the Congress was able to nearly cross 272 with its rather small pre-poll alliance was definitely a surprise. It also means that it will not need to coddle temperamental allies while governing.

So, why the outpouring of support for the UPA? There are a number of early theories. Many commentators have asserted that voters chose the harmony and stability of another five years of UPA rule. Electing the NDA or the Third Front would certainly have brought policy changes and more unpredictable relations with other countries. Yet a mere desire for stability does not convincingly explain the results in my mind. Indian voters are notorious for kicking incumbents out of office. Indeed, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh is the first PM to be reelected since India’s first PM, Jawaharlal Nehru, nearly 50 years ago.

5 More Years!

Other commentators give more positive reasons for the UPA’s success. Many credit Dr. Singh’s honest, able, deliberate, and understated style of governing as an asset that appealed to voters in a time of regional instability and rapid economic change within India. This seems plausible, especially since the NDA decided to attack Singh as a weak PM beholden to the Nehru-Gandhi family dynasty, while projecting their PM candidate, LK Advani as stronger and better able to respond to the threats India faces. This macho saber-rattling may have worried voters who perhaps appreciated Dr. Singh’s thoughtfulness and restraint in response to events like the terrorist attacks in Mumbai last November.

Others give credit to the political blossoming of handsome, young Nehru-Gandhi heir Rahul Gandhi, who was a tireless campaigner and who spearheaded Congress’ campaign strategy in India’s largest state, Uttar Pradesh (UP), where the Congress recorded its best showing in two decades. Rahul worked hard for the Congress campaign and began to show some political savvy while presenting a fresh, young face to voters – in contrast to the elderly leadership in other political parties. Given the Indian media’s obsession with glamour, celebrity, and the Nehru-Gandhi family, Rahul’s influence may be overblown, but it does seem to have made a positive difference in the way voters – especially young ones – view the Congress. And his bold political strategy in UP was indeed a success.

The last major reason for the UPA’s success was voter support for its unprecedented and substantial welfare policies that poured billions of rupees into programs to improve rural development, agriculture, health, and education. The NDA’s 2004 campaign slogan – “India Shining” – backfired on them spectacularly when voters reminded them that most Indians had not joined the hallowed ranks of the middle class. It appears the UPA learned from the NDA’s mistake. India is changing fast, but not everyone has gained from the country’s new found prosperity. The UPA’s programs targeted the country’s poorest and most disadvantaged, aiming to improve lives, the country, and their election chances. And it worked.

In my previous article about the Indian elections, I stressed the importance of coalitions. With the Congress’ spectacular showing, coalition politics will be less significant than in the past. This hardly marks the end of coalition politics, however. The Congress was fortunate that its coalition partners did very well, particularly in West Bengal and Tamil Nadu. It also seems significant that most of the UPA’s support came in states that were also fielding Third Front parties. Perhaps the voters’ rejection of this anarchic hodge-podge brought voters to the UPA in greater numbers. In others, it is entirely possible that Congress benefited from voters’ rejection of a new, untested coalition.

Confused? Well, that’s how it goes with Indian elections. The question is: What will happen now? With the Congress’ strong showing, there are now high expectations for significant improvements in India’s governance and policies, some of them wildly unrealistic. Will the UPA be able to deliver? Does their win herald a new direction for Indian politics? Don’t expect dramatic changes, though the UPA may now act more boldly in pursuing certain favored policies. For example, there is frequent speculation that without needing to rely on support from the Left, the UPA will accelerate India’s economic liberalization (even though some are making the argument that India’s protected markets and regulated banks have saved it from the worst of global economic implosion). The neighborhood is also changing quickly. Worries about Pakistan’s stability have risen dramatically. The Obama administration is scaling up the war in Afghanistan. Rebuilding society after a long civil war in Sri Lanka presents a new challenge. These changes may compel the UPA to make some new foreign policy choices.

However, barring a political catastrophe, the UPA’s reelection will provide 10 years of relative political stability at the national level. At this point in time, when India is being touted as an emerging global superpower, this stability should only help legitimize its global ambitions, particularly in the able hands of Manmohan Singh. Despite the UPA’s shortcomings, their reelection gives India the political opportunity to take the next steps toward being a global leader.

This is the second of two articles about this year’s Indian national elections and the second in a series of pieces about major elections in Asia this year.

The largest democracy on Earth is presently in the middle of national elections. In India, three out of five phases of voting have been completed, and in only two weeks the final results will be known. Indian elections are always rambunctious. The democratic process itself is chaotic, accommodating dozens of political parties, thousands of candidates, and around 700 million voters who live in the world’s biggest cities and most remote villages, speak dozens of languages, and represent thousands of castes across a shockingly wide socioeconomic spectrum. Corruption, violence, and outlandish campaigning are a part of elections in any given year. Newspapers and news channels flood the cities and countryside with relentless election news and gossip while politicians crisscross the country in frenetic campaigning that can draw crowds of hundreds of thousands of people. The frequent involvement of cricket and film stars lends an air of celebrity and glamour to the proceedings. Hindi-speakers frequently use the word tamasha to describe elections and politics – a word meaning a “spectacle” and “amusement.” It also connotes rowdiness and a sense of being outside of normal life.

This year’s national elections are no different. But last November’s terrorist attacks in Mumbai have raised concerns about serious violence interfering with the elections. Indeed, after a right-wing Hindu nationalist candidate made inflammatory anti-Muslim remarks in public speeches, a Muslim mafia don allegedly threatened to kill him. But, this is really just par for the course. So far, the press has said little about (presumably Pakistani-based) Muslim militants planning any attacks during the elections. The larger threat – during the first two phases of polling at least – were Maoist guerrillas known as Naxalites, active in many of India’s poorest rural regions, who called for an election boycott and carried out murderous attacks on police forces, detonated bombs, and hijacked a train, leading to the deaths of over two dozen people.

With that said, the chance that India’s elections will be derailed by any violent organization or event is exceedingly small. Barring an unprecedented attack in India, this year’s National Assembly (Lok Sabha) elections will be completed relatively smoothly and on time. With the counting of votes on May 16, the election will come to a climax, and it is difficult at this point for anyone to imagine what is likely to happen. By all accounts, this election is a toss up, and the Election Commission’s ruling that exit polls and post-poll surveys be banned have made it even more difficult to predict what may happen. Complex coalition politics, which have dominated national politics in India since the 1990s, makes this election more unpredictable than the typical close US election, and this year’s addition of a third and an even smaller fourth coalition of regional parties makes these 2009 elections more jumbled than the last national elections five years ago. The stunning emergence of the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) since 2004 has also complicated matters.

Consider: The ruling United Progressive Alliance (UPA), led by the secular, centrist Congress Party, is currently a coalition of 16 parties. The UPA has ruled since 2004 and can claim a rather ho-hum record that is neither impressive nor a failure. The alliance that ruled from 1999-2004, and which has sat in opposition since, is the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), led by the right-wing Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which has recently been beset by serious infighting and an unclear message for voters. It now contains 10 parties. Until now, these two alliances were the only ones to wield enough power to gain control at the center. The Congress and the BJP have been the largest parties since the 1990s, but their support has gradually been chipped away by communist, regional, and caste-based parties. Until recently, these smaller parties had no choice but to ally themselves with the Congress or the BJP if they wanted to play a part in national politics. However, this year a Third Front has emerged, gambling that a coalition of such parties can perhaps capture as many seats as the UPA and the NDA. This would enable these parties to take power without bowing down to the two parties that have dominated national politics for the past two decades.

With this development, parties are jockeying for power and weighing their options before and after the elections. While some parties have committed to one alliance or another, other parties are waiting until after the votes are counted to pick a side. And whichever alliance is asked to form a government will, with some serious political wrangling, likely attract new parties to its side – whether they have committed to another or not.

In this day and age, this is how elections in India are won and lost. The mathematics and the political sticks and carrots necessary for building a winning coalition have all but drowned out issues, personalities, and ideologies. For evidence of this, just follow the Indian news. The vast majority of election coverage is currently speculation about likely alliances or defections, not about issues. Of course, certain events and issues may shape an election, but they must be extraordinary. Though this is a national election, voters are choosing local candidates (in India’s parliamentary democracy, the party or coalition with the most candidates elected forms the central government). And these local candidates must address local issues – issues which often don’t change a great deal in much of India. Who can ensure electricity, drinkable water, better roads, better health care facilities, and better schools? And with such a plethora of political parties catering to specific caste and religious sensibilities, many voters will simply vote their caste or religious identity. For this reason, I doubt that, aside from Mumbai and maybe other large Indian cities, the issue of terrorism will be important. Nor will the global economic crisis. What will be most important in these elections are the alliances that are negotiated. For now, those alliances have yet to cohere. And there are enough wild cards in the deck that the final outcome is anyone’s guess.

Writer Amitav Ghosh divined a crucial connection between the two messages. “When commentators repeat the metaphor of 9/11, they are in effect pushing the Indian government to mount a comparable response.” Indeed, India’s opposition Hindu nationalist BJP has blustered, “Our response must be close to what the American response was.” Fearful of imminent war, the media has indulged in frantic hand wringing about Indian and Pakistani nuclear arsenals and renewed fears about the Indian subcontinent being “the most dangerous place on earth.”

As an observer of the subcontinent for over a decade, I am optimistic that war will not be the end result of this event. As horrifying as the Mumbai attacks were, they are not likely to drive India and Pakistan into an armed international conflict. The media frenzy over an imminent nuclear war seems the result of the media being superficially knowledgeable about the history of Indian-Pakistani relations, of feeling compelled to follow the most sensationalistic story, and being recently brainwashed into thinking that the only way to respond to a major terrorist attack was the American way – a war.

Here are four reasons why the Mumbai attacks will not result in a war:

1. For both countries, a war would be a disaster. India has been successfully building stronger relations with the rest of the world over the last decade. It has occasionally engaged in military muscle-flexing (abetted by a Bush administration eager to promote India as a counterweight to China and Pakistan), but it has much more aggressively promoted itself as an emerging economic powerhouse and a moral, democratic alternative to less savory authoritarian regimes. Attacking a fledgling democratic Pakistan would not improve India’s reputation in anybody’s eyes.

Indian Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh, speaks to the Indian Leadership Forum

The restraint Manmohan Singh’s government has exercised following the attacks indicates a desire to avoid rash and potentially regrettable actions. It is also perhaps a recognition that military attacks will never end terrorism. Pakistan, on the other hand, couldn’t possibly win a war against India, and Pakistan’s military defeat would surely lead to the downfall of the new democratic government. The military would regain control, and Islamic militants would surely make a grab for power – an outcome neither India nor Pakistan want. Pakistani president Asif Ali Zardari has shown that this is not the path he wants his country to go down. He has forcefully spoken out against terrorist groups operating in Pakistan and has ordered military attacks against LeT camps. Key members of LeT and other terrorist groups have been arrested. One can hope that this is only the beginning, despite the unenviable military and political difficulties in doing so.

2. Since the last major India-Pakistan clash in 1999, both countries have made concrete efforts to create people-to-people connections and to improve economic relations. Bus and train services between the countries have resumed for the first time in decades along with an easing of the issuing of visas to cross the border. India-Pakistan cricket matches have resumed, and India has granted Pakistan “most favored nation” trading status. The Mumbai attacks will undoubtedly strain relations, yet it is hard to believe that both sides would throw away this recent progress. With the removal of Pervez Musharraf and the election of a democratic government (though a shaky, relatively weak one), both the Indian government and the Pakistani government have political motivations to ease tensions and to proceed with efforts to improve relations. There are also growing efforts to recognize and build upon the many cultural ties between the populations of India and Pakistan and a decreasing sense of animosity between the countries.

3. Both countries also face difficult internal problems that present more of a threat to their stability and security than does the opposite country. If they are wise, the governments of both countries will work more towards addressing these internal threats than the less dangerous external ones. The most significant problems facing Pakistan today do not revolve around the unresolved situation in Kashmir or a military threat posed by India. The more significant threat to Pakistan comes from within. While LeT has focused its firepower on India instead of the Pakistani state, other militant Islamic outfits have not.

Slain ex-Pakistani Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto

Groups based in the tribal regions bordering Afghanistan have orchestrated frequent deadly suicide bombings and clashes with the Pakistani military, including the attack that killed ex-Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in 2007. The battle that the Pakistani government faces now is not against its traditional enemy India, but against militants bent on destroying the Pakistani state and creating a Taliban-style regime in Pakistan. In order to deal with this threat, it must strengthen the structures of a democratic, inclusive political system that can also address domestic problems and inequalities. On the other hand, the threat of Pakistani based terrorists to India is significant. However, suicide bombings and attacks are also carried out by Indian Islamic militants, and vast swaths of rural India are under the de facto control of the Maoist guerrillas known as the Naxalites. Hindu fundamentalists pose a serious threat to the safety of many Muslim and Christian Indians and to the idea of India as a diverse, secular, democratic society. Separatist insurgencies in Kashmir and in parts of the northeast have dragged on for years. And like Pakistan, India faces significant challenges in addressing sharp social and economic inequalities. Additionally, Indian political parties, especially the ruling Congress Party and others that rely on the support of India’s massive Muslim population to win elections, are certainly wary about inflaming public opinion against Pakistan (and Muslims). This fear could lead the investigation into the Mumbai attacks to fizzle out with no resolution, as many other such inquiries have.

4. The international attention to this attack – somewhat difficult to explain in my opinion given the general complacency and utter apathy in much of the western world about previous terrorist attacks in places like India, Pakistan, and Indonesia – is a final obstacle to an armed conflict. Not only does it put both countries under a microscope in terms of how they respond to the terrible events, it also means that they will feel international pressure to resolve the situation without resorting to war. India and Pakistan have been warned by the US, Russia, and others not to let the situation end in war. India has been actively recruiting Pakistan’s closest allies – China and Saudi Arabia – to pressure Pakistan to act against militants, and the US has been in the forefront of pressing Pakistan for action. Iran too has expressed solidarity with India in the face of the attacks and is using its regional influence to bring more diplomatic pressure on Pakistan.

A scene from a peace march and vigil in Mumbai

Still, however unlikely, it must be said that an unforeseen constellation of unfortunate events and colossally stupid decisions could result in war. Just before Christmas, Pakistan began moving military forces from the west where they had been engaging the Taliban to its eastern border with India as tensions between the two countries rose, despite recent conciliatory gestures on both sides.  However, because of the reasons outlined above, one can hope that both India and Pakistan will continue to aggressively engage in diplomacy, intelligence sharing, and military cooperation to cripple the types of organizations that have carried out the heinous attacks in Mumbai, and who threaten both countries.  If these efforts are fruitful, peace is indeed possible. War is not imminent.

Is it American arrogance that makes Secretary Gates think that the purpose of the attack was to target Americans? Partially; American ubiquity demands it. Just like American clothing and pop culture is everywhere in the world, so too must American tragedies be recognized and venerated, and whenever a roughly analogous local tragedy happens, that tragedy must be understood through the lens of the American tragedy. In this case, since the local tragedy was terrorism, the American analogue is September 11.

President Bush (and now the rest of the country) seems to think that the Sept. 11 attacks were the first time any country has ever dealt with terrorist attacks on its own soil, and furthermore, that the United States, as a result of those attacks, is the only country that has experience dealing with terrorists. Prior to Bush’s tenure in office, the United States was not so cocky: of course we knew that Ireland has been dealing with terrorism since the 1920s, that Israel and Spain have been dealing with it since the 1960s, that India itself has been dealing with it from the Tamil Tigers, Kashmir separatists, and both Hindu and Muslim nationalists. Everyone seems to have forgotten, though, that the United States is not the world’s expert on dealing with terrorism.

So, no, it’s not likely that the attacks in Mumbai were designed to target Americans. But in order for the United States to lay claim to a War on Terrorism, it must lay claim to every instance of terrorism that occurs in the world in order to assert a leadership role in that war. The Bush administration has used the September 11 attacks as a throughway by which the United States may assert a “Me, too!” role in worldwide terrorism, even if the terrorism didn’t directly impact the United States.

It could be called the Cheney Doctrine after Vice President Cheney’s pronouncement earlier this year that the United States has a right to invade any country in the world, even if that country didn’t directly harm the United States, if the United States thinks that country has the capability or intent of harming the United States. Of course, the doctrine is nothing more than a unilateral pronouncement by Cheney and does not have the effect of law, but at least it shows us what he’s thinking. It’s the foreign policy equivalent of the “interstate commerce” clause, the section of the Constitution that has been interpreted so broadly as to allow Congress to control any aspect of business that could conceivably or theoretically impact interstate commerce (protecting endangered species in waterways that, through a series of even small creeks, eventually drain into interstate rivers, for example).

Diplomatic Implications

The United States would especially like to stick its nose into relations between Pakistan and India. Al-Qaeda is or was hiding in Pakistan on the Afghanistan border. Former president Pervez Musharraf didn’t send the military up there to investigate for fear of alienating those populations. The new Pakistani government will not be as America-friendly as the last one, since the United States supported the unpopular Musharraf. Without Musharraf, the United States has no reason or authority to be involved in India/Pakistan relations. Using the terrorism angle allows the United States to remain involved in that relationship.

We still think we are the gatekeepers to all the world’s diplomacy: no one anywhere in the world can have any bilateral talks without inviting the United States, as well. Every talk is necessarily multilateral because every relationship between any people anywhere in the world is relevant to the United States. It’s time for us to get over this attitude. When James Monroe asserted U.S. diplomatic hegemony in the Western hemisphere — essentially telling the rest of the world that, if you wanted to deal with Latin America, you had to go through the U.S. first — the arrogance was apparent, but at least it was confined to America’s sphere of influence in the world.

As the United States’ diplomatic clout has waned — particularly under the watchful eye of the Bush administration — its ability to assert leadership roles in negotiations in which it has no stake has similarly waned. Thankfully, there will always be the War on Terrorism there to insist that, by virtue of the United States being attacked on September 11, and its self-proclaimed doctrine of warfare against terrorism, the United States automatically has a stake in any negotiation that may even be tangentially related to terrorism.

It is a gross disservice to the people in Mumbai who were killed, wounded, and terrorized to narcissistically focus their tragedy in terms of our tragedy. Perhaps going through the same kind of event allows Americans to better understand what Indians are feeling right now, but we should no more shift the focus to our own attack any more than we would eulogize our own losses at someone else’s funeral.