To some, Rajapaksa’s win signaled the triumph of democracy after decades of civil war, but it doesn’t take much looking to find that Rajapaksa resorted to some decidedly undemocratic methods to secure victory. Reporters Without Borders condemned the Sri Lankan government for blocking websites, intimidating critics, and possibly being responsible for the disappearance of opposition supporters. The Sri Lankan government had been preventing foreign journalists from entering the country to cover the elections, and the situation on the ground in Sri Lanka, especially in Tamil areas, had hardly been conducive to ensuring that the citizens’ right to vote would be protected. The election day bombshell that Fonseka was allegedly not registered to vote prompted Rajapaksa’s UPFA to loudly threatened to challenge his election if he were to win. This threat came despite the fact that the election commission had declared that Fonseka’s papers were in order and that not being registered to vote had no bearing on whether he could hold office.

Since the election, Rajapaksa has made drastic moves to consolidate his power and clamp down on journalists, the political opposition, and protesters in the streets. Earlier fears of post-election violence between supporters of Rajapaksa and Fonseka seem to have given way to fears of a coup, at least according to Rajapaksa, orchestrated by military supporters of General Fonseka. In response, Rajapaksa has ordered the biggest shake up of the Sri Lankan military in decades, purging the forces of high-ranking supporters of Fonseka. Many justifiably fear that Rajapaksa’s election will worsen the state of media freedom in Sri Lanka.

During the election, Rajapaksa was strongly supported by the ethnic Sinhalese majority in the south. Rajapaksa won over 65%, while Fonseka – also Sinhalese – carried less than 35% of the vote. The largest Tamil political party – faced with the option of  supporting the president who led a brutal war against them or supporting the general who carried out the president’s orders – chose to back Fonseka, hopeful that he would do more than Rajapaksa has to bring about a Sinhalese-Tamil reconciliation. In the Jaffna district, the Tamil heartland, 64% supported Fonseka and just 25% backed Rajapaksa. Since the end of the long and devastating civil war in May, Rajapaksa has aggravated ethnic tensions and has failed to demonstrate a desire or ability to reimagine Sri Lanka as an inclusive democratic society willing to accommodate the still-legitimate Tamil demands on the Sri Lankan government that originally led the country into war. His behavior since his election victory once again appears to reflect an insecure and greedy desire to remain in power rather than a strategy for rebuilding an island destroyed and torn apart by violence and social inequality.

This shortsightedness could backfire on Rajapaksa. The International Crisis Group still sees a need for international community involvement in reconstructing Sri Lanka and making sure Tamil grievances are responded to. Rajapaksa should also keep in mind that while the LTTE has been soundly defeated militarily in Sri Lanka, its organization still exists overseas, holding up to one billion dollars in assets. Despite its wealth, this network is, for now, beset by infighting and a lack of central leadership and fighters. Yet, Tamil concerns cannot be expected to go unaddressed forever, and a continued denial of rights, opportunities, and dignity to the Tamil people by the Sri Lankan government just might provide the motivation to unify and organize that today’s overseas Tigers are lacking.

President Rajapaksa believes that “Sri Lanka’s struggle is a victory for global democracy and demonstrates that a workable model exists for eradicating terrorism.” Optimists see this peacetime election as an opportunity for Rajapaksa and Sri Lankans to put the war behind them and to get on with creating an economically prosperous, politically inclusive, and socially harmonious nation. Yet, such a project will take time and will require rebuilding a constructive Tamil political voice, not merely a relatively free electoral win by a seemingly divisive and ethnically chauvinist politician. Based on Rajapaksa’s record since the defeat of the LTTE, I doubt that he is a leader capable of forging a new peaceful political future for Sri Lanka.

And I fear for the toll that fighting terrorism takes on democracy. While Sri Lanka may provide a “workable model” for defeating terrorism, it hardly provides us with a desirable model. As a country engaged in (perhaps indefinitely) fighting terrorism, we in the United States should see Sri Lanka as a warning. We must decide if we are willing to sacrifice our democratic ideals to possibly attain an all-out victory over terrorism.

American officials act reasonably satisfied with these elections, though it’s hard to see why. They are now left with an Afghan partner in the escalating war against the Taliban that has run a shockingly corrupt and ineffective government, has garnered less than half the majority of votes cast in the election, and has committed large-scale fraud in a failed effort to win these elections. To sum up, Karzai has proven to be bad at governing Afghanistan, does not have the support of most of the Afghan people, and was caught trying to steal the election. While Karzai seems to have legitimately won a commanding plurality of the vote, his behavior indicates a blatant disregard for the electoral process and the rule of law that would be condemned by the US government had it occurred in a place such as Iran or Venezuela.

Though President Obama gave Karzai a scolding about improving his governance when he called to congratulate him on his victory, close US-Afghan cooperation is bound to continue. Indeed, if Obama has his way, it will increase (though he appears to be feeling less hawkish about Afghanistan than he was as candidate – perhaps because of this tainted election). And it should. The return of the Taliban poses a threat to Afghans, the region, and perhaps the world. After a decade of supporting violent religious fanatics (both Afghan and foreign) against the Soviets, and then walking away to let these extremists, drug kingpins, and warlords plunge the country into civil war, the US owes the Afghan people a serious commitment to rebuilding Afghanistan by providing security, promoting development, and nurturing a democratic government.

This means US military involvement is needed, but more importantly, it means overcoming the challenges of bringing things like water, electricity, roads, health care, education, and jobs to Afghans. Yet, hopes have been dashed that these elections would give Afghanistan a clear and legitimate democratic leader who was ready to work with the US and battle the Taliban with the support of the Afghan public. The muddied results will certainly make the work of the Afghan government, the US, NATO, and other foreign players more difficult. And the Taliban are already claiming victory, believing that their attacks stopped the second round of voting.

In the end, these elections give little hope for the immediate future of Afghanistan and the US mission there. By his own actions, Karzai has weakened his position vis-à-vis the Taliban, and the US will be hard-pressed to win Afghan hearts and minds while backing a largely discredited Afghan government and failing to follow through on efforts to improve the lives of Afghan people. US involvement is also becoming increasingly unpopular at home, and the longer US soldiers and aid workers are in Afghanistan, the more chances there are for casualties that may not be palatable to Americans who increasingly believe that there are unclear reasons to stay in Afghanistan.

The Obama administration is hopeful that Karzai will clean up his act and the UK is making threats that it can’t support a government that is so unapologetically corrupt. However, it is hard to imagine that the US or the UK – as heavily invested in Afghanistan as they are – will simply quit Afghanistan if Karzai continues running his government as is. The US certainly has some leverage over Karzai, but for now it has little choice but to put most of its eggs in one basket, hoping that he is the man best suited to improve life in Afghanistan and to fight the Taliban. Unrest seems sure to continue to plague Afghanistan, and US ability to win a counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan has been seriously compromised by this election’s outcome. How adeptly Obama’s strategy can adapt to today’s complex political situation in Afghanistan and how well US forces can work with other regional players (Pakistan, India, Russia, Iran, China) will be key to preventing Afghanistan and the entire region from becoming more dangerous and unstable than they are today.

This is the second article covering the Afghan election and the fourth in a series on major elections in Asia this year.

US policy towards Burma under George W. Bush was to shun the military government and to stick to the strict international sanctions regime imposed on the junta. This did nothing to noticeably change Burma’s internal political situation. So now the Obama administration is trying a new tack of unconditional diplomatic engagement while continuing sanctions until the junta makes some significant concessions. The US and many Burmese would like to see three things – the release of Suu Kyi and other political prisoners, constitutional reforms, and assurances that 2010’s election will be free and fair. While committed to dialogue with General Than Shwe’s government, the US does not appear optimistic that change will happen quickly in Burma.

Aung San Suu Kyi

While this strategy alone may not bring quick or significant change to Burma, other factors are also shaking up the country’s political status quo. Aung San Suu Kyi – the incredibly popular and politically shrewd leader of the opposition National League for Democracy who has been under house arrest for most of the past 20 years after winning the 1990 elections, only to have the results ignored — has recently met with members of the junta, agreeing to help negotiate an end to sanctions on Burma by Western nations. While Suu Kyi likely believes that the sanctions have been ineffective and detrimental to the Burmese people (the standard argument for ending them), she is also making a political move.  This is based on the assumption that her favor to the junta will not go unrewarded, perhaps reminding the junta of the substantial power she still wields. Should the junta decide to release Suu Kyi, next year’s elections have a chance of being legitimate, with Suu Kyi’s NLD possibly coming to power.

In recent days, there have been hints that Suu Kyi may indeed be released by the government. This could be thanks to Suu Kyi’s recent cordial relations with the government, because of the change in US Burma policy or due to mounting international pressure. The US is leaning on other nations to put pressure on the Burmese government, and China, India, and Russia recently have joined the US and Europe in calling for Suu Kyi’s release. The calls of the three emerging powers are particularly significant given their relatively close ties and positions of influence with Burma. These new calls for Suu Kyi’s release accompany strained relations between Burma and its closest ally, China, because of border disputes and Chinese anxiety over the possibility of improved US-Burma ties.

Within Burma, politically active Buddhist monks continue to challenge the junta, pressing it to apologize for killings during 2007’s massive protests and threatening further protests if their demands go unmet. Monks inside and outside Burma have also demanded a timeline and clear benchmarks for US engagement with Than Shwe’s government.

The Mon State, Burma (Myanmar)

The most likely change in the foreseeable future is the release of some political prisoners, including Suu Kyi, which could open a Pandora’s box for the junta. The more parties involved in 2010’s elections, the greater likelihood that they may, from the junta’s perspective, get out of control. Should the elections actually be held freely and fairly, countless other complicated political and constitutional issues will be raised. After this, a redrafting of the constitution could take place, which would likely deny the junta the constitutional protections that they now enjoy against prosecution for their actions while in power.

Of course, there are a host of other possible futures for Burma – the most likely being that not much will change. The junta may allow cosmetic political changes while retaining power and continuing to suppress its domestic critics, defying the international community. However, there seem to be enough wild cards in the deck now that a political shakeup in the next year is more likely than it has been for some time. Whatever happens, one hopes that life will improve for the Burmese people.

Hamid Karzai (Photograph by Harald Dettenborn)

With 90% of the vote counted, Karzai appears to have won 54% of the vote, with runner-up Dr. Abdullah Abdullah with 28%, and the remainder of the vote being split among 36 other presidential candidates. However, these results are not official, hundreds of thousands of votes have been thrown out, and there have been persistent allegations of massive voter fraud. It appears that there is substance to many of the allegations, raising the possibility that enough votes could be disqualified to drop Karzai’s tally to under the 50% that he needs to avoid a runoff with Abdullah. Investigations into voter fraud could last months, delaying any eventual runoff and threatening to plunge Afghanistan into more violence and perhaps a constitutional crisis as competing groups and candidates jockey for a position in whatever government eventually comes to power (or alternatively, strive to discredit and destabilize the government elect).

The reason for the strong opposition against Karzai has been his government’s extreme corruption and his political amorality in being willing to team up with unsavory former warlords like Abdul Rashid Dostum, accused of human right atrocities against Taliban captives under his control. The Afghan people also have seen Karzai largely as the candidate of the US and the international community which has generated distrust concerning the outcome of the vote, believing that his victory has been preordained without concern for Afghan opinion. If Karzai wins a majority in a flawed election process, his adminstration is sure to be dogged by accusations that it came to power illegitimately. Should he fail to win over 50%, his position would be confirmed as relatively weak while he would be subject to repeated opposition attacks (during and between election campaign) highlighting his corruption and poor administration. If Karzai were to win the runoff election, he would be returning to office with a poor record, a weak administration, and no mandate from Afghans. If on the other hand, Abdullah were to win the run off, there may be a public sense of hope for a new direction in Afghan politics, and a belief in the legitimacy of the electoral system. Nor would Abdullah have the amount of negative baggage that is holding Karzai back. While Abdullah’s backers are also likely to have engaged in vote fraud, the most serious allegations appear to be against the Karzai campaign. An Abdullah win would more likely be perceived as representative of a fair and legitimate electoral process.

Dr. Abdullah Abdullah

The biggest difference between Karzai and Abdullah is that Karzai supports a government with power concentrated in the office of president, while Abdullah sees a parliamentary system as a more appropriate system for representing the diversity of Afghan beliefs and communities. An Abdullah win would mean a fundamental restructuring of the Afghan government with unpredictable results. In governing, Abdullah would probably need to rely on supporters as shady as Karzai’s, and his government would face the same difficult challenges to improving life in Afghanistan that Karzai’s would.

But it may just be time for a change. Karzai may have been the man for the job when the Taliban fell. He had an admirable history of brave opposition to the Taliban and al Qaeda. He challenged Presidents Bush and Musharraf on many aspects of his country’s rebuilding and advocated strongly for the Afghan people. He may have been the best chance to hold Afghanistan together after 2001, but now, his rule has become a liability for the Afghan state. A new leader is needed to bring legitimacy to the election process and to restore faith in the Afghan government itself. Bringing progress in Afghanistan will be a difficult task for anyone, but should Karzai win, it will be harder than need be.

This article is the third in a series about major elections taking place in Asia this year.  Part one and two covered the recent elections in India.

While the Cold War has ended and China has become a capitalist powerhouse, China’s government has retained its iron grip. Strikingly, any acknowledgment of this week’s historic anniversary was blotted out in China (with, for legal reasons, the exception of Hong Kong where over 100,000 people gathered to mark the occasion). Any news of the event – via television, internet, radio, press, even Twitter! – was blacked out and any demonstrations commemorating the event and its victims were forbidden. And this has not been the beginning of Tiananmen Square’s erasure from public memory. Many of China’s under-20 generation know nothing about what happened there in 1989, and students do not learn anything about the incident in their classes.

Tiananmen Square, with the Monument to the People's Heroes in the background

Many in China and the outside world remember, however. And although world leaders and citizens spoke out this week to condemn the 1989 crackdown as well as China’s silencing recognition of the event, these words were uttered in a different context, in a different world. China and the world are so different from 1989 that these words, coming from the mouths leaders who have become increasingly friendly with China, ring somewhat hollow. For example, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton suggested that China “should examine openly the darker events of its past and provide a public accounting of those killed, detained or missing, both to learn and to heal.” To which Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang responded, “We urge the U.S. to put aside its political prejudice and correct its wrongdoing and refrain from disrupting or undermining bilateral relations.” It is hard to see Clinton’s statement as anything besides political rhetoric. This is the same Secretary of State who visited China just this spring and refused to discuss “marginal issues” like human rights in favor of issues like the economic crisis and environmental concerns.

I’m sure that Clinton, Obama, and other outspoken world leaders and heads of state are uncomfortable with China’s lackluster human rights record. Who isn’t? But now China doesn’t fit quite so easily into the box that it used to. It was easy to condemn its human rights shortcomings and to demonize China as a godless commie dictatorship when it didn’t supply most of the cheap consumer products that we are so addicted to in the US. Or when it didn’t finance much of our ballooning national debt. It is still easy to condemn Burma’s similar 1988 and 2007 pro-democracy crackdowns because Burma still remains politically and economically insignificant on the global stage. China now occupies center stage.

These days, words condemning China are generally just that – words. Discomfort with China’s disregard for democratic values and basic human rights will not stop our businesses – or US consumers – from buying cheap goods from China. It will not stop businesses from moving factories there. Nor will it stop the US government from stepping up diplomatic and economic engagement with China, an important rising global superpower. Barring a shockingly egregious misstep on the part of China’s political leadership, relatively small issues like the Tiananmen Square blackout and even bigger concerns such as Chinese policies regarding Tibet, the rest of the world will be eager to be a part of China’s stunning rise.

A military guard stands watch at Tiananmen

Really, China is a new manifestation of an old dilemma for US foreign policy. We (and here I use “we” to stand in for the US government) claim to stand for democracy, freedom, liberty, human rights, the right to free speech, freedom of religion, etc., etc. And sometimes we do, but often we don’t. We support a Saudi monarchy/dictatorship because they ensure our access to oil. We supported the mujahaddin in Soviet-era Afghanistan because it was anti-Soviet. Then we supported a military dictatorship in Pakistan because it was anti-mujahaddin (kind of). We supported South Africa’s apartheid government for years. We armed, trained, and funded death squads and dictatorships throughout Central and South America during the 1980s and beyond (and before too). This list goes on.

China is just the latest challenge to applying lofty American ideals to the nitty-gritty of national foreign policy and bilateral relations. Perhaps one day, China’s government will give in (willingly or unwillingly) to global and domestic concerns about human rights and political freedom in China. It doesn’t look likely to happen soon however. And neither the US nor other countries have the political will to really stand up to China on such issues. In fact, conflicts with China over such issues could very well undermine the material benefits we enjoy thanks to our growing relationship with China. And, in all honesty, the compromises that the US and China are compelled to make to maintain a working, if imperfect, relationship are certainly better than another Cold War. Diplomacy and relationship building are always more complex, muddled, and morally ambiguous than outright hostility.

After being enlightened about Pakistan’s history and foreign interference, I was desperate to find out his views about the insurgency in his native tribal areas. We were out in the open air, and Naveed was in a calm mood.

“So you asked me about the insurgency in the North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan?,” he uttered after taking a deep breath. As I nodded, he said: “To understand the present insurgency, you have to go back to the British Empire era when Pashtun tribal areas had their own tribal administrators called ‘Walis’.”

ISOLATION AND INDIFFERENCE

“The British did little to interfere in our lives and gave us the freedom to have our own code which we call the ‘jirga’ (assembly of tribal elders) that defines laws, regulations, and policies. Soon after the independence, we joined Pakistan on certain preconditions. One of them was to have our own jirga system,” Naveed said, adding that Pakistani courts and law enforcement have no jurisdiction over the tribal areas known as Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).

Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA)

FATA is an interesting region of Pakistan. It covers an area of 27,220 sq. km and has an estimated population of 3.5 million. Pashtuns comprise the overwhelming majority of the population with a few ethnic Hazaras, Sikhs, and Punjabis living alongside. The literacy rate is hardly 10%, well below the national average of 40%. It is an underdeveloped area with few metalled roads and limited gas and electricity supply. The locals do not pay tax to the state. With only seven percent of the land area cultivatable, people make a livelihood by smuggling custom-free goods from Afghanistan, operating car theft rackets, drug trafficking, and selling locally produced illegal small and heavy arms.

The Pakistani government seldom intervenes in the tribal affairs. A government appointed political agent called “Malik” represents the federation with few executive powers. FATA is however represented in the National Assembly in Islamabad. Unelected tribal elders represented the region until the system was changed in 1997 to introduce mandatory elections. However, little has changed as the elections are contested on tribal rather than on political lines. Therefore, although there are now elections, most individuals vote solely along tribal lines. This is in contrast to the rest of the country where political parties cut across tribal identities.

“This whole region is in a limbo. It is part of Pakistan, but at the same time it is not. Confused aren’t you?” a sarcastic Naveed remarked at my puzzled face. “Thanks to our tribal elders’ wishes, the government never incorporated us into mainstream Pakistan. There always remained a divide between the settled and tribal areas that local leaders as well as Islamabad exploited for their own gains. We are the Pakistani version of America’s Wild West,” he joked in his patent ironic tone.

The dynamics of this tribal society are now unraveling. Due to the fact that this region never became part of the mainstream Pakistani society, the allegiance of the people is toward their tribes or clans rather than to their country. The idea of a shared cultural identity has remained confined to the boundaries of the tribal regions spread across Pakistan and Afghanistan. Therefore, although they are counted as part of the Pakistani population and their areas are shown on the map as part of federal Pakistan, the state has failed to win the Pashtun hearts and minds in order to fully include them in the wider Pakistani cultural society.

“The people in the province, especially in the tribal areas, felt the isolation. Politicians, time and again, made promises to bring them into the mainstream and grant a comprehensive political and judicial system. From Bhutto to his daughter Benazir and from General Zia-ul-Haq to his stalwart Nawaz Sharif, everyone made promises. Empty promises. Things hardly changed on the ground,” Naveed remarked. “Does a promise remain a promise if unfulfilled?,” he argued while referring to an Urdu proverb with a similar connotation.

RETURNS OF THE HOLY ALLIANCE

The outbreak of a guerrilla war in Afghanistan is a turning point in the history of Pakistan. In 1980, Pakistani military dictator General Zia-ul-Haq setup an alliance with the United States to send fighters across the border to aid the Afghan resistance against the Soviet-backed government in Kabul. The joint Pakistani-US investment of arms and fighters radically altered the course of war in Afghanistan, drawing Soviet troops into a long, bloody conflict that ultimately left them defeated and contributed to the disintegration of the USSR.

But the Pakistan-US alliance also brought a host of problems to the region, especially Pakistan. The tribal areas, acting as a launching pad for anti-Soviet fighters known as the “mujahideen,” became a den of illegal arms, drugs, and smuggling. Millions of people from Afghanistan sought refuge in Pakistan, straining the already limited resources of their hosts. The impoverished refugees from Afghanistan, at times, clashed with more modern and well-off Pakistanis due to cultural, religious, and lifestyle differences. People still resent the military government of General Zia over his handling of the Afghan crisis.

The area that was touched most by the conflict was the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan. Naveed described the post-war situation. “The mujahideen returned to their homes. The government had no rehabilitation plan for them. Frustration rose tremendously and their warfare experience gave them the confidence to lift their arms and fight for their rights.” He added that veterans of the Afghan war returned to Pakistan along with their comrades from the Middle East, Central Asia, and North Africa.

the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP)

“Most of the non-Afghan fighters were exiles from their home countries who could no longer return to their states. Many of their home governments feared a rebellion from their ranks and labeled them as unwanted elements. The only people who welcomed them were the Pashtuns as we have an ancient code of hospitality and generosity for someone who asks for protection and refuge,” Naveed explained, pride for his culture and traditions evident in his tone.

While the USSR left Afghanistan humiliated and defeated, the US reveled with joy. Afghanistan was abandoned, as the US interest was limited to the defeat of its nuclear rival rather than rebuilding of the nation. Former mujahideen turned their guns on each other and a full-scale civil war ensued. Thousands of people died during the conflict from 1992-1996. The only forces that stopped the civil war were the Taliban, who drove the warring former mujahideen factions from power and seized control of 90% of the country.

HOSTILITIES AT HOME

“The former mujahideen who returned from Afghanistan demanded a judicial system based on Islamic law and Pashtun culture and traditions. This was their own version of Shariah. It was a simple demand that was raised to deal with the complex law and order situation in their region,” the young academic described, adding that the local people were very enthusiastic about such demands. “Everybody including the former mujahideen wanted it. The government, instead of principally agreeing to their demand and holding a referendum to decide the issue, sent troops and tanks to the region. People did not get what they really wanted,” he remarked with bitterness replacing his usually soft tone.

In 1994, a bloody conflict erupted in the Malakand division of NWFP province. Veterans of the Afghan war formed a militia called “Tehrik Nifaz Shariat Muhammadi” (Movement for the Imposition of Muhammad’s Shariah law) and started an armed uprising in the region. Government buildings in the region were attacked and occupied in November 1994. The Islamabad government led by the late Benazir Bhutto, initially signing a peace agreement with the militants, backed off under international pressure and waged a military operation. The TNSM militants were flushed out to the hills, and calm was restored. However, the situation on the ground remained the same, and no general judicial system reforms were introduced to speed up the delivery of justice. The demand for a time saving and cost-effective judicial system in the national courts remained unheard, further infuriating the masses.

Hundreds of people lost their lives in the bloody conflict between the TNSM militants and Pakistani armed forces from November 1994 until early 1996. Thousands of people also left their homes in the region due to the conflict.

“The government’s short-sighted and half-baked measures exacerbated the situation. It waged an armed operation against the group but forged an alliance with the leadership. The head of TNSM, Maulana Sufi Muhammad, was captured by the army, but was released without any charges. I do not understand the logic of a military operation that ends up with the signing of a peace deal and distribution of sweets,” the 26 year-old said while mentioning the local practice of distributing sweets on the eve of a festive ceremony. “They sit side-by-side adorning each other with garlands while people mourn over their losses and bury their dead. Is this justice?”

According to a statement issued on May 3, 2001 by the then-NWFP provincial governor Owais Ghani, criminals and assorted illegal arms, timber, and drugs mafias provided financial support to the TNSM and flourished under their rule. TNSM strictly denies the allegations. The Shariah movement returned to the political scene in the region with a vengeance soon after the 9/11 attacks in the USA. While the then-US President George W. Bush was envisioning plans to invade Afghanistan and topple the Taliban government in Kabul, the former mujahideen in Pakistan were renewing their vows for a jihad and promising a new war against the USA along the same lines of struggle against the USSR.

Soon after the US forces invaded Afghanistan on October 7, 2001, TNSM was the first pro-Taliban group to send its forces to fight alongside the Taliban. Thousands of fighters crossed into Afghanistan along with their leader Maulana Sufi Muhammad. The TNSM fighters returned to their bases after Taliban retreated from urban Afghanistan to their rural strongholds to initiate a guerrilla war against the occupying US and NATO forces. Leaders of TNSM were arrested by Islamabad after their return in 2002 and imprisoned on charges of incitement of violence and violation of state laws. President General Pervez Musharraf outlawed the organization in 2002.

Naveed stopped all of a sudden in the middle of the conversation. Something was clearly bugging him as his face turned red. “The cat and mouse game between TNSM and Pakistani military continued. The Pakistani government enjoyed the support of Washington while TNSM were bolstered by the inclusion of al-Qaeda elements in its ranks. The government signed a peace deal on one day and initiated an armed operation against the opposite side the very next day,” Naveed uttered angrily.

His outburst continued: “Nothing changed on the ground except that the situation got out of control and the militants got bolder with their tactics. Pakistani military attacked militant positions on the ground. They also hit their hideouts from the air with the help of Cobra gunship helicopters given by the US.”

“As if this was not enough to wreak havoc, the US drones unleashed hell from the skies, allegedly killing hundreds of innocent civilians. Thousands of people have been caught in the crossfire with no place to run and nowhere to hide. I’ve seen the carnage myself. Was this all for peace?”

Stocky-built Naveed came to an abrupt halt. His voice was shaky, and he didn’t want to continue anymore. Having lived for more than a year with him I never saw Naveed so silent before. He silenced himself. The aggression was in his hands, but he unclenched his fists and stood still. What else can he do?

The Swat District (yellow) within the larger NWFP (green). FATA (blue) also shown.

As we were having this chat on a rainy spring evening, thousands of internally displaced refugees in Swat valley in northwest Pakistan were lying in the open without any shelter. There is an acute shortage of food in the refugee camps, I’m told. But one thing is very certain. There is no shortage of ammunition on either side.

The radical Islamists impose their style of governance in the name of religion and carry out their harsh sentences against poor and powerless people. In the opinion of many in Pakistan, the Islamabad government with the aid of the US government bombs and maims its own people by using tanks and fighter planes. The poor and powerless people, suppressed by the militants and oppressed by the government, run to save their lives. Where is the democratic promise of liberty, fraternity, and equality? Why don’t I see the Islamic spirit of forgiveness, compassion, and justice? Perhaps, both the sides are interested in furthering their agenda and exploiting their subjects in the name of their ideologies.

After the votes were tallied on March 16, the UPA did emerge victorious. And by much more than anyone had thought. To form a government in India, a party or coalition must win 272 seats to claim a majority in the Lok Sabha, the lower house of Parliament. The Congress won 206 seats on its own, and its five pre-poll allies won an additional 52 seats, putting the UPA within reach of 272, needing to pick up only a few more independent and smaller party representatives. To American ears, this may sound like less than a mandate. However, in most national elections, only about half of Indian voters vote for the two parties with a national presence – the Congress and the BJP. The last time any single Indian party won over 200 seats was in 1991. And the most optimistic Congress members predicted 180 seats at the most. The BJP finished a distant second, claiming 116 seats, and no other party gained more than 23 seats. The last UPA government didn’t even have 272 members and had to rely on support “from the outside” from India’s communist parties – known as the Left. When the Left withdrew its support over the Indo-US nuclear deal, the Congress was forced to enlist the support of an on-again off-again ally, the Samajwadi Party, who also supported the UPA from the outside. So the fact that the Congress was able to nearly cross 272 with its rather small pre-poll alliance was definitely a surprise. It also means that it will not need to coddle temperamental allies while governing.

So, why the outpouring of support for the UPA? There are a number of early theories. Many commentators have asserted that voters chose the harmony and stability of another five years of UPA rule. Electing the NDA or the Third Front would certainly have brought policy changes and more unpredictable relations with other countries. Yet a mere desire for stability does not convincingly explain the results in my mind. Indian voters are notorious for kicking incumbents out of office. Indeed, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh is the first PM to be reelected since India’s first PM, Jawaharlal Nehru, nearly 50 years ago.

5 More Years!

Other commentators give more positive reasons for the UPA’s success. Many credit Dr. Singh’s honest, able, deliberate, and understated style of governing as an asset that appealed to voters in a time of regional instability and rapid economic change within India. This seems plausible, especially since the NDA decided to attack Singh as a weak PM beholden to the Nehru-Gandhi family dynasty, while projecting their PM candidate, LK Advani as stronger and better able to respond to the threats India faces. This macho saber-rattling may have worried voters who perhaps appreciated Dr. Singh’s thoughtfulness and restraint in response to events like the terrorist attacks in Mumbai last November.

Others give credit to the political blossoming of handsome, young Nehru-Gandhi heir Rahul Gandhi, who was a tireless campaigner and who spearheaded Congress’ campaign strategy in India’s largest state, Uttar Pradesh (UP), where the Congress recorded its best showing in two decades. Rahul worked hard for the Congress campaign and began to show some political savvy while presenting a fresh, young face to voters – in contrast to the elderly leadership in other political parties. Given the Indian media’s obsession with glamour, celebrity, and the Nehru-Gandhi family, Rahul’s influence may be overblown, but it does seem to have made a positive difference in the way voters – especially young ones – view the Congress. And his bold political strategy in UP was indeed a success.

The last major reason for the UPA’s success was voter support for its unprecedented and substantial welfare policies that poured billions of rupees into programs to improve rural development, agriculture, health, and education. The NDA’s 2004 campaign slogan – “India Shining” – backfired on them spectacularly when voters reminded them that most Indians had not joined the hallowed ranks of the middle class. It appears the UPA learned from the NDA’s mistake. India is changing fast, but not everyone has gained from the country’s new found prosperity. The UPA’s programs targeted the country’s poorest and most disadvantaged, aiming to improve lives, the country, and their election chances. And it worked.

In my previous article about the Indian elections, I stressed the importance of coalitions. With the Congress’ spectacular showing, coalition politics will be less significant than in the past. This hardly marks the end of coalition politics, however. The Congress was fortunate that its coalition partners did very well, particularly in West Bengal and Tamil Nadu. It also seems significant that most of the UPA’s support came in states that were also fielding Third Front parties. Perhaps the voters’ rejection of this anarchic hodge-podge brought voters to the UPA in greater numbers. In others, it is entirely possible that Congress benefited from voters’ rejection of a new, untested coalition.

Confused? Well, that’s how it goes with Indian elections. The question is: What will happen now? With the Congress’ strong showing, there are now high expectations for significant improvements in India’s governance and policies, some of them wildly unrealistic. Will the UPA be able to deliver? Does their win herald a new direction for Indian politics? Don’t expect dramatic changes, though the UPA may now act more boldly in pursuing certain favored policies. For example, there is frequent speculation that without needing to rely on support from the Left, the UPA will accelerate India’s economic liberalization (even though some are making the argument that India’s protected markets and regulated banks have saved it from the worst of global economic implosion). The neighborhood is also changing quickly. Worries about Pakistan’s stability have risen dramatically. The Obama administration is scaling up the war in Afghanistan. Rebuilding society after a long civil war in Sri Lanka presents a new challenge. These changes may compel the UPA to make some new foreign policy choices.

However, barring a political catastrophe, the UPA’s reelection will provide 10 years of relative political stability at the national level. At this point in time, when India is being touted as an emerging global superpower, this stability should only help legitimize its global ambitions, particularly in the able hands of Manmohan Singh. Despite the UPA’s shortcomings, their reelection gives India the political opportunity to take the next steps toward being a global leader.

This is the second of two articles about this year’s Indian national elections and the second in a series of pieces about major elections in Asia this year.

This week, the Sri Lankan military has finally defeated the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) after over 30 years of armed conflict, killing the LTTE’s leader Vellupillai Prabhakaran and wiping out most of the LTTE leadership. In the early 1980s the LTTE emerged as the strongest and most ruthless of the Tamil separatist groups, upset with the discrimination and violence directed against the island’s Tamil-speaking Hindu minority by the Sinhala-speaking Buddhist majority. Sri Lanka’s Buddhist clergy rabidly supported the war despite its high cost, heavy civilian casualties, and questionable effectiveness. The LTTE (and other armed and unarmed Tamil groups), fighting for a Tamil homeland in the north and east of Sri Lanka, was supported from abroad and from the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu despite being labeled a terrorist organization by the US and other nations. For decades the conflict dragged on without an end in sight, and was presumed to be unwinnable by either side. Up to 100,000 people died. But in the last few years, Sri Lanka’s government launched an all-out assault on the LTTE, and the LTTE was split by infighting. The Sri Lankan military’s final push in the last few weeks precipitated a humanitarian crisis in which hundreds of thousands of terrified Tamil civilians were caught in the crossfire between the Sri Lankan military and the LTTE, and 7,000 were killed. But Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa won his war.

Now that the Sri Lankan military has emerged victorious, it remains to be seen how well the government secures the peace. The struggle for a Tamil homeland has perhaps been dealt a final blow and Sri Lankans are undoubtedly weary of war. But if, in the wake of the war, the Sri Lankan government treats Tamils as conquered subjects and fails to address the conflict’s root causes, resistance may again grow. This week’s national holiday celebrating the government’s victory over the LTTE must have seemed like insensitive gloating to many of the country’s Tamils, and it makes one wonder if the Sri Lankan government truly grasps what needs to happen next.

The challenge facing the Sri Lankan government is complex and substantial – to heal the wounds inflicted over the past three decades of war, to substantively address Tamil grievances against the Sri Lankan government, and to build a new inclusive Sri Lankan state and society. Can a government that has been on a war footing for so long accomplish these delicate tasks? Can a government that has for so long demonized, distrusted, and assaulted nearly three million of its own people move towards a just and peaceful future? I fear that it will not. Without doing this, the island’s Tamils will continue to flee Sri Lanka and those left will become increasingly marginalized. This may or may not result in renewed violence on the part of Tamils against the Sri Lankan state. Either way, the future for the country’s Tamil population looks bleak unless the Sri Lankan government is pushed to rebuild their war-torn country in a manner that includes those who once rejected its legitimacy.

It’s been more than a year since I last saw my friend, Naveed, a 26-year-old marketing and finance graduate who is now a lecturer at an Islamabad University. He went back to his country soon after completing his Masters degree in Business Administration. When leaving for home, his mood was an eerie mixture of optimism and caution. “I’m confident that things will finally change in my country,” he said before boarding the flight. I remember his confident words but can’t forget the empty smile on his face.  It seems to require more than confident words and smiles to live in a country where optimism and pessimism on any given day are as predictable as the flip of a coin.

Pakistan is  a country where failure is rewarded. We like to live in a state of denial.  We often believe that we have never been wrong or can be wrong.  In the process we make many excuses to justify our actions.

LAMENTABLE HISTORY

“Moign, to understand my ‘lecture,’ as you put it, you have to understand the history of the country,” Naveed said jokingly. It seemed that he was once again enjoying the argumentative chats that we used to have in our free time while living together in student accommodation. Nothing seems to have changed since then.

Pakistan has a long history of foreign interference before there was any lawlessness, unemployment, corruption, civil mismanagement, or army intervention in the country. Soon after its birth in 1947 as a result of blood-strewn partition carried out by the imperial British, the infant state had to pick a master that would act as a caretaker of the country’s policies and safeguard its interests. The choices at that time were the USSR and the USA. The country’s first Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, embraced the latter. And the results of this “embrace,”  as promised, were magical.

During the 1950s and 1960s, the new Pakistani master taught its new satellite state to be wary of two things — communism and grass-roots democracy. As a result, the rulers of Pakistan always kept these two “viruses” in check. Thousands of workers suspected of communist sympathies were put behind the bars and a general election was ruled out in favor of a “sustained democracy” that was “compatible with the country’s Islamic and social values.” Both of these decisions had a devastating effect on the country’s democratic identity and politico-economic activities.

Washington, the “torch-bearer of democracy” and “leader of the free world,” never raised an eyebrow when a military coup in 1958 overthrew the civilian administration in the then Pakistani capital city of Karachi. Instead, new accords of friendship and military partnership were signed that gave the Americans access to the Soviet’s backyard for the first time. The US military soon stationed U2 bombers in the country to keep an eye on Soviet activities in Central Asia.  (One of these U2’s launched from Pakistan would of course be shot down by USSR surface-to-air missiles over Soviet skies on May 1, 1960.)

“This was the first time we pleased our masters and had bit of a misadventure,” a bitter Naveed remarked.

OBSESSION OF THE SOCIETY

“Islam, it seems to me, is a blanket term that defines our ambitions and justifies each and every deed performed in our political and social life. From politicians to common man, everyone has his or her own idea of Islam and chart their plans accordingly.”

Pakistan was created in the name of Islam with the founding leaders promising no room for ethnic partisanship and discrimination. But that’s not what really happened. The country witnessed its first bout of instability in 1952 when Bengal was stripped of its national language status despite the fact that it was spoken by more than half of the country’s population. The imposition of Urdu as the sole national language was seen as an imperial move that triggered riots across the eastern half of the newborn geographically disjointed state. This was the first time when the seeds of ethnic divide were sown in the newly cultivated fields of Pakistan.

The Pakistani army fought the Indian army in 1965 when its misadventures (which included covert military operations in Indian controlled Kashmir) backfired in occupied Jammu & Kashmir. New Delhi [India] then invaded our country to teach us a lesson. For the first time we raised the flag of Jihad against an occupying power and the then (military) rulers drummed up massive support – all in the name of Islam.

Naveed added that this is the official textbook version of Pakistani history, and not necessarily his.

From this time on, we have never looked back on the idea of our army as the vanguard of Islam, and we, as a nation, as the righteous people.

HEADS & TAILS

The situation got more interesting in 1970 after the first ever free and fair general elections for a parliament were held in both wings of Pakistan–East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) and West Pakistan (now Pakistan).

The Bengali separatist movement in 1971 complained that the majority Bengali ethnic group was being sidelined by the minority Punjabis that dominated the civil service and the military. They also accused West Pakistan of usurping the resources of East Pakistan and exploiting them. Statistically, they weren’t wrong as exporting jute produced in East Pakistan generated most of Pakistan’s revenues, while East Pakistanis suffered under grinding poverty.

“I think that was the first time we said: ‘Heads or tails, both flips of the coin are ours, hence we win the toss,” Naveed said while referring to an Urdu proverb that has a similar connotation.

A military operation was waged against Awami League, the party that was demanding more autonomy for the Bengali-dominated East Pakistan and a fair distribution of resources between both entities of  the Pakistani federation. Though winning a clear majority in 1970 elections, Awami League’s leader, Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman, was denied the transfer of power and was instead arrested and tried for treason.

Disgruntled East Pakistanis took up arms against the powerful Punjabi-dominated Pakistani Army. A bloody civil war broke out in the eastern wing of Pakistan that saw the army, along with its pro-Islamic paramilitary groups, attempting to crush the separatist movement. Bengali separatists, thanks to the active support from India, soon weakened the grip of the Pakistani army in the eastern territory. The nine month long bloody movement witnessed countless massacres of innocent people and wanton destruction of property and infrastructure. The people’s power superseded the military’s might, and the Pakistani army surrendered to Bengali insurgents and their principal backers – the Indian army.

This is how we learnt the lesson. Or shall I say, this is how we are taught at school. We are told: This all happened due to some miscreants that created mistrust between us (Pakistanis) and Bengalis (Bangladeshis). India wanted to extract revenge and dismember us. But thanks to our valiant Islamic army we did not let that happen. We succeeded in keeping our western flank intact while giving our Bengali brothers the right to freedom.

Naveed’s tone while quoting his history textbook didn’t seem convincing to me, but I let him continue rather than dispute the textbook version.

HAPPY MASTER

Pakistan’s chief ally, the United States of America, of course did not practically intervene in the conflict. However, Islamabad enjoyed its tacit approval throughout the conflict. The USS Enterprise was dispatched to the Bay of Bengal in 1971 to boost the morale of its ally in the region. The hue and cry raised by human rights groups over genocides committed by the Pakistani army were ignored, and a steady supply of military hardware and ammunition flowed from the US.

The public was in shock when they found that the Pakistani army has surrendered to the Indian army and the Bengali separatists. No one could believe their eyes. Their army, strengthened by the spirit of Jihad, was defeated by the Indian army and their “mercenaries.” At least this is what was fed to them during the 1971 conflict.

Naveed insisted that people for the first time became wary of the Pakistani army’s alliance with the US army and lost their faith in the military as an institution.

“The surrender of 94,000 Pakistani military and paramilitary personnel was not a joke,” he added while referring to the fall of Dhaka on December 16, 1971. “All the architects of this humiliation got away with their crimes and were never brought to justice. The public felt betrayed by their own guardians,” he said while referring to the fact that though a formal inquiry of the war was conducted, the main players of the debacle were never punished.

HOLY ALLIANCE

After a brief interval of civilian rule from 1972 to 1977, a military regime returned from the barracks to instigate a coup d’état. Under an alleged agreement with the US, Pakistani military chief General Zia-ul-Haq overthrew Pakistan’s first democratically elected civilian leader, Zulfiqar Bhutto. Bhutto was later hanged to death on charges of treason and murder.

While other murder cases drag on for years and years, Mr. Bhutto was executed within five months. Lawlessness, vigilantism, police heavy handedness, extra-judicial murders, and many other problems stem from the dilapidated justice system of Pakistan.

Afghanistan was invaded by the USSR in December 1979, soon after General Zia took the reigns of the government. The Soviet invasion not only rang bells in Islamabad, but it also stirred unease in Washington, DC. With the Vietnam War’s humiliation in mind, the Americans seized on the opportunity to drag the Soviets into a long, bloody war that would deplete their power and leave them economically and militarily drained and exhausted.

Bureaucrats under the command of the then US Secretary of State Zbigniew Brzezinski initiated a plan that started the training of Afghan insurgents by the CIA months before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan itself.

The US struck a holy alliance with the anti-Soviet insurgents who called themselves “mujahideen” – the ones waging Jihad in the name of God – to bleed the USSR army to death in Afghanistan and seek revenge for role in the Vietnam defeat. To me this was the height of hypocrisy demonstrated by both sides. While the capitalist Americans and Islamists in the Middle East and South Asia seldom saw eye to eye on any issue and often regarded one another as adversaries, they struck an alliance against communism. What a historic alliance it was!”

ARMY, INC.

While the world’s attention was set on the war in Afghanistan, General Zia-ul-Haq’s autocratic regime throttled the voices of reform and democracy in the country at the behest of his “Islamic agenda.”  During his 11 years in power, the country never had free and fair democratic elections and the army, in connivance with the so-called Islamist forces, ruled with an iron fist. At this time, all important civil institutions like the judiciary, election commission, press, bureaucracy, and foreign service came under direct military control, and the army’s role in the country’s day-to-day affairs changed from an institution to a corporation.

The army initiated schemes for banking, insurance, heavy industries, housing, aviation, education, security firms, farms, and food production and soon became the country’s biggest enterprise. This in turn weakened private businesses, which  stood no chance of competing with the military backed businesses due to their growing political and economic clout. Civil institutions also suffered a direct blow and languished due to deliberate neglect and apathy, partly due to political strife in the country.

General Zia-ul-Haq died in a mysterious plane crash along with many of his top generals and the US Ambassador on August 17, 1988. The country then returned to civilian rule after 11 years of military in power, but little changed on the ground. The army, instead of returning to the barracks, realigned itself and started interfering in politics by supporting its favorite candidates.

Naveed agrees with the view that Pakistan’s problems are not the result of a few years of mismanagement and chaos. “The crises have been brewing since the military eclipsed the civilian institutions and democracy was wound up in favor of a martial law in 1958,” the young Pakistani graduate said lamenting the fact that army’s role was only strengthened by the Americans. “We have never seen them (Americans) flaying military intervention in our politics. This is a mockery of democracy by any standards.”

“So what are the reasons behind the insurgency in the tribal regions of Pakistan including the latest bloodshed in Swat valley? What went so wrong that led the country to the brink of failure and to be labeled as a failed state?” I asked Naveed impromptu. Naveed, totally baffled by the complex nature of my questions, took me out for a walk. “Is it OK if I answer your questions in the open air? I need to breathe some fresh air,” he asked. I nodded and made a quick exit with him.

Why is the insurgency raging in many parts of Pakistan? Born in the tribal areas, whom will he blame for the deaths of innocent lives and suffering of millions of people? I kept on walking in the chilly evening wondering what he was going to say about the ground realities.

I will explore the answer to this and more in Part 2 of this two part series.

The largest democracy on Earth is presently in the middle of national elections. In India, three out of five phases of voting have been completed, and in only two weeks the final results will be known. Indian elections are always rambunctious. The democratic process itself is chaotic, accommodating dozens of political parties, thousands of candidates, and around 700 million voters who live in the world’s biggest cities and most remote villages, speak dozens of languages, and represent thousands of castes across a shockingly wide socioeconomic spectrum. Corruption, violence, and outlandish campaigning are a part of elections in any given year. Newspapers and news channels flood the cities and countryside with relentless election news and gossip while politicians crisscross the country in frenetic campaigning that can draw crowds of hundreds of thousands of people. The frequent involvement of cricket and film stars lends an air of celebrity and glamour to the proceedings. Hindi-speakers frequently use the word tamasha to describe elections and politics – a word meaning a “spectacle” and “amusement.” It also connotes rowdiness and a sense of being outside of normal life.

This year’s national elections are no different. But last November’s terrorist attacks in Mumbai have raised concerns about serious violence interfering with the elections. Indeed, after a right-wing Hindu nationalist candidate made inflammatory anti-Muslim remarks in public speeches, a Muslim mafia don allegedly threatened to kill him. But, this is really just par for the course. So far, the press has said little about (presumably Pakistani-based) Muslim militants planning any attacks during the elections. The larger threat – during the first two phases of polling at least – were Maoist guerrillas known as Naxalites, active in many of India’s poorest rural regions, who called for an election boycott and carried out murderous attacks on police forces, detonated bombs, and hijacked a train, leading to the deaths of over two dozen people.

With that said, the chance that India’s elections will be derailed by any violent organization or event is exceedingly small. Barring an unprecedented attack in India, this year’s National Assembly (Lok Sabha) elections will be completed relatively smoothly and on time. With the counting of votes on May 16, the election will come to a climax, and it is difficult at this point for anyone to imagine what is likely to happen. By all accounts, this election is a toss up, and the Election Commission’s ruling that exit polls and post-poll surveys be banned have made it even more difficult to predict what may happen. Complex coalition politics, which have dominated national politics in India since the 1990s, makes this election more unpredictable than the typical close US election, and this year’s addition of a third and an even smaller fourth coalition of regional parties makes these 2009 elections more jumbled than the last national elections five years ago. The stunning emergence of the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) since 2004 has also complicated matters.

Consider: The ruling United Progressive Alliance (UPA), led by the secular, centrist Congress Party, is currently a coalition of 16 parties. The UPA has ruled since 2004 and can claim a rather ho-hum record that is neither impressive nor a failure. The alliance that ruled from 1999-2004, and which has sat in opposition since, is the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), led by the right-wing Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which has recently been beset by serious infighting and an unclear message for voters. It now contains 10 parties. Until now, these two alliances were the only ones to wield enough power to gain control at the center. The Congress and the BJP have been the largest parties since the 1990s, but their support has gradually been chipped away by communist, regional, and caste-based parties. Until recently, these smaller parties had no choice but to ally themselves with the Congress or the BJP if they wanted to play a part in national politics. However, this year a Third Front has emerged, gambling that a coalition of such parties can perhaps capture as many seats as the UPA and the NDA. This would enable these parties to take power without bowing down to the two parties that have dominated national politics for the past two decades.

With this development, parties are jockeying for power and weighing their options before and after the elections. While some parties have committed to one alliance or another, other parties are waiting until after the votes are counted to pick a side. And whichever alliance is asked to form a government will, with some serious political wrangling, likely attract new parties to its side – whether they have committed to another or not.

In this day and age, this is how elections in India are won and lost. The mathematics and the political sticks and carrots necessary for building a winning coalition have all but drowned out issues, personalities, and ideologies. For evidence of this, just follow the Indian news. The vast majority of election coverage is currently speculation about likely alliances or defections, not about issues. Of course, certain events and issues may shape an election, but they must be extraordinary. Though this is a national election, voters are choosing local candidates (in India’s parliamentary democracy, the party or coalition with the most candidates elected forms the central government). And these local candidates must address local issues – issues which often don’t change a great deal in much of India. Who can ensure electricity, drinkable water, better roads, better health care facilities, and better schools? And with such a plethora of political parties catering to specific caste and religious sensibilities, many voters will simply vote their caste or religious identity. For this reason, I doubt that, aside from Mumbai and maybe other large Indian cities, the issue of terrorism will be important. Nor will the global economic crisis. What will be most important in these elections are the alliances that are negotiated. For now, those alliances have yet to cohere. And there are enough wild cards in the deck that the final outcome is anyone’s guess.