Afghanistan: An Inaugural Gift

So now that we have a new President, what to get him for an inauguration present? How about an antiwar movement? Specifically an anti-Afghanistan War movement. Some may consider it in poor taste to immediately set about opposing Barack Obama’s Afghan policy before it’s had a chance to “work.” But some ideas don’t deserve a chance to work, and adding an additional 30,000 American troops to the 32,000 currently in Afghanistan is one of them.

You might think it should be easy enough to develop a movement against a war that has been going on for over seven years, but for almost all this time the nation has considered the Afghanistan War with little more than averted vision. After the September 11, 2001 attacks, retaliatory US military action was widely viewed as inevitable. The only question was what the target would be. If a country is bombed by military aircraft, you look for their country of origin; if it is attacked by highjacked airliners, things are not so simple. But when Afghanistan was chosen, the prospect of the demise of its Taliban government alleviated at least some of the misgivings of those who considered invading an entire country an inappropriate response to the actions of nineteen hijackers. Already notorious in the west for blowing up its giant ancient Buddha statues, its treatment of women was so primitive that George Bush could be viewed as a feminist crusader for launching an attack against it.

However, before there was much time to actually consider what was going on in Afghanistan, came the buildup to Iraq invasion the following year. Ever since then, Afghanistan has largely been lost in the glare. This has been an extraordinary lapse of attention, even for a country that seems to have come to accept military conflict as the norm. However, even Afghanistan War’s early opponents resigned themselves to devoting their complete energies to opposing the larger and more outrageous Iraq War with the hope for a day when they could return to actively organizing against what had now become America’s second war.

That day has probably arrived, not with the hoped for clarity of an actual end of the Iraq War, but with the vaguer prospect of an end coming in the next couple of years. But of course, the people who plan these wars don’t exactly keep the convenience of potential antiwar movements in mind, and a murky set of circumstances is what we’ve now got.

Whether antiwar interests like it or not, between the perception of Obama as an antiwar candidate (whether deserved or not) and the Iraqi troop withdrawal agreement negotiated by the outgoing administration, the public is likely to give President Obama a pass on Iraq for at least the next year. Therefore, even though Afghanistan may still not feel like the correct priority for American antiwar interests, circumstances seem to dictate that it may become just that. For one thing, the leeway the new President will enjoy regarding Iraq will not extend to the Afghanistan War, which he has embraced as a “good war,” unlike that “dumb” one in Iraq. In fact, with the talk of the surge, there even seems to be a reasonable chance that Afghanistan will one day be remembered more as Obama’s war than as Bush’s.

There are some Obama supporters whom I have talked with recently who do not think that he really meant much, if anything, of what he said about Afghanistan during the campaign.  Rather, it was the sort of thing that he felt that he had to say in order to get elected. This theory assumes that you can’t seriously aspire to the White House without supporting at least one military action. However it seems least equally plausible that his stance reflects a genuine belief that the Democrats will be able to get the Afghanistan War “right” by being smarter about it, much as “the best and the brightest” of the Kennedy Administration once figured that they could fix Eisenhower’s Vietnam problem for us.

Building broad support for getting out of Afghanistan will likely not be easy in the short run. The upcoming escalation will probably produce some military successes that will foster illusions about finally “turning a corner” there. There will likely be lots of tough talk about eliminating the Afghan opium trade, closing the border with Pakistan, and perhaps even extending the war to that country (something that candidate Obama indirectly advocated during the primary season). The new Administration will inevitably benefit from the perception of bringing new vision to the conflict, even if it has done no such thing. However, if and when this war moves from the periphery and the nation begins to focus more attentively, opposition will inevitably deepen.

In order for such opposition to mount, the first uncomfortable fact that America needs to confront is that the Karzai government that the US and NATO forces are committed to defending would not exist without the foreign invasion. Its legitimacy is based on the force of arms–foreign arms. Unpleasant as the prospect of another Taliban government may be, can we assume that it is a less legitimate option from an Afghani point of view? In addition, the other portion of Washington’s rationale, that we have engaged in seven years of war in the unsuccessful pursuit of one man, Osama bin Laden, becomes somewhat pale in the light of the fact that the US rejected out of hand the Taliban’s offer to turn him over to another Muslim country for trial if he were found.

Even more urgently, Americans will need to wake up to the fact that a “war on terror” is a slogan – like a “war on crime,” not a military operation like the invasion of Normandy. The American public is capable enough of sympathizing with the suffering peoples of the world, the population of Darfur for instance. However, unfortunately that empathetic capability often vanishes when the cause of the suffering is the US itself. Can we Americans really imagine ourselves accepting a situation like that of Afghanistan today where a foreign power (namely us) will bomb the occasional wedding, say, “Oops, our bad,” and continue right along because mistakes happen in even in the best intentioned of wars? The day our country actually comes to grips with what it means to be on the receiving end of our misconceived “war on terror” will be the day its support crumbles.

Hopefully the friends of Obama who think his heart really isn’t in the escalation of the fight in Afghanistan will realize that they can do him no greater favor than helping to deliver a groundswell of opposition to being there. After all, friends don’t let friends fight dumb wars. And if they’re right, if he’s really serious about wanting to “forge a hard-earned peace in Afghanistan” as he said in his inaugural address, even he will ultimately thank us.

It may take a while to catch on, we should start practicing the words now: “Afghanistan–out now!”

Robert Gates: Beyond Politics

Hacking off the people that got you elected is a dubious way of beginning a presidency. Why on earth then would President-elect Obama draw the ire of some Democrats by keeping Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, a Bush appointee, in his cabinet?

“Change” has been the mantra of the Obama machine’s public face from day one. It catapulted him from an obscure, yet “articulate and bright and clean” (thanks, Joe) junior U.S. Senator from Illinois to the next President of the United States. As such, the Obama campaign promised a transparent administration that would redress the excesses of power wielded by the unitary executive under Bush’s wicked little coven. We would see an end to the war in Iraq and a realignment of our foreign policy that would lead to open communications with those nations deemed unworthy by the Bush cadre. Good God, don’t let any of THOSE guys stick around for his new “change” administration.

The thing is, Secretary Gates isn’t really one of those guys.

In fact, Robert Gates has served seven presidents, both Republican and Democrat, during his years with the intelligence community. He is notable for being the only director of the CIA to rise in ranks from an entry-level position to director (DCI). He wasn’t born with the proverbial silver spoon in his mouth and earned his directorship in 1991 the hard way. In fact, he was up for the job in 1987, but shadows of doubt about his role in the Iran-Contra affair took their toll on his nomination. There were intimations that he may have been complicit in suppressing irregularities that should have been reported to Congress during the affair. However, Gates, unlike many, was completely cleared of any wrongdoing. In fact, during those confirmation hearings, he gained a measure of introspection that the current administration lacks, as noted in his memoirs:

I would go over those points in my mind a thousand times in the months and years to come, but the criticisms still hit home. A thousand times I would go over the ‘might-have-beens’ if I had raised more hell than I did with Casey [former director of the CIA William]  about non-notification of Congress, if I had demanded that the NSC get out of covert action, if I had insisted that CIA not play by NSC rules, if I had been more aggressive with the DO in my first months as DDCI, if I had gone to the Attorney General.

Gates’ political alignment is a little vague, but he most certainly leans conservative. Some sources cite him as an Independent, while others quote him as saying “I consider myself a Republican.” However, his foreign policy ideals were shaped by those conservatives who did not necessarily hold with the current administration’s neoconservative “either you are with us or you are with the terrorists” absolutist philosophy. Rather, Gates could be better identified with the more rational “realists” of the first Bush administration. In fact, during his service as deputy national security adviser during the Bush 41 administration, Gates worked closely with then director Brent Scowcroft, some even referring to Gates as his protégé . Scowcroft has been vilified by the neocons for his vocal opposition to the war in Iraq, and his influence on Gates should not be underestimated.

Gates’ work with the Iraq Study Group before his nomination to Secretary of Defense should also be considered closely. This group consisted of a bipartisan team of heavy hitters, including former Secretary of State James Baker, former representative Lee Hamilton, and retired Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor. The group’s recommendations, published in 2006, significantly differed from the course of action taken by the Bush administration. They favored a substantial shift in responsibility for Iraq’s security from U.S. to Iraqi forces and opined that “by the first quarter of 2008…all combat brigades not necessary for force protection could be out of Iraq.” Instead, we got the surge. The surge, arguably, was effective, but Gates’ presumable role in advising the group in matters of intelligence steered them towards their conclusions that a troop reduction was the wiser course. It is a testament to Gates’ integrity that he listened to his better judgment rather than the rantings of the hawks. Gates maintained a rational voice and was the farthest thing from a sycophant to the neoconservative prevailing interests of the administration.

Gates’ reliance upon his own well-founded deductive ability over hard line party rhetoric became even more evident during his confirmation hearings for Secretary of Defense. When asked to describe his motivations for accepting the nomination to the position, Gates stated that he believed “very deeply that one of the fundamental factors in our success in the Cold War was our ability to have a broad, bipartisan agreement on the fundamental strategy on how to deal with the Soviet Union” and that “it is imperative, in this long war on terrorism that we face that could go on for a generation, that there be a bipartisan agreement.” That philosophy of bipartisanship stands in stark contrast to the Bush administration’s politically unilateral attitude.

Even more revealing is his thoughtful, realistic understanding of relations with Iran and Syria. When asked by Sen. Byrd, D-West Virginia, if “an attack on either Iran or Syria would worsen the violence in Iraq and lead to greater American casualties,” Gates paused gravely, and replied, “Yes, sir, I think that’s very likely.”

What one gathers from studying Secretary Gates is that his actions are guided by his assimilation of experience and an exceptional understanding of the geopolitical world around him. He is no slave to demagoguery, and has a history with the more levelheaded elders of his party. His agenda seems one of a true civil servant as opposed to a political ladder-climber. He has used his ascendancy to power to effect cautious, intelligent policies that are much more self-guided than adherence to any particular political dogma. President-elect Obama seems to value these characteristics as virtue enough to override divisive political considerations and has entrusted the defense of the nation to such a man of intelligence, independence, and integrity.

The Wild Card in Iranian Relations

Recent news reports are indicating that Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is suffering from ill health. Combine that with economic uncertainty in Iran because of economic woes caused largely by declining world oil prices, and it is now not certain that Ahmadinejad will even run for reelection next year, let alone win. This development throws another kink into the already complicated foreign policy relationship that the new U.S. President will inherit with Iran.

Being over reliant on a single resource, Iran’s economy is not completely diversified and therefore prone to severe economic shocks.  For example, recent inflation in the country is approaching 30 percent. In addition, civil unrest is not a new phenomenon there. A large young population has been restless for years, not a good sign for a repressive dictatorship that wishes to keep tight control. Of course, the real power in Iran lies with Ayatollah Khameini, not with President Ahmadinejad. Therefore, even if Ahmadinejad were to leave office next year, overall issues of strategic direction that lie with the head of state would not be disrupted. However, Ahmadinejad is the current face, albeit a very controversial face to the rest of the outside world. Therefore, foreign relations with the west, and the U.S. in particular, might change drastically with a new president in Iran.

Chances are that a new moderate leader could take power. However, one can never be sure. If the economy deteriorates and unemployment rises at a fast pace, no one knows what may happen. Yes, Iran is a hostile nation. However, social unrest in Iran could lead to an even scarier foreign policy dilemma–stateless actors with potential access to nuclear reactors.

Therefore, as the U.S. candidates debate the nuances of whether there should be discussions with Ahmadinejad without preconditions, they may just be missing the forest for the trees.

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