When the legal system fails to provide Kleist’s protagonist (based on a real life figure of 250 years earlier) with proper redress after he is wronged by a minor noble, Kohlhaas decides to take matters into his own hands. Eventually he will burn the noble’s house down and raise a private army to repeatedly attack the city of Wittenberg in his attempt to capture the man. His wife will die of injuries sustained in the pursuit of his goal and Martin Luther and the Kaiser in Vienna will become personally involved in the matter. At the very end, he does find that some measure of justice has been done. Unfortunately, that realization comes as he is being led to his beheading.

There was a point when Brinkley, a former New York Times writer now teaching journalism at Stanford, would have raised few eyebrows in writing, “Right now, the most effective thing the United States could do to turn the tide in the so-called war on terror is to capture or kill Osama bin Laden, the terrorists’ shining symbol.” But that point was eight years, two wars, ten of thousands of casualties, and a trillion dollars ago. Today, such writing conveys the obsession of a real-life Michael Kohlhaas who wants to go on and on and on in pursuit of his concept of justice. Of bin Laden he writes, “We know where he is, more or less [sic],” but “Pakistan refuses to go after him.” His solution?  “I’m not talking about an invasion. Infiltrate the region with special-operations forces.”

How many countries can there be, I wondered, where a journalist writing that sending armed personnel into another country does not constitute an invasion will not be asked to seek professional help? But at least Brinkley does recognize that the Pakistanis might see things a little differently: “Let them scream,” he writes, “Over almost a decade, we have given Pakistan every chance to do the job. Now it’s time to do it ourselves.”

What seems to bother Brinkley most is that “Today, bin Laden must wake up every morning with a smile on his face for all he has inspired.” This he may well do, but probably not quite for the reasons Brinkley thinks.  Bin Laden’s stated goal, let us remember, it to maneuver the United States into a global war against Islam that will spiral out of control. So he’d have every reason to smile if he read an article like Brinkley’s. Ultimately, it’s not columnists like Brinkley who matter, though, but the Kohlhaasian spirit that seems to drive our foreign policy.  After all, while much of the country once dismissed George W. Bush as a hopeless, misguided warmonger and embraced Barack Obama as a peace candidate, this second post-9/11 President appears at least as committed to globalizing this war as his predecessor, if perhaps in somewhat different directions.  From the point of view of tying the U.S. down in endless war, what’s not to like?

Kafka: An inspiration for US foreign policy?

But if the strategy of that war seem like something Kleist might have imagined, the tactics bring to mind a far better remembered German writer – Franz Kafka, the rare author influential enough to have his name turned into an adjective. While there are probably as many different definitions of “Kafkaesque” as there are readers of Kafka – and maybe more – “incomprehensibly complex, bizarre, or illogical” will probably do as well as any.  But whatever your personal definition of Kafkaesque may be, American military operations in and over Pakistan will probably fit it.

The current centerpiece of that campaign appears to be a program of missile strikes aimed at “terrorist leaders” from unmanned “Predator” drone planes flying above the country. Officially, though, there is no such program and as a spokesperson for the Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff says, “We do not discuss current operations one way or the other, regardless of their nature.”

The New York Times reports the strikes are “carried out from a secret base in Pakistan and controlled by satellite link from C.I.A. headquarters in Virginia.”  The government of Pakistan regularly denounces them as a violation of its sovereignty. Unnamed U.S. officials claim there is an understanding under which the Pakistani government allows the U.S. to carry out the strikes while the U.S. allows the Pakistanis to publicly denounce the attacks. The government of Pakistan denies this.

Unnamed U.S. intelligence officials frequently name figures they claim have been killed in the strikes. A recent target was Pakistani Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud, whom, the Washington Post says, “a senior U.S. official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity” called “one of the worst people on the planet.”  As you might expect, this non-existent program is rather unpopular among the people of the country where its targets live: a Gallup Pakistan poll found it with 9 percent support among the Pakistani population.

The uncertain level of civilian casualties is a growing concern. A United Nations rights investigator complains that “the Central Intelligence Agency is running a program that is killing significant numbers of people and there is absolutely no accountability in terms of the relevant international laws.” Unnamed sources within the U.S. government privately assure reporters that civilian deaths are lower than reported. One unnamed government official told the New York Times that the drone strikes are “the purest form of self-defense.”  The C.I.A. had no comment on a report that the private security contractor formerly known as Blackwater – now Xe Services LLC – was involved in the work of actually placing the bombs on the drones.  An unnamed defense official denied it to The Nation magazine – “on background.”

In response to repeated questions about the unacknowledged drone strike campaign at a press conference in Pakistan, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton would only say that “there is a war going on.” She did not specify to which war she referred. The United States Government acknowledges being at war in Iraq and Afghanistan, but not in Pakistan. Appearing at a memorial service for seven CIA operatives killed in Afghanistan, some of whom were thought to be involved in the planning of the Pakistan drone strikes, President Barack Obama exhorted hundreds of their colleagues “to win this war.”  He also did not specify of which war he was speaking.

In regard to the acknowledged war in Afghanistan, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates recently said, “The Taliban, we recognize, are part of the political fabric of Afghanistan at this point.” He did not say at exactly which point this recognition occurred; the U.S. overthrew the Taliban government eight years ago and has been at war with the organization ever since. Gates went on to say that “The question is whether they are prepared to play a legitimate role in the political fabric of Afghanistan going forward, meaning participating in elections, meaning not assassinating local officials and killing families.” He did not say whether a simple denial of involvement in assassinations and other killings – on or off the record – would suffice in place of an actual cessation of such activities. Nor did he speak to the question as to when various Taliban officials might be removed from the United Nations “terrorist blacklist” that currently prohibits the Afghanistan government from negotiating with them.

I have to think Kleist and Kafka would have loved this material.

As complicated as the mere choice of venue can be for a politically- and emotionally-charged speech, consider also the debate raging on our own soil currently over the administration’s near-total embrace (astutely noted by Charles Krauthammer) of Bush-era detainee and citizen surveillance policies. Despite Obama’s euphoric relationship with large swaths of the American public throughout the campaign and into his first 100 days as Commander-in-Chief, the cold, hard facts of a post-9/11 security reality have put the administration at odds with the very people who regarded the man as saint and savior less than six months ago. Throw in a growing concern with our Israeli allies over the Likud party’s unwillingness to move toward a two-state solution and one can undoubtedly bet that our domestic and diplomatic tensions are being taken in and poured over with deliberant intent by the Arab audience Obama means to engage, and influence, in early June.

With so much at stake for the administration and U.S. foreign policy, generally, the task of penning the Cairo speech is most certainly a daunting one. And, though no one doubts the speech will be given with the president’s usual degree of bold eloquence, the process of defining the message and the words that will carry it is often one that involves an incalculable mixture of research, meditation and sheer epiphany.

Former Bush speechwriter, Troy Senik

Troy Senik, former presidential speechwriter for George W. Bush and current contributor to Real Clear Politics and the Center for Individual Freedom, knows this dynamic very well. Following is a conversation between Mr. Senik and myself, where he discusses presidential speechwriting, what’s at stake in Cairo, and how – while most of us were sliding comfortably into bed for the evening, during his tenure in the Bush administration – he was just hitting his stride, pouring himself another steaming cup of coffee as he walked the hallowed halls of the White House with a legal pad.

RB: Ben Rhodes, foreign policy speechwriter for President Obama, has outlined the upcoming speech in Cairo as a next step in the process of building positive relationships and dialogue with the Muslim World. He has referred to Obama’s overture to Iran in January as the start of that process. However, many of Obama’s critics are wary of missing an opportunity not to meet the frequent human rights missteps and looming security threats of most Arab governments head-on. Do you see his upcoming speech as a chance to facilitate more engagement with the Arab world, or to deliver a tough message on nuclear non-proliferation and human rights protection?

TS: It will probably be a little bit of both. One of the dangers of White House speechwriting is that every speech goes through what’s called the “staffing process.” That means that all of the relevant folks in the Executive Office of the President and the bureaucracy get their hands on the speech and try to insert their own points of view and their own policy agendas. I’m sure there will be talk about non-proliferation, but it will probably be just that: talk. President Obama has waved his finger at regimes like North Korea and Iran already, and they’ve cheerfully ignored him because they’re confident that there’s no penalty for ignoring him.

As for human rights and democracy promotion, it will be interesting to see if he takes that message abroad. Those were both big parts of the Bush Administration: the “Freedom Agenda” and the Bush Doctrine, respectively. But, Obama has basically kept quiet on both of those issues thus far in his presidency.

I think the upshot is that the Administration desperately wants to convey the message that America is not at war with the entire Arab world. That’s a noble goal, but it’s also something that we’ve been trying since 9/11. I don’t think it necessarily makes the president look weak, but I think it does make him look like he doesn’t have much of an idea of how to deal with the Arab street beyond giving a speech.

Cairo, Egypt

RB: The choice of Cairo has been panned by some in the West because of Mubarak’s backsliding on human rights protection in recent years, and by the Arab world, due to Cairo’s pseudo-alliance with Israel, in which Egyptian police have safeguarded the tunnels into Gaza, among other reasons. How important is choosing the location in giving a speech of this magnitude?

TS: It’s important. Egypt may not be an ideal choice, but it’s the Obama Administration’s least worst option. Obama promised a speech in the Muslim world. He can’t do Saudi Arabia, because it’s a cradle of radicalism, a state that we support primarily because of our need for its petroleum, and a totally atavistic society. He could go to Indonesia, which has the world’s largest Muslim population, but it looks incoherent to give a speech in Southeast Asia when everyone knows your real audience is the Middle East. Jordan is not an option because their relationship with the U.S. has historically been close enough that it would look like Obama was looking for a sycophantic venue. Turkey has been too politically aligned with Israel and would lead to the speech being rejected out of hand by Arabs. So, Egypt certainly has stains, but if you’re looking to reach out to the Arab world, all of your options are states with pretty pockmarked records.

RB:And, obviously, Israel would have been a security nightmare, in addition to presenting a situation closely paralleling the Jordanian dynamic you mentioned.

TS: Right. And going to Israel to talk about the Islamic world would be suicidal. It would be the best possible way for Obama to simultaneously alienate the world’s Jewish and Muslim populations.

RB: Which brings up the issue of how far Obama is willing to go to obtain the first fruits of a peace accord with the Muslim world. The build-up to Netanyahu’s recent visit to Washington was primed with shots across the bow from Obama and the Israeli PM, both seemingly frustrated with the other’s perceived next steps in the realm of Arab diplomacy. Obama, and Bush before him, in addition to countless scholars and former diplomats, have advocated a two-state solution. Does Obama have enough political leverage, at home and abroad, to alienate (even if slightly) Israel to achieve better relationships in the Arab world?

TS: Well, that question really gets to the heart of one of the biggest fallacies in the world of diplomacy, which I know for a fact is embraced by a huge swath of the people working in the State Department. The idea is that you make the Arab world like us more by sticking it to Israel. And I think that’s absolutely untrue.

Can Obama put some sunlight between himself and Israel? Sure. But will the Arab states like us as a result? No. They’ll be happy that they’ll have marginally less difficulty in trying to eradicate Israel, but they won’t be carrying American flags through the street anytime soon — at least not unlit ones. The reality is that all the Arab governments really want from us is to keep buying their oil, stop defending Israel, and stay out of their part of the world. So, the only way you can make them happy is by being a supplicant for their cartel, turning your back on the only long-standing democracy in the region, and pretending that Islamic extremism, terrorism, and their routine violations of human rights aren’t a problem. And by any rational standard, that is way too high of a price to pay.

RB: Does the debate over Guantanamo, in which Obama swears to reengage American detainee policy with jurisprudence and constitutional reverence, contribute to how Obama’s speech will be received in Cairo?

TS: Probably more on the domestic side than the international side. The foreign audience might be mindful of the fact that he’s ending up much closer to the Bush Administration’s policies on some war measures than was initially expected, but they know that Obama is a different kind of guy at his core than President Bush was.

On the domestic side, however, it may actually be a problem. With Guantanamo, the interrogation memos, the Pentagon photos, etc., Obama has reached his first real impasse with the public. This week, people started realizing that the administration has no plan for how to close Guantanamo and what to do with the people being detained there. And when you talk about putting these people on American soil, and you learn that 1 out of every 7 we’ve released in the past have gone back on the battlefield, you realize that this isn’t the law school hypothetical that everyone’s been treating it as for the past few years. So I think the public’s had their first widespread dose of skepticism towards Obama, and if he goes to Egypt and gives a speech that looks overly deferential to people who don’t like us, it’s going to compound that concern, especially since that’s starting to look like a pattern for him.

An inflection point in President Obama's foreign policy agenda?

RB: Right. And, this comes at a time when he’s enjoying 64% approval ratings on national security – an undoubtedly pleasing fact to Democrats who’ve struggled against Republicans in this area for years, though just as likely a campaign-resilient and unsustainable number.

Your point also brings to mind a recent piece by Jacob Weisburg at Slate, “What we’ve learned so far about President Obama,” in which the author “continues to suspect him of harboring deeper convictions.” He references reversals on torture and “Don’t ask, Don’t tell.” In light of this possibility, that Obama hasn’t quite found his footing in the Oval Office with regards to where political philosophy and the real-world meet, is this speech pre-mature, or is it absolutely necessary given Iran and North Korea’s recent belligerency, in addition to the constant tension elsewhere in the Arab World with Western ideals?

TS: I suspect that in the long view it’s simply irrelevant. Obama is fond of talking about “game changers.” This isn’t one. He’ll go and give the speech and capture the media cycle for a day or two, but that will be it. Unless he has some unanticipated “Let them come to Berlin” or “tear down this wall” moment, it will probably be forgettable. And I see no indication that there’s anything that bold brewing in the White House. So in the end, this probably gets him nowhere.

RB: Referencing his overture to the Iranian people, again, who were celebrating Nowruz — the Persian New Year — during his address in January (a fact he used to link our shared humanity with the Iranian people), would the impact of the Cairo speech be any more or less significant by speaking to the citizens of Arab nations versus the leaders?

TS: It would be much more significant if Obama chose to speak to the Arab people instead of their governments. There is a long tradition of American presidents speaking directly to the populations of nations with whom we have strong disagreements because the American view has traditionally — and rightly — been that we oppose governments, not peoples. That being said, I don’t think Obama will do that for two reasons. One, something that dramatic would indicate that we think of the entire Arab world as essentially hostile dictatorships. Two, you have to be very careful about stirring up the populations in those countries, because in some cases, mass movements would actually yield even worse regimes than the current one (that’s certainly the case with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt).

Also, an important note about the New Year message to the Iranians. While it was addressed directly to the people, it made clear reference to the “Islamic Republic of Iran.” That is Obama’s way of legitimizing the current government there and telegraphing that the U.S. is not seeking regime change. And that’s about as dispiriting a sign as you can get if you’re an Iranian citizen who hopes to live in a freer society.

RB: Do you think he missed an opportunity in the January address?

TS: Yes, but that error was fathered by the policy. The mistake was saying you’re going to basically endorse a dictatorship. Sometimes, reasonable constraints may force you to tolerate a dictatorship, but you never endorse one.

RB: Earlier, you mentioned the complex nature of vetting a presidential speech, especially when it comes to speeches of this magnitude – the “staffing process.” Before a speech gets to this point, though, what were the first steps you took when preparing a speech for President Bush?

TS: You would get a description of the speech and the goals a few weeks in advance, then have the research team gather background material. Depending on the magnitude of the speech, you’d then usually get some guidance from senior staff or the president himself. From there, you’d try to hammer out an outline and/or a rough draft, which for me often consisted of walking the halls of the White House at 11 PM with a cup of coffee and a legal pad. In the Bush White House, the writers would then edit the first draft and send it into the staffing process.

RB: Was Bush the kind of president that poured over every word and turn of phrase, or was he concerned less with specifics and more that his central thesis be present?

TS: President Bush was relentlessly focused on the logic of his remarks. Sometimes that would translate into a focus on minutiae, sometimes it wouldn’t. But often times how much he dove into the details of a speech would be determined by how passionate he was about the topic. The most important thing was that he could see a coherent structure and feel like every point logically flowed into the next one. Like his father, I think he was a little distrustful of high-flying rhetoric. He certainly wouldn’t have attempted a lot of the fireworks that Obama does.

RB: It isn’t surprising that Bush differs in this respect from Obama. David Axelrod, senior advisor to the president, was quoted in a recent Politico piece as saying, “Everyone here sort of lives with the reality that the president is the best speechwriter in the group,” a sentiment also captured in Weisburg’s piece, noting Obama’s penchant for wanting to run the business of the Oval with a high degree of personal oversight.

TS: Yes, and that has to be intimidating. Given Obama’s talents as a writer and a speaker, I’m sure he’s much more intimately involved with the process than most presidents.

RB: What’s the most that Obama, and his speechwriting team, should expect out of a speech to the Muslim world that comes while the U.S. wages two wars in the Middle East? What would you like to see him say?

TS: They are probably expecting some softening in the Arab world’s attitude towards the U.S., but I’m deeply skeptical of that. Speeches can change the hearts of the people, but they almost never change the interests of governments.

I’d like to see him come out strong in favor of universal values instead of doing a multicultural soft-shoe. I’d like to hear him say that peaceful and benevolent religion is an incalculable gift in every corner of the world that it inhabits, just as radicalism is a scourge that must be defeated no matter where and why it takes root. If the nations of the Middle East really crave the international legitimacy they always talk about, they have to be willing to play by the rules of civilized nations and stop using their past and their real and imagined grievances as excuses for violence and tyranny.

Normally we might say a country had no choice but to wage war if it found itself the target of ongoing sustained attacks from another country. Having been the victim of a highly coordinated and lethal terrorist attack, there was little question that the US – and much of the rest of the world – had to revamp a wide array of security measures, the results of which are evident in any airport. The decision to fight a war in Afghanistan, however, was quite another matter.

From the beginning, a central goal of this war, as announced by the White House, was bringing the apparent perpetrator of the September 11 attacks, Osama bin Laden, to justice. And a week into the war, the Taliban government then in power in Afghanistan made an offer to turn him over — with several substantial provisos. They would do so if provided evidence connecting him to the crimes; they would not give him to the US, but only to another Muslim country; and naturally it would happen only if they could locate him. The offer was rejected out of hand.

Looking back, the matter of evidence would presumably have proven no obstacle. And so far as the stumbling block of the refusal to deliver him directly to the US goes, it now seems highly relevant to note that the Bush Administration then in power would go on to organize an elaborate worldwide campaign to prevent Americans from ever being turned over to the International Criminal Court despite the fact that 108 other countries have opted to recognize its legitimacy. The White House certainly would never have honored a demand such as it made upon Afghanistan.

Finally, there’s the matter of whether the Taliban was acting in good faith or would do so in the future: Did they know where bin Laden was and would they have delivered him if they did? That’s all speculation, of course, but what is not speculation is that seven plus years of war have not produced him either. And as we consider whether this war is worth continuing today, let’s consider the crux of the President’s argument as to why we had no choice but to get into it – the “nearly 3,000 of our people” killed.

In contrast to the facts surrounding September 11, data concerning Afghan civilians killed by American military action is very hard to come by. In what is arguably the most thorough study that was ever done on the question, University of New Hampshire Professor Marc Herold concluded that there were already nearly 3,800 of them by December 7, 2001. His research report listed the number of casualties, location, type of weapon, and source of information, but Herold believed “the figure I came up with is a very, very conservative estimate. I think that a much more realistic figure would be around 5,000.” These Afghanis too were simply “doing nothing more than going about their daily lives.”

The actual number to this day? No one knows. Certainly the casualty rate abated after the war’s first few months, yet few would question that the number is greater than that of the Americans who died as a result of the hijackers’ activities. Which brings us to the current President’s statement. Do the Afghanis therefore now also have no choice but to fight a war with the US? “An eye for an eye and soon the whole world is blind,” as Gandhi put it?

Whatever one thinks of the logic of getting into this war in the first place, the logic of staying is quite another thing. And actually, it may be a stretch to call it logic. Consider, for instance, the March 28, 2009 New York Times editorial praising Obama for asserting “leadership over the war that matters most to America’s security — the one against Al Qaeda and the Taliban,” while simultaneously complementing “his plans to urge so-called moderate Taliban to abandon their hard-line leaders” and noting that “more than seven years into the fight, the leader of the American intelligence community acknowledged that it knows shockingly little about the Taliban command structure.”

And that’s the current strategy in a nutshell: send in more troops to fight the enemy at the same time you’re trying to negotiate with them and figure out who they actually are. Unfortunately, the level of intransigence of the last administration was such that this approach may strike a lot of people as reasonable by comparison. But even though American casualties may well remain small enough in number and Afghan casualties may seem too remote and obscure to provoke a crisis in confidence back home, the fact remains that these are real people’s lives that the White House is hanging its flimsy strategy on.

Seeking to prevent Al Qaeda from inflicting any further harm on the US is a worthy goal and probably a realistic one. Trying to eliminate everyone who doesn’t like us in Afghanistan – and increasingly in Pakistan as well – is surely a prescription for endless war. We do have a choice

President Obama ran his election campaign on a slogan we all now know – “Change We Can Believe In.” However,  I have always been skeptical of Obama’s ability or commitment to bring fundamental change in US foreign policy. Obama’s Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s February trip to Asia, as well received and heavily covered as it was, has only confirmed my skepticism. Here’s why.

First, while Clinton’s words in Japan, Indonesia, South Korea, and China were a departure from Bush’s simplistic might-makes-right foreign policy, they weren’t too different from the foreign policy followed by her own husband, George H.W. Bush, Ronald Reagan (you get the idea). Obama’s foreign policy “change” appears to be a return to how the US has conducted foreign policy since World War II. That is, we work cooperatively within the UN, NATO, and other alliances; we engage other countries diplomatically; we don’t declare preemptive wars; we promote a certain type of economic model; we support nuclear non-proliferation; etc.  While this is undoubtedly better than George W. Bush’s foreign policy, it doesn’t look like a fundamental foreign policy shift. Nor does it bode well for those optimistic that President Obama will base his foreign policy on human rights, as many had hoped for during the campaign.

Admittedly, I did start out happy with how Clinton was conducting herself during this trip. She discussed relevant issues in the countries she visited and met with officials, students, and  activists. People seemed to be generally impressed with and charmed by her performance.  However, after following her trip for a while, I began to feel like it was just that–a performance. She was saying what she needed to say (and not saying what she needed to not say) depending on where she was, and her priority was selling the US, President Obama, and herself to officials and the public. This was sorely needed after eight years of George Bush, and while she showed her serious professional side as well as a softer personal side, Clinton is a seasoned, hard-nosed politician who surely understands the realities of being the only global superpower’s top diplomat. Realpolitik rules. Mushy sentimental support for human rights does not guide international relations or foreign policy. Clinton did after all vote against a Congressional bill to ban the use of cluster bombs in civilian areas because it would make her look weak on terrorism (her new boss supported the ban). 

Nothing idealist here.

The dissonance of her message was most jarring when comparing her speeches in Indonesia to those in China. She wooed and flattered her Indonesian hosts by talking up their democratic government, their thriving and diverse civil society, and the inclusive positive example they show to the Muslim world. China was another matter. Before she even arrived, Clinton emphasized that human rights concerns would not interfere with major issues like the economic crisis and global warming. She curbed her earlier harsh criticism of China’s human rights record in favor of other topics (which, to be fair, were not much easier to confront). While implying human rights are a marginal issue was not music to the ears of human rights advocates, it is consistent with US foreign policy historically. Human rights have had their place when they support US policy, but are always easily swept aside when they don’t. So far, the Obama administration doesn’t seem to offer a change from this realist worldview.

This is not to say that changes are not likely on the horizon. Obama is certainly charting a different course than George Bush did. His early choices about China, Russia, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria indicate a new tack, and he is making a concerted effort to clean up the US image in the world’s eyes. Human rights may be more important to President Obama than many previous US presidents, but Clinton’s stance in China makes it clear that they will not be the guiding principal of his foreign policy. The US participation as a mere observer at the recent UN Human Rights Commission and its boycott of the UN Conference on Racism also show that Obama’s administration is wary of treading new ground in the defense of human rights.

So then what is Obama’s guiding principle for his foreign policy? Not surprisingly, it appears to be essentially the same as every other US president–to protect and promote American interests abroad. This definition clearly leaves a lot of room for interpretation. Obama has pledged deeper and more sustained diplomatic engagement with allies as well as enemies–even Iran! Cuba! Venezuela!–in an effort to forge constructive relationships across the globe. As a caveat to this policy, Obama has explicitly said he will act in such a way only if it is in America’s self-interest.

Fair enough. This is the president’s job, and the reality is that US foreign policy probably will never be guided by any principle other than American self-interest. I understand this, and though it sounds amoral and opportunistic to my ears, I understand the necessity, and benefit, to advance a flexible foreign policy in an effort to engage with as many other countries as possible. And, in reality, should it be any other way? Maybe what Obama is offering is the best we can hope for when it comes to US foreign policy. George Bush’s presidency clearly demonstrated the pitfalls of having a foreign policy that stubbornly brooks no opposition to its moral certainty. Any moral justification can be abused by those in power–even a commitment to human rights or democracy or freedom. (Such a commitment to worldwide democracy is in fact one of the guiding principles of both idealist foreign policy, put in practice historically by those such as Woodrow Wilson, and modern neoconservatism under President Bush.) Promoting and protecting American interests abroad can be abused too, but at least it is an honest selfish justification for how our government behaves overseas. Protecting American interests is perhaps all the president should commit to, and if he (or one day she) is willing to keep as many channels of communication open with friend and foe, this may be the best long-term strategy. To expect anything more just may be naive, unrealistic, and unfair.

Brief Blowback History

In 1953, Iran, or Persia as it was then called, had a functioning democratic system. A successful coup by the CIA and British Intelligence overthrew the democratically elected government and replaced them with the hereditary Shah of Persia. His abuses and misrule led directly to the Islamic Revolution and the problems we have encountered with their Islamic government ever since. In the early 1980s, Iraq thus was encouraged to invade Iran, by the US in a fit of pique, and was supplied with arms in the resulting war. This assistance helped solidify Saddam Hussein’s military ambitions and indirectly encouraged his invasion of Kuwait in 1991, all of which led to the mess in Iraq today.

Meanwhile during the 1980s, the military assistance given to the tribes opposing the Russian occupation of Afghanistan led to the Taliban taking over the country. These people, who were responsible for 9/11 (despite what the Bush administration’s claims to the contrary), are whom we continue to fight today in Afghanistan. In addition, they also have brought the war on terror to the nuclear-power country of Pakistan.

Bill Clinton didn’t help matters, when he, in the midst of the Monica Lewinsky affair, launched Tomahawk missiles against suspected Al Qaeda munitions facilities at a site in Sudan and the Bora Bora site in Afghanistan where Osama Bin Laden was thought to be. This was in retaliation after US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania had been previously bombed. One of Tomahawks destroyed a human and veterinary manufacturing plant in Sudan, killing at least 20 Sudanese and putting many out of work. The Sudanese government immediately cut off all ties with the U.S. and released an important Al Qaeda suspect they had been about to hand over to the U.S. The Tomahawks in Afghanistan missed Bin Laden totally–he was in Kabul at the time. He in turn sold an unexploded Tomahawk to the Chinese for 10 million dollars. Worse, almost all of Africa, who had been outraged over the Embassy bombings by Al Qaeda, swung against the US policy after the bombings. Sound familiar?

In addition, it is clear to most of the world, though rarely reported in the US, that huge military assistance to Israel keeps them so dominant that they often disdain from entering into meaningful dialogue with the Palestinians or other nations in the region. Without meaningful legitimate political channels, arguably, that may have in turn indirectly led to the cult of the indefensible and grotesque suicide bomber.

Similar situations of blowback have occurred on all continents. It is alleged that the policy of supporting vain, immoral megalomaniacs as leaders in the more unstable areas of the world could be summed up as, “We don’t care if he’s a bastard so long as he’s our bastard”.

In too many situations today, previous meddling in the internal affairs or politics of other countries has led directly or indirectly to these messes that we may now face. If intervention leads to revolution or serious instability in the country involved, it is often inevitable that the beneficiaries of the situation will be the worst possible choices. It takes many generations for the situation to settle down and for the voices of reason make headway over the radicals who are always the initial power base. The French Revolution, The Russian Revolution, and the Persian [Iranian] Revolution are all cases in point

To return to the end of the Cold War, there was at that time, along with a feeling of relief that we were all suddenly safe, a hope that the troops could come home, and be discharged. That of course never happened. Why not?

The Military Industrial Complex

Today the US spends 46% of the total world’s military budget. The next 4 nations, the UK, France, Japan and China spend between 4-5% each. The US military budget has risen from 250 billion dollars in 2001 to over 700 billion in 2008. Thus, the sensible solution to help our failing economy would logically have to be to cut the military budget and bring everyone home. Wouldn’t that give us iron clad security at home? Maybe we could even make our inner cities safe and bring down the horrendous murder rate from the 17,000 yearly victims it is today.

Of course that is about as realistic as overall world peace. But why?

The answer to why that apparently sensible solution is currently a pipe dream was first given by President Eisenhower in 1961. Eisenhower was the first President, as a former General, to recognize the power of the Military Industrial Complex.

That term refers to an over friendly relationship between the government, the military, munitions manufacturers, and defense contractors. All in this relationship benefit financially, and unfortunately peace can get in the way. Eisenhower as a military man saw what could occur when future Presidents without military experience tried to go up against this Complex. They would be easily maneuvered by the military to react where no reaction was necessary, and to keep the US military equipped with constantly updated equipment and every new technology. Today, there is a defense contractor in every State of the Union. If there are cutbacks, you can be sure these workers will be out in force rallying senators and representatives at every level. The President will be lambasted across the nation and the Republicans will make hay. Any President to take on this issue will be lauded by history, but unlikely to win a second term.

Will Barack Obama be able to break this endless cycle to prevent the never ending cycle of blowback? If recent history is a good predictor, it certainly won’t be easy. For the sake of the rest of the world, let’s hope for the best.

You might think it should be easy enough to develop a movement against a war that has been going on for over seven years, but for almost all this time the nation has considered the Afghanistan War with little more than averted vision. After the September 11, 2001 attacks, retaliatory US military action was widely viewed as inevitable. The only question was what the target would be. If a country is bombed by military aircraft, you look for their country of origin; if it is attacked by highjacked airliners, things are not so simple. But when Afghanistan was chosen, the prospect of the demise of its Taliban government alleviated at least some of the misgivings of those who considered invading an entire country an inappropriate response to the actions of nineteen hijackers. Already notorious in the west for blowing up its giant ancient Buddha statues, its treatment of women was so primitive that George Bush could be viewed as a feminist crusader for launching an attack against it.

Where have all the Afghanistan War protesters gone?

However, before there was much time to actually consider what was going on in Afghanistan, came the buildup to Iraq invasion the following year. Ever since then, Afghanistan has largely been lost in the glare. This has been an extraordinary lapse of attention, even for a country that seems to have come to accept military conflict as the norm. However, even Afghanistan War’s early opponents resigned themselves to devoting their complete energies to opposing the larger and more outrageous Iraq War with the hope for a day when they could return to actively organizing against what had now become America’s second war.

That day has probably arrived, not with the hoped for clarity of an actual end of the Iraq War, but with the vaguer prospect of an end coming in the next couple of years. But of course, the people who plan these wars don’t exactly keep the convenience of potential antiwar movements in mind, and a murky set of circumstances is what we’ve now got.

Whether antiwar interests like it or not, between the perception of Obama as an antiwar candidate (whether deserved or not) and the Iraqi troop withdrawal agreement negotiated by the outgoing administration, the public is likely to give President Obama a pass on Iraq for at least the next year. Therefore, even though Afghanistan may still not feel like the correct priority for American antiwar interests, circumstances seem to dictate that it may become just that. For one thing, the leeway the new President will enjoy regarding Iraq will not extend to the Afghanistan War, which he has embraced as a “good war,” unlike that “dumb” one in Iraq. In fact, with the talk of the surge, there even seems to be a reasonable chance that Afghanistan will one day be remembered more as Obama’s war than as Bush’s.

There are some Obama supporters whom I have talked with recently who do not think that he really meant much, if anything, of what he said about Afghanistan during the campaign.  Rather, it was the sort of thing that he felt that he had to say in order to get elected. This theory assumes that you can’t seriously aspire to the White House without supporting at least one military action. However it seems least equally plausible that his stance reflects a genuine belief that the Democrats will be able to get the Afghanistan War “right” by being smarter about it, much as “the best and the brightest” of the Kennedy Administration once figured that they could fix Eisenhower’s Vietnam problem for us.

Building broad support for getting out of Afghanistan will likely not be easy in the short run. The upcoming escalation will probably produce some military successes that will foster illusions about finally “turning a corner” there. There will likely be lots of tough talk about eliminating the Afghan opium trade, closing the border with Pakistan, and perhaps even extending the war to that country (something that candidate Obama indirectly advocated during the primary season). The new Administration will inevitably benefit from the perception of bringing new vision to the conflict, even if it has done no such thing. However, if and when this war moves from the periphery and the nation begins to focus more attentively, opposition will inevitably deepen.

Hamid Karzai at the 2008 World Economic Forum

In order for such opposition to mount, the first uncomfortable fact that America needs to confront is that the Karzai government that the US and NATO forces are committed to defending would not exist without the foreign invasion. Its legitimacy is based on the force of arms–foreign arms. Unpleasant as the prospect of another Taliban government may be, can we assume that it is a less legitimate option from an Afghani point of view? In addition, the other portion of Washington’s rationale, that we have engaged in seven years of war in the unsuccessful pursuit of one man, Osama bin Laden, becomes somewhat pale in the light of the fact that the US rejected out of hand the Taliban’s offer to turn him over to another Muslim country for trial if he were found.

Even more urgently, Americans will need to wake up to the fact that a “war on terror” is a slogan – like a “war on crime,” not a military operation like the invasion of Normandy. The American public is capable enough of sympathizing with the suffering peoples of the world, the population of Darfur for instance. However, unfortunately that empathetic capability often vanishes when the cause of the suffering is the US itself. Can we Americans really imagine ourselves accepting a situation like that of Afghanistan today where a foreign power (namely us) will bomb the occasional wedding, say, “Oops, our bad,” and continue right along because mistakes happen in even in the best intentioned of wars? The day our country actually comes to grips with what it means to be on the receiving end of our misconceived “war on terror” will be the day its support crumbles.

Hopefully the friends of Obama who think his heart really isn’t in the escalation of the fight in Afghanistan will realize that they can do him no greater favor than helping to deliver a groundswell of opposition to being there. After all, friends don’t let friends fight dumb wars. And if they’re right, if he’s really serious about wanting to “forge a hard-earned peace in Afghanistan” as he said in his inaugural address, even he will ultimately thank us.

It may take a while to catch on, we should start practicing the words now: “Afghanistan–out now!”

“Change” has been the mantra of the Obama machine’s public face from day one. It catapulted him from an obscure, yet “articulate and bright and clean” (thanks, Joe) junior U.S. Senator from Illinois to the next President of the United States. As such, the Obama campaign promised a transparent administration that would redress the excesses of power wielded by the unitary executive under Bush’s wicked little coven. We would see an end to the war in Iraq and a realignment of our foreign policy that would lead to open communications with those nations deemed unworthy by the Bush cadre. Good God, don’t let any of THOSE guys stick around for his new “change” administration.

The thing is, Secretary Gates isn’t really one of those guys.

General Petraeus and Secretary Gates

In fact, Robert Gates has served seven presidents, both Republican and Democrat, during his years with the intelligence community. He is notable for being the only director of the CIA to rise in ranks from an entry-level position to director (DCI). He wasn’t born with the proverbial silver spoon in his mouth and earned his directorship in 1991 the hard way. In fact, he was up for the job in 1987, but shadows of doubt about his role in the Iran-Contra affair took their toll on his nomination. There were intimations that he may have been complicit in suppressing irregularities that should have been reported to Congress during the affair. However, Gates, unlike many, was completely cleared of any wrongdoing. In fact, during those confirmation hearings, he gained a measure of introspection that the current administration lacks, as noted in his memoirs:

I would go over those points in my mind a thousand times in the months and years to come, but the criticisms still hit home. A thousand times I would go over the ‘might-have-beens’ if I had raised more hell than I did with Casey [former director of the CIA William]  about non-notification of Congress, if I had demanded that the NSC get out of covert action, if I had insisted that CIA not play by NSC rules, if I had been more aggressive with the DO in my first months as DDCI, if I had gone to the Attorney General.

Gates’ political alignment is a little vague, but he most certainly leans conservative. Some sources cite him as an Independent, while others quote him as saying “I consider myself a Republican.” However, his foreign policy ideals were shaped by those conservatives who did not necessarily hold with the current administration’s neoconservative “either you are with us or you are with the terrorists” absolutist philosophy. Rather, Gates could be better identified with the more rational “realists” of the first Bush administration. In fact, during his service as deputy national security adviser during the Bush 41 administration, Gates worked closely with then director Brent Scowcroft, some even referring to Gates as his protégé . Scowcroft has been vilified by the neocons for his vocal opposition to the war in Iraq, and his influence on Gates should not be underestimated.

Gates’ work with the Iraq Study Group before his nomination to Secretary of Defense should also be considered closely. This group consisted of a bipartisan team of heavy hitters, including former Secretary of State James Baker, former representative Lee Hamilton, and retired Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor. The group’s recommendations, published in 2006, significantly differed from the course of action taken by the Bush administration. They favored a substantial shift in responsibility for Iraq’s security from U.S. to Iraqi forces and opined that “by the first quarter of 2008…all combat brigades not necessary for force protection could be out of Iraq.” Instead, we got the surge. The surge, arguably, was effective, but Gates’ presumable role in advising the group in matters of intelligence steered them towards their conclusions that a troop reduction was the wiser course. It is a testament to Gates’ integrity that he listened to his better judgment rather than the rantings of the hawks. Gates maintained a rational voice and was the farthest thing from a sycophant to the neoconservative prevailing interests of the administration.

Gates’ reliance upon his own well-founded deductive ability over hard line party rhetoric became even more evident during his confirmation hearings for Secretary of Defense. When asked to describe his motivations for accepting the nomination to the position, Gates stated that he believed “very deeply that one of the fundamental factors in our success in the Cold War was our ability to have a broad, bipartisan agreement on the fundamental strategy on how to deal with the Soviet Union” and that “it is imperative, in this long war on terrorism that we face that could go on for a generation, that there be a bipartisan agreement.” That philosophy of bipartisanship stands in stark contrast to the Bush administration’s politically unilateral attitude.

Even more revealing is his thoughtful, realistic understanding of relations with Iran and Syria. When asked by Sen. Byrd, D-West Virginia, if “an attack on either Iran or Syria would worsen the violence in Iraq and lead to greater American casualties,” Gates paused gravely, and replied, “Yes, sir, I think that’s very likely.”

What one gathers from studying Secretary Gates is that his actions are guided by his assimilation of experience and an exceptional understanding of the geopolitical world around him. He is no slave to demagoguery, and has a history with the more levelheaded elders of his party. His agenda seems one of a true civil servant as opposed to a political ladder-climber. He has used his ascendancy to power to effect cautious, intelligent policies that are much more self-guided than adherence to any particular political dogma. President-elect Obama seems to value these characteristics as virtue enough to override divisive political considerations and has entrusted the defense of the nation to such a man of intelligence, independence, and integrity.

Ahmadinejad speaking to reporters

Being over reliant on a single resource, Iran’s economy is not completely diversified and therefore prone to severe economic shocks.  For example, recent inflation in the country is approaching 30 percent. In addition, civil unrest is not a new phenomenon there. A large young population has been restless for years, not a good sign for a repressive dictatorship that wishes to keep tight control. Of course, the real power in Iran lies with Ayatollah Khameini, not with President Ahmadinejad. Therefore, even if Ahmadinejad were to leave office next year, overall issues of strategic direction that lie with the head of state would not be disrupted. However, Ahmadinejad is the current face, albeit a very controversial face to the rest of the outside world. Therefore, foreign relations with the west, and the U.S. in particular, might change drastically with a new president in Iran.

Chances are that a new moderate leader could take power. However, one can never be sure. If the economy deteriorates and unemployment rises at a fast pace, no one knows what may happen. Yes, Iran is a hostile nation. However, social unrest in Iran could lead to an even scarier foreign policy dilemma–stateless actors with potential access to nuclear reactors.

Therefore, as the U.S. candidates debate the nuances of whether there should be discussions with Ahmadinejad without preconditions, they may just be missing the forest for the trees.